Here, the fraud claims not only arose out of the identical circumstances as the cause of action alleging breach of contract, but were based upon identical allegations in the complaint ( see Morgan v Smith Corp., 265 AD2d 536; Purnavel v Tel-A-Car of N.Y., 204 AD2d 297). Recovery under the doctrine of promissory estoppel is limited to cases where the promisee suffered unconscionable injury ( see Dunn v B H Assoc., 295 AD2d 396, 397; Gary Powell, Inc. v Mendel/Borg Group, 237 AD2d 407, 408; D N Boening v Kirsch Beverages, 99 AD2d 522, 523-524, aff'd 63 NY2d 449). The plaintiff failed to allege such injury here.

The documentary record alone established that the parties never agreed to all the material terms of the proposed sale and therefore the defendants were therefore not contractually bound (see Matter of Express Indus. Term. Corp. v. New York State Dept. of Transp., 93 N.Y.2d 584; Scheck v. Francis, 26 N.Y.2d 466; Trout Acquisition Corp. v. Penn Cent. Corp., 156 A.D.2d 298) . Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to make out the elements of a cause of action to recover damages for promissory estoppel (see Gurreri v. Assocs. Ins. Co., 248 A.D.2d 356; Gary Powell, Inc. v. Mendel/Borg Group, 237 A.D.2d 407; Wiscovitch Assocs. v. Philip Morris Cos., 193 A.D.2d 542; WE Transp. v. Suffolk Transp. Serv., 192 A.D.2d 601). Upon renewal, the Supreme Court, inter alia, properly adhered to its prior determination dismissing the complaint (see CPLR 2221[e][2]).

However, the Supreme Court erred in denying those branches of the motion which were to dismiss the causes of action alleging fraud, and to recover in quantum meruit and for counsel fees. Since the plaintiffs allege that there is a specific contract provision governing the very subject matter for which they seek to recover in quantum meruit, there can be no recovery in quantum meruit (see Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v. Long Is. R. R. Co., 70 N.Y.2d 382; Tako Holdings v. Tillman, 272 A.D.2d 394; Gary Powell Inc. v. Mendel Borg Group, 237 A.D.2d 407; Aviv Constr. v. Antiquarium, Ltd., 259 A.D.2d 445). With respect to the fraud allegations, "[t]he courts of this State have consistently held * * * that a cause of action for fraud does not arise when the only alleged fraud relates to a breach of contract" (Metropolitan Transp. Auth. v. Triumph Adv. Prods., 116 A.D.2d 526, 527; see also Krantz v. Chateau Stores of Canada, 256 A.D.2d 186; Spellman v. Columbia Manicure Mfg. Co., 111 A.D.2d 320).

In its complaint, the plaintiff sought judgment against the defendant on the ground that, as managing agent for Peregrine Hall Associates, L. P., she had agreed to answer for its debt to the plaintiff. However, it became apparent in connection with the defendant's motion for summary judgment that such an alleged agreement, which was concededly not memorialized in a writing, was voidable under the Statute of Frauds ( see, General Obligations Law § 5-701 [a] [2]; Gary Powell, Inc. v. Mendel/Borg Group, 237 A.D.2d 407; see also, Martin Roofing v. Goldstein, 60 N.Y.2d 262, cert denied 466 U.S. 905). Thereafter, the president of the plaintiff, Richard Parry, submitted an affidavit wherein he asserted that "the Defendant personally agreed to pay the plaintiff for the fuel oil the Plaintiff delivered and the services which were provided to her". However, nowhere in Parry's carefully-worded affidavit, which is vague on all essential points and rife with ambiguities, does he set forth any evidentiary basis for such a conclusion.

“To apply the doctrine of promissory estoppel, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a clear and unambiguous promise; (2) reasonable and foreseeable reliance by the party to whom the promise is made; and (3) an injury sustained in reliance on the promise” (NGR v. General Elec. Co., 24 AD3d 425, 425 [2005],see Fleet Bank Pine Knoll, 290 A.D.2d 792, 797 [1992];Gurreri v. Associates Ins. Co., 248 A.D.2d 356, 357 [1998] ). Recovery under the doctrine of promissory estoppel is limited to cases where the promisee suffered unconscionable injury ( see Halliwell v. Gordon, 61 AD3d 932 [2009];Dunn v. B & H Assoc., 295 A.D.2d 396, 397 [2002];Gary Powell, Inc. v. Mendel/Borg Group, 237 A.D.2d 407, 408 [1997];D & N Boening v. Kirsch Beverages, 99 A.D.2d 522, 523–524 [1984],affd63 N.Y.2d 449 [1984] ). In other words, an oral promise will not be enforced on promissory estoppel grounds unless it would be unconscionable to deny it ( see Steele v. Delverde S.R.L., 242 A.D.2d 414, 415 [1997] ).

Furthermore, since there is an express contract that covers the issue in dispute, a claim of quantum meruit is inappropriate. Gary Powell, Inc. v Mendel/Borg Group, Inc., 237 AD2d 407 (2d Dept 1997). Therefore, the Relais Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as against the claims of First Atlantic and ATCO.

In order to recover on a claim for promissory estoppel, the Plaintiff must establish a substantial change in position resulting in an unconscionable injury. Gary Powell, Inc. v. Mendel/Borg Group, Inc., 237 AD2d 407, (2nd Dept. 1997); and D N Boening, Inc. v. Kirsch Beverages, Inc., 99 AD2d 522, (2nd Dept. 1984). Reiter has not plead or established either a substantial change in position or an unconscionable injury resulting from the actions of Scovill.