Opinion
No. 4-195 / 03-0675
April 14, 2004.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Scott D. Rosenberg, Judge.
David Garst appeals the Iowa Department of Transportation's decision to revoke his driver's license. AFFIRMED.
Richard Bartolomei, Des Moines, and Patricia Wengert of Roehrick, Krull Blumberg, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Carolyn Olson, Assistant Attorney General, Ames, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Vogel and Mahan, JJ.
Background facts and procedure.
On May 4, 2002, David Garst was stopped by Perry Police Detective Vaughn and Perry Police Officer Graham for suspicion of driving while intoxicated. Because Garst refused to submit to chemical testing after being arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated (OWI), Garst's driver's license was revoked by the Iowa Department of Transportation (DOT) for one year pursuant to Iowa Coded section 321J.9 (2001).
Review of agency actions is limited to correcting errors at law. IBP, Inc. v. Harpole, 621 N.W.2d 410, 414 (Iowa 2001). The agency's decision will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f). This requires that the entirety of the record, including supporting and detracting relevant evidence, as well as credibility assessments, be sufficient to allow a reasonable and neutral person to reach the same conclusion as the agency. Id.
Iowa Code section 321J.13 limits the issues before the agency to a determination of whether the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that Garst was operating a motor vehicle in violation of section 321J.2 and he refused to submit to chemical testing. At the agency hearing, Garst argued the arresting officer lacked such reasonable grounds and also challenged whether a preliminary breath-screening test (PBT) was requested. The DOT determined the issue of whether a PBT was requested was immaterial, as Garst was lawfully arrested under section 321J.2. See Crosser v. Iowa Dep't of Public Safety, 240 N.W.2d 682, 685 (Iowa 1976).
The issues Garst raised before the district court upon judicial review were 1) whether there were reasonable grounds to believe that Garst was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, 2) whether the officers had reasonable grounds to request either a PBT or an implied-consent intoxilyzer test, and 3) whether the administrative law judge (ALJ) abused its discretion in denying Garst's request to reopen the record for additional testimony after the production of the videotaped stop and arrest. The district court affirmed the ALJ's findings and found no abuse of discretion in the ALJ's ruling to not allow further testimony after the close of the record.
Procedural issue.
On appeal, Garst expands his arguments to include a denial of due process stemming from the ALJ's decision to not reopen the record for further testimony. We do not consider arguments not raised below and therefore find that Garst's constitutional claims were not preserved for appeal. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pflibsen, 350 N.W.2d 202, 206-07 (Iowa 1984) (stating issues must be presented to and ruled upon by trial court to be preserved for appeal). Moreover, we agree with the district court that the DOT's denial of Garst's last minute request for a copy of the video tape of the stop and attendant requests to keep the record open to allow further testimony was not an abuse of discretion. See Purethane, Inc. v. Iowa State Bd. of Tax Review, 498 N.W.2d 706, 711 (Iowa 1993).
The Revocation.
The burden of proof in administrative driver's license proceedings is on the licensee to show by a preponderance of the evidence that his license should not be revoked. The agency's decision will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f) (2001). This requires that the entirety of the record, including supporting and detracting relevant evidence, as well as credibility assessments, be sufficient to allow a reasonable and neutral person to reach the same conclusion as the agency. Id. We agree that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the DOTs decision to revoke Garst's driving privileges for one year. The uncontroverted testimony of Officer Graham and Detective Vaughn, both present at the roadside stop, support the conclusion that Garst was operating while intoxicated, giving rise to his arrest and the invocation of implied consent under Iowa Code section 321J.9. As Garst refused to submit to chemical testing, his license was accordingly revoked for one year. See Iowa Code § 321.J.9(1)(a).