Opinion
02-27-2024
Joyce A. GARRISON, Plaintiff, v. The CITY OF NEW YORK, Safeway Construction Enterprises LLC, Anchorman Construction, LLC, Barrierl Systems, Inc., Defendant.
Joyce Garrison: The Lambrou Law Firm P.C., Lambros Lambrou, Esq. The City of New York: New York City Corporation Counsel Safeway Construction Enterprises: Littman PLLC, Matthew Lipman, Esq. Anchorman Construction: Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Sullivan PC, Jose Bustillos Varela, Esq.
Joyce Garrison: The Lambrou Law Firm P.C., Lambros Lambrou, Esq.
The City of New York: New York City Corporation Counsel
Safeway Construction Enterprises: Littman PLLC, Matthew Lipman, Esq.
Anchorman Construction: Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Sullivan PC, Jose Bustillos Varela, Esq.
Dakota D. Ramseur, J.
In June 2021, plaintiff Joyce Garrison commenced this personal injury action against defendants The City of New York, Safeway Construction Enterprises, Anchorman Construction LLC (the moving defendant; hereinafter, "Anchorman"), and Barrier 1 Systems, Inc., alleging that she was injured in a fall at a property owned, managed, or operated by defendants. In motion sequence 003, Anchorman moves for spoliation sanctions and/or sanctions pursuant to CPLR 3126, arguing that plaintiff ignored its "Notice to Preserve and Demand to Conduct Pre-surgery Physical Examination" when electing to have two surgeries on her injured shoulder on January 4, 2023, and November 15, 2023. Consequently, Anchorman now seeks an order either (1) dismissing plaintiff’s action, or (2) precluding her from offering into evidence her alleged shoulder injuries at trial. Plaintiff opposes and cross-moves for sanctions pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1 against defendant for bringing this allegedly frivolous motion. For the following reasons, both motions are denied.
Both the City of New York and Construction Enterprises have executed stipulations of discontinuance with plaintiff.
On November 16, 2021, counsel for Anchorman served its verified answer together with its Demand for a Bill of Particulars. (NYSCEF doc. no. 86 at 36, demand.) On January 16, 2022, plaintiff served her Verified Bill of Particulars, in which she alleges she suffered extensive injuries to her left shoulder, cervical spine, left hip and leg, and right knee. (NYSCEF doc. no. 87 at 6, bill of particulars.) Less than a week later, Anchorman served plaintiff with the Notice to Preserve and Demand to Conduct Pre-Surgery Physical Examination." (NYSCEF doc. no. 88 at 2, notice to preserve.) Therein, it demanded that plaintiff "preserve her alleged injured body parts in their pre-surgery condition(s), until such time that Plaintiff has presented for a physical examination (i.e., an "IME") conducted by a physician designated by Defendant’s counsel, absent any emergency need for surgery, in accordance with applicable case law." (Id. at 1.) As applicable case law, the Notice to Preserve cites (Martinez v. Nelson, 64 Misc.3d 225, 101 N.Y.S.3d 580 [Sup. Ct. Bronx County 2019]), (Mangione v. Jacobs, 37 Misc.3d 711, 950 N.Y.S.2d 457 [Sup. Ct. Queens County 2012]), and (Kang v. Perri, 2021 US Dist. LEXIS 162769 [E.D.N.Y. 2021]). On June 1, 2022, plaintiff responded to the Notice to Preserve and objected to the demand as it "is in direct contravention of controlling appellate authority. See Gilliam v. Uni Holdings, 201 A.D.3d 83, 85-86, 159 N.Y.S.3d 401 (1st Dept. 2021)." (NYSCEF doc. no. 88 at 8, response to notice.) Thereafter, plaintiff served two supplemental Bills of Particulars (see NYSCEF doc no.’s 91 and 92) wherein she revealed that she had undergone two left shoulder surgeries on January 4 and November 15, 2023, without first having submitted to an IME.
[1] On this motion, Anchorman argues spoliation sanctions are appropriate since (1) plaintiff was under an obligation to preserve evidence of her shoulder injury, in the form of undergoing an IME, (2) by electing surgery without an IME, evidence of her shoulder injury was destroyed with a culpable state of mind, and (3) the evidence of her shoulder injury was material and relevant to Anchorman’s defense. In opposition, plaintiff contends that the holding in (Gilliam v. Uni Holdings, 201 A.D.3d 83, 85-86, 159 N.Y.S.3d 401 [1st Dept. 2021]) is clear: "the condition of one’s body is not the type of evidence that is subject to a spoliation analysis," meaning she was under no obligation to undergo an IME before electing surgery. While Anchorman acknowledges Gilliam's central holding, it argues that the case should not be considered dispositive. In its view, in Gilliam, the First Department confronted a narrow evidentiary problem: whether spoliation sanctions are appropriate where the plaintiff undergoes a medical procedure within a short window of time after being served a preservation letter, thus forcing them to choose between undergoing surgery (and being sanctioned for failing to submit to an IME) and holding off on a medically necessary procedure. (See NYSCEF doc. no. 84 at ¶ 35-44, Anchorman memo of law.) Given that Anchorman served its Notice to Preserve approximately one year before plaintiff’s first planned surgery and over two years prior to her second, Anchorman argues that the rationale underpinning Gilliam is not present here and thus, the Court retains the authority to impose spoliation sanctions.
