Opinion
No. 30237
Decided August 8, 1945.
Schools — Teacher withdrew accumulated contributions to State Teachers' Retirement System — Mandamus thereafter issued to compel board of education to execute continuing contract — Subsequent action by teacher to recover salary — Res judicata — Withdrawal of contributions as bar to recovery of salary.
A judgment, which is rendered in a mandamus proceeding after all the facts and circumstances surrounding the withdrawal by the relatrix teacher of accumulated contributions to the credit of her account in the Teachers' Savings Fund of the State Teachers' Retirement System are received in evidence and which awards a writ of mandamus commanding the respondent board of education to enter into a continuing contract with the relatrix as of September 2, 1941, is res judicata in a subsequent action, brought by the teacher against the board of education for the recovery of salary accruing after such date, upon an issue as to whether such withdrawal was made under such circumstances as to bar, by estoppel or otherwise, the right of recovery.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals of Mahoning county.
This action was brought in the Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning county by Bernice S. Garrison, plaintiff, against Patrick and others as the Board of Education of the City of Youngstown, defendants, for the recovery of salary and for a declaratory judgment. A jury was waived and the cause tried to the court.
The plaintiff taught for more than five consecutive years in the public schools of Youngstown, her teaching ending with June 1941, and was, on September 1, 1941, the holder of a teacher's life certificate. After the board of education had failed to tender her a continuing contract pursuant to the provisions of Section 7690-2, General Code (119 Ohio Laws, 452), which required such a contract to be entered into on or before September 1, 1941, with each teacher who had the prescribed qualifications and experience, she, as relatrix, brought a proceeding in mandamus against the members of such board of education, to compel them to comply with the statute.
In the trial of the mandamus case, which opened July 25, 1942, it was shown in evidence that the relatrix, not having any teaching position or employment of any kind and needing money with which to pay living expenses, made a written application, on or about November 14, 1941, to the Retirement Board of the State Teachers' Retirement System for a refund of the accumulated contributions standing to the credit of her account in the Teachers' Savings Fund of the State Teachers' Retirement System.
The application contained the following statement:
"I do not expect to teach again in the public schools of the state of Ohio, and am not under contract with any board of education in Ohio. * * *
"Reason for leaving the teaching profession (cause must indicate that withdrawal from service is permanent). Was not rehired."
In the application was the following statement signed by the superintendent of the public schools of Youngstown:
"This is to certify that this teacher who is applying for funds deposited in the retirement system is no longer employed in our schools, either as a regular or substitute teacher. This teacher is not on leave of absence, is not an applicant for a position with us and to the best of my knowledge does not intend to teach anywhere else in the public schools of Ohio."
It was further shown in evidence in that case that in November 1941, the relatrix received $1,971.43, the amount to her credit in the Teachers Savings Fund; that she was ready, able and willing to teach in the public schools of Youngstown at all times in 1941, 1942 and 1943; and that she would have taught there, had she been rehired.
Judgment was rendered in favor of the relatrix and a writ of mandamus issued commanding the respondents, the members of the board of education, to enter into a continuing contract with relatrix as of September 2, 1941. The judgment remains in full force.
The board of education having failed to obey the writ, the instant action was instituted. In the course of the trial of such action, a transcript of all the evidence adduced in the mandamus case (including the application referred to) was introduced in evidence.
In addition, all the facts recited above appear from the admissions in the pleadings or from the evidence. It was further shown that after the trial of the mandamus case the plaintiff taught temporarily in a school in another city for which she received $737.17.
The trial court found and adjudged in substance as follows:
1. A declaratory judgment was "a proper remedy available to plaintiff."
2. The withdrawals made by plaintiff from the Teachers' Savings Fund were not a bar to the recovery of salary after September 1, 1941.
3. The judgment in the mandamus case was conclusive as between the parties to this case and in no wise constituted a bar to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff herein.
4. The question whether plaintiff held herself in readiness to teach up to the time of the judgment in the mandamus case was concluded by that judgment; and plaintiff did not waive any of her rights.
5. By reason of the pronouncement in James v. Allen County, 44 Ohio St. 226, 6 N.E. 246, 58 Am. Rep., 821, any money judgment recovered by plaintiff for the school years 1941-1942 and 1942-1943 will bar further recovery by her for future years.
On appeal the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in adjudging that the judgment in the mandamus case was conclusive as a matter of law or res judicata as to any issue herein, relating to the withdrawal of moneys from the Teachers' Savings Fund, but the Court of Appeals further held that no prejudicial error intervened in the trial of the cause upon any other issue, and then affirmed the judgment "except as hereinbefore modified."
This court allowed a certification of the record.
Messrs. Hammond, Hoyt Rand, for appellant.
Mr. W.P. Barnum, for appellees.
All the questions that were decided in the companion case of Roller v. Patrick et al., Bd. of Edn., ante, 572, are presented in the instant case. As to the questions common to both cases the issues and evidence are in the main identical. Any minor variations that exist do not affect the problems presented. There remain undetermined all questions arising out of the withdrawal of accumulated contributions from the Teachers' Savings Fund and the incidental question of res judicata. These questions were not in the Roller case.
With respect to such withdrawal counsel for defendants states his position in these words:
"The Board does not contend that the mere fact that the teacher withdrew all funds owing to her by the retirement system constituted any bar or defense. It is on the other hand claimed that upon a consideration of the written statements which she made to the retirement system and the written statements procured by her from the board, which were forwarded to the retirement system, amounted in law to either a resignation as a teacher or estops her from claiming that her continuing contract, awarded to her in the mandamus action, was in force and effect after such statements were procured and submitted to the retirement system."
Counsel for plaintiff could well counter, as they did in substance, by saying that the teacher could not resign until she had a contract or be estopped by conduct that did not mislead the board of education to its harm or disadvantage. Yet, if the judgment in the mandamus proceeding is res judicata, the court does not reach the question of resignation or estoppel. It is the part of judicial wisdom not to decide unessential legal questions. So let us pass on to the issue of res judicata.
The contention of counsel for defendants, respecting the application of the doctrine of res Judicata, is that the only question before the court in the mandamus case was the teacher's status as of September 2, 1941. The supporting argument advanced is that anything the teacher did after that date could not in any way affect her right to a continuing contract and, therefore, what was stated in the application for the withdrawal of accumulated contributions was immaterial and irrelevant upon the issue as to whether a writ of mandamus should be granted.
The prime reason for not acceding to the contention is that it runs counter to the case of State, ex rel. Ford, v. Board of Education, 141 Ohio St. 124, 47 N.E.2d 223, 145 A. L. R., 1075. In that case the teacher accepted a contract for the balance of the school year 1941-1942 and at the same time tendered her resignation effective at the end of that year. The board of education accepted the resignation. We quote from the opinion at page 127:
"When relatrix accepted without protest the limited contract of September 29, 1941, and likewise tendered her resignation, she covenanted with the respondent board that her services as a teacher would finally end, so far as the board was concerned, on June 20, 1942, and she should be bound by such conduct.
"Instead of demanding a continuing contract and standing on such demand, relatrix deliberately pursued another course, the effect of which was to relieve the board of education from tendering the continuing contract provided by statute."
In the mandamus case involved herein the court had before it the question whether the relatrix should be awarded a writ for a limited contract ending with the withdrawal of accumulated contributions or a writ for a continuing contract without limit as to time but subject to discontinuance as provided by statute. The court adjudged that the relatrix was entitled to a continuing contract as of September 2, 1941, and the judgment, awarding accordingly a writ of mandamus, is res judicata. Therefore plaintiff's right to recover salary would not be affected by the application for withdrawal and the refund of the money.
It follows from what has been said that the pronouncements in the Roller case, supra, control the rights of the parties in the instant case.
The Court of Common Pleas committed prejudicial error in rendering a declaratory judgment and in failing to fix the amount of salary to which plaintiff was entitled, and render judgment in her favor therefor less what she had earned by teaching elsewhere, and the Court of Appeals committed prejudicial error in modifying and affirming as modified the judgment of the trial court.
For such errors the judgments of the courts below are reversed and the cause is remanded to the Court of Common Pleas for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
WEYGANDT, C.J., ZIMMERMAN, BELL and HART, JJ., concur.
MATTHIAS, J., not participating.