See Koester v. Montgomery, 886 S.W.2d 432, 435 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ) (applying predecessor statute). In addition to the subject matter jurisdiction over child-custody proceedings under the UCCJEA as set out in section 152.201, a Texas trial court has jurisdiction to render emergency temporary orders for the protection of a child if (1) the child is physically present in Texas and (2) has been abandoned or “it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child ... is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.” SeeTex. Fam.Code Ann. § 152.204(a) (Vernon 2008); Garza v. Harney, 726 S.W.2d 198, 201 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1987, no writ) (quoting predecessor to Family Code section 152.204(a)). In such a case, the district court is empowered to act “only on a short term, temporary, emergency basis ” when the potential for immediate harm exists.

In addition to the subject matter jurisdiction over child-custody proceedings under the UCCJEA as set out in section 152.201, a Texas trial court has jurisdiction to render emergency temporary orders for the protection of a child if (1) the child is physically present in Texas and (2) has been abandoned or "it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child . . . is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse." See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.204(a) (Vernon 2008); Garza v. Harney, 726 S.W.2d 198, 201 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1987, no writ) (quoting predecessor to Family Code section 152.204(a)). In such a case, the district court is empowered to act "only on a short term, temporary, emergency basis" when the potential for immediate harm exists.

The first substantive question in a child custody dispute in which multiple states are involved is whether the Texas trial court has jurisdiction over the case under section 152.201. See Garza v. Harney, 726 S.W.2d 198, 201 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1987, no writ). Family Code section 152.201, governing “Initial Child Custody Jurisdiction” in a suit subject to the UCCJEA, provides that the trial court has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if one of four circumstances exists. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 152.201 (West Supp.2015).

A trial court enjoys broad discretion in issuing orders for immediate protection of a child. Garza v. Harney, 726 S.W.2d 198, 202 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1987, orig. proceeding). States have a parens patriae duty to children within their borders, and the possibility that allegations of immediate harm might be true is sufficient for a court to assume temporary emergency jurisdiction in the best interests of the child under the UCCJEA.

1986); Brock v. District Court of Boulder County, 620 P.2d 11, 14 (Colo. 1980); Nelson v. Nelson, 433 So.2d 1015, 1019 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1983); Silva v. Tucker, 500 A.2d 947, 949 (R.I. 1985); Gainey v. Gainey, 237 Ill. App.3d 868, 604 N.E.2d 950 (1992); Garza v. Harney, 726 S.W.2d 198 (Tex.Ct.App. 1987); State in Interest of D.S.K., 792 P.2d 118, 126-28 (Utah App. 1990); In re A.L.H., 630 A.2d 1288 (Vt. 1993). See generally Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody: Initial Jurisdiction and Continuing Jurisdiction under the UCCJA, 14 Fam.L.Q. 203, 225-26 (1981).

In the alternative, Abderholden argues that Sec. 11.53(a)(3)(B) vests the court with emergency jurisdiction to modify custody temporarily but does not confer jurisdiction to modify custody permanently. See Garza v. Harney, 726 S.W.2d 198 (Tex.App. — Amarillo 1987, orig. proceeding). We agree.

However, the court noted that Arkansas had retained continuing jurisdiction through the guardian proceeding and that the record did not support a finding that Arkansas had declined jurisdiction. Therefore, the Arizona court had jurisdiction to grant temporary orders only. See, also, In re Custody of Cox, 536 N.E.2d 520 (Ind. App. 1989) (father filed petition in Indiana seeking emergency modification of custody decree rendered by Kentucky court; the appellate court upheld a temporary order of custody but required the trial court to refrain from modifying the decree, since Kentucky had continuing jurisdiction); Garza v. Harney, 726 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. App. 1987) (Texas trial court had jurisdiction to enter a temporary order on emergency grounds for a child who was subject to custody determination in a Mexican divorce proceeding, but could not take any action that would change the orders of the Mexican court). In the case before us, the juvenile court, unaware of the Iowa divorce decree, initially assumed original jurisdiction under 43-247(3) only. It was not until March 5, 1991, that the mother informed the court of a prior out-of-state custody determination.

"A trial court enjoys broad discretion in issuing orders for immediate protection of a child." Saavedra v. Schmidt, 96 S.W.3d 533, 544 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002, no pet.) (citing Garza v. Harney, 726 S.W.2d 198, 202 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1987, orig. proceeding)). "States have a parens patriae duty to children within their borders, and the possibility that allegations of immediate harm might be true is sufficient for a court to assume temporary emergency jurisdiction in the best interests of the child under the UCCJEA." Id. at 544.

These jurisdictional provisions have been characterized as: (1) home state; (2) significant connection; (3) emergency; and (4) default bases of jurisdiction. Garza v. Harney, 726 S.W.2d 198, 201 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1987, orig. proceeding). The UCCJA defines "home state" as:

Two Texas cases have applied the UCCJA in an international context. See Koester v. Montgomery, 886 S.W.2d 432 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ); Garza v. Harney, 726 S.W.2d 198 (Tex.App. — Amarillo 1987, no writ). We follow the plain language of the statute and the unanimous opinion of Texas appellate courts in applying the UCCJA to this appeal.