Even assuming that Anchorman is correct that (1) the relatively long period of time between when plaintiff received defendant’s Notice to Preserve and her elective surgery does not pose the same short-term evidentiary issues that (2) the Gilliam court confronted, there is nothing in Gilliam, to support the position that the timing of the procedure affects whether a plaintiff may be exposed to a spoliation sanction. The First Department’s opening paragraph explained that the present appeal "hinges on whether the condition of one’s body is the kind of evidence that is subject to a spoliation analysis" (Id. at 86, 159 N.Y.S.3d 401 [emphasis added])—not, as Anchorman’s position requires, under what circumstances the condition of one’s body may be subject to such an analysis. The First Department then expressly held, without qualification, that "the condition of one’s body is not the type of evidence that is subject to a spoliation analysis" and instructed future courts to ignore those lower decisions—like Mangione v. Jacobs and Martinez v. Nelson—that had come to a contradictory holding. (Id. at 85-86, 159 N.Y.S.3d 401.) In its view, "[t]o hold [the opposite] would improperly subject a plaintiff’s health condition to an unsuitable legal analysis." (Id.)
[2, 3] The First Department’s rationale is similarly unambiguous: it explained that "the state of one’s body is fundamentally different from inanimate evidence, and medical treatment, including surgery, is entirely distinct for the destruction of documents or tangible evidence which spoliation sanctions attempt to ameliorate. To find that a person has an ‘obligation’ to preserve his or her body in an injured state so that a defendant may conduct an ME is antithetical to our belief in personal liberty and control over our own bodies." (Id. at 86-87, 159 N.Y.S.3d 401.) Contrary to Anchorman’s position, the above quota- tions—and the absence of any limiting language surrounding them—demonstrate that the First Department adopted a general rule, whose applicability does not depend on the relative timing of a Notice to Preserve and the medical procedure. Had the First Department intended to adopt a narrower rule—for example, one that applies only to cases, in Anchorman’s word’s, "farther along in the discovery timeline," where the plaintiff’s deposition had already taken place or where IME designation notices had already been served—it could have indicated as such. That it did not, in any way, qualify its rule is instructive and points, again, to the adoption of a general rule. It should be noted that the Second Department adopted the same rule in Fadeau v. Corona Indus. Corp., 217 AT).3d 1 7, 192 N.Y.S.3d 160 [2d Dept. 2023].) Lastly, as in Gilliam, Anchorman has not been "prejudiced" by plaintiff’s medical treatment since it may rely on plaintiff’s pre-surgical and post-surgical medical records. (Id. at 87, 159 N.Y.S.3d 401.) Accordingly, since plaintiff’s body and physical injury is not the type of evidence which can be the subject of a spoliation analysis, defendant’s motion for sanction thereunder is denied.
[4] Even if it is not entitled to spoliation sanctions, Anchorman asserts that it is entitled to discovery sanctions under CPLR 3126. Anchorman asserts that under CPLR 3121 (a) it was entitled to conduct an IME prior to plaintiff’s surgery since its Notice to Preserve states, in pertinent part, that Anchorman "demands that Plaintiff … preserve her alleged injured body parts in their pre-surgery condition(s), until such time that Plaintiff has presented for a physical examination … In particular, the demand to preserve and demand to conduct a pre-surgery IME apply to any left shoulder, cervical spine, left hip/leg, and right knee, surgery or procedure." (NYSCEF doc. no. 88 [emphasis original].) That plaintiff failed to inform it of her surgeries and, thus, did not sit for an IME, in Anchorman’s view, defeated the language of CPLR 3121 providing parties the right to conduct an IME "at any point ‘after the commencement of an action’." (See NYSCEF doc. no. 84 at ¶57-60.) However, while Anchorman of course had a right to demand plaintiff submit to an IME at a time of its choosing, it did nothing to effectuate that right. The record reveals that it never scheduled an IME with a designated physician and plaintiff did not ignore any order to appear at one. That this might have been a choice made in good faith in order to save plaintiff from burdensome and pointless IMEs (see id. at ¶ 57) is immaterial: plaintiff objected to the Notice to Preserve, on exactly the grounds asserted herein, at least six months prior to electing surgery and was under no obligation to inform Anchorman of the treatments she sought. Still, at any point prior to (or even after) the first surgery, Anchorman could have served an IME designation notice to ensure that it preserved any evidence relevant to its defense. To this point, since plaintiff has still not been deposed, the purpose of CPLR 3121 has not been frustrated as Anchorman can still require plaintiff to submit to an IME. Accordingly, the Court finds discovery sanctions, much less dismissing the entire complaint or precluding evidence, inappropriate.
[5] Plaintiff’s cross motion for sanctions pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1 is also denied. While the Court found in her favor under Gilliam, