Opinion
No. 978 C.D. 2013
01-03-2014
Denisha Garvin v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Appellant
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE SIMPSON
The Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles (PennDOT) appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County (trial court) that sustained the appeal of Denisha Garvin (Garvin) from the three-month suspension imposed on her registration pursuant to Section 1786(d) of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL), 75 Pa. C.S. §1786(d). PennDOT argues the trial court erred in rescinding the suspension because Garvin failed to maintain financial responsibility on her vehicle. Upon review, we reverse.
I. Background
The financial responsibility on Garvin's 2005 Honda sedan (Vehicle) lapsed for nonpayment. Garvin's financial responsibility carrier, GEICO Indemnity Company, terminated the insurance on the Vehicle effective December 26, 2012. After receiving notice of the termination, PennDOT mailed notice dated January 5, 2013, to Garvin requesting verification of coverage. Receiving no response, PennDOT then issued notice to Garvin dated February 21, 2013, suspending her registration for three months pursuant to Section 1786(d) of the MVFRL.
The trial court held a de novo hearing where Garvin, unrepresented by counsel, testified on her own behalf. PennDOT submitted Garvin's certified registration record as evidence. The record contained a letter from Garvin's financial responsibility carrier indicating the termination of coverage in December 2012. PennDOT's evidence reflected the Vehicle lacked insurance for 12 days beyond the 31-day statutory grace period.
Garvin did not dispute the lapse in financial responsibility on the Vehicle. She confirmed she did not resume coverage until February 7, 2013, which is beyond the statutory 31-day grace period. Garvin admitted her coverage lapsed because she did not make her payment timely, explaining she was unable to do so when she lost her job. Also, as a result of losing her job, Garvin did not drive the Vehicle during the lapse in coverage.
Garvin also testified she did not receive PennDOT's notification regarding lack of insurance until the latter part of the 31-day grace period because she could not get into her mailbox. Her purse, containing the key, was stolen.
After hearing Garvin testify, the trial court stated "given the fact that you received notice, you did take steps to insure your car. I'm also going to sustain your appeal based upon your good faith efforts to comply with the [MVFRL]." Certified Record (C.R.), Item No. 8, Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 5/2/13, at 4. The trial court issued an order directing reinstatement of Garvin's registration. After receiving notice of an appeal, the trial court did not issue an opinion; instead, it stated the reasons for its decision were adequately set forth in the transcript of the proceedings. C.R., Item No. 10.
PennDOT then filed a notice of appeal to this Court.
Our review of a trial court order sustaining a statutory appeal from a suspension of registration is limited to determining whether the necessary findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence and whether the court committed a reversible error of law or abused its discretion. Greenfield v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 67 A.3d 198 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).
II. Discussion
PennDOT argues it met its burden to prove a prima facie case of a statutory violation. It also contends Garvin's eventual compliance with financial responsibility does not excuse the more than 31-day lapse in coverage.
Under the MVFRL, every motor vehicle that is operated, or currently registered, is required to be covered by insurance. 75 Pa. C.S. §1786(a). Section 1786(d)(1) of the MVFRL provides in pertinent part: "The Department of Transportation shall suspend the registration of a vehicle for a period of three months if it determines the required financial responsibility [insurance] was not secured as required by this chapter ...." 75 Pa. C.S. §1786(d)(1).
PennDOT has the initial burden of showing that a registrant's vehicle is registered or is a type of vehicle that must be registered, and that it received notice that the registrant's financial responsibility coverage was terminated. 75 Pa. C.S. §1786(d)(3). PennDOT may satisfy this burden by certifying its receipt of documents or of an electronic transmission from an insurance company stating that a registrant's financial responsibility coverage was terminated. Section 1377(b)(2) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §1377(b)(2).
When submitted, as in this case, the foregoing evidence (1) constitutes prima facie proof that the termination of an insurance policy was effective under the laws of the Commonwealth, and (2) creates a presumption that the licensee's vehicle lacked the required financial responsibility coverage. 75 Pa. C.S. §1786(d)(3)(ii). The MVFRL expressly limits the trial court's discretion to examining these two factors. Fagan v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 875 A.2d 1195 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005).
It is undisputed that PennDOT submitted sufficient evidence to make its prima facie case that termination of Garvin's coverage was effective and created a presumption that the Vehicle lacked coverage. Therefore, the burden shifted to Garvin.
Garvin did not file a brief in this matter, and upon this Court's order dated November 22, 2013, she was precluded from filing one.
The presumption that a vehicle lacked required insurance coverage may be overcome by presenting "clear and convincing evidence that the vehicle was insured at all relevant times." 75 Pa. C.S. §1786(d)(3)(ii). Clear and convincing evidence is defined as "testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue." Fagan, 875 A.2d at 1199 (quoting Matter of Larsen, 532 Pa. 326, 332, 616 A.2d 529, 532 (1992)).
Garvin failed to produce "clear and convincing evidence that the vehicle was insured at all relevant times." 75 Pa. C.S. §1786(d)(3)(ii). Although Garvin produced her insurance card, it does not establish she had coverage during the relevant timeframe, the 31-day grace period. Greenfield v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 67 A.3d 198 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).
Further, a financial responsibility insurance card is insufficient to prove coverage, as the card is routinely sent in advance of payment. Greenfield. --------
Significantly, during the hearing, Garvin conceded her insurance lapsed beyond the 31-day statutory grace period. C.R., Item No. 8, N.T., at 3. Therefore, she admittedly violated the statute. Any cause for her exceeding the grace period is beyond this Court's consideration. Despite her clear acknowledgement of violating the statute, the trial court considered the equities and her hardship to sustain her appeal.
The clear statutory scheme applicable to registration suspensions does not allow the trial court to resort to an equitable remedy. Greenfield; Banks v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 856 A.2d 294 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004); Pray v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 708 A.2d 1315 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). In the case of a lapse in financial responsibility in violation of the MVFRL, a three-month registration suspension is mandatory. Pray.
However, the MVFRL provides for a limited exception to mandatory registration suspension when a registrant proves that "the lapse of financial responsibility coverage was for a period of less than 31 days and that the owner or registrant did not operate or permit the operation of the vehicle during the period of lapse ...." Section 1786(d)(2)(i) of the MVFRL, 75 Pa.C.S. §1786(d)(2)(i) (emphasis added). The statute thus sets a conjunctive standard for exceptions from suspension, requiring the lapse to not exceed 31 days and no operation of the vehicle.
This exception to suspension is strictly applied. Pray. The 31-day grace period a registrant has to secure financial responsibility is an absolute prerequisite regardless of whether "financial responsibility has been secured either prior to the expiration or the imposition of the suspension." Pray, 708 A.2d at 1317. Accordingly, the statute does not allow for an exception from mandatory suspension when a lapse in financial responsibility exceeds 31 days.
There is no dispute that Garvin's financial responsibility lapsed for more than 31 days. C.R., Item No. 8, N.T., at 2. The trial court is not free to consider the reasons for exceeding the 31-day grace period. For this reason, the fact that Garvin did not drive the Vehicle during the lapse does not constitute a legal excuse. See Banks.
Because the exception is strictly construed, the trial court could not consider Garvin's "good faith efforts" at compliance. C.R., Item No. 8, N.T., at 4. Precedent precludes us from considering alleged hardship when the lapse lasts more than 31 days, as it did here. See Greenfield (reversing trial court for rescinding suspension for equitable reasons); Banks (reversing trial court for rescinding suspension due to hardship when lapse exceeded 2 months).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, this Court is constrained to reverse the trial court's order and reinstate Garvin's three-month registration suspension.
/s/_________
ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 3rd day of January, 2014, the May 16, 2013 Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County is hereby REVERSED.
/s/_________
ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge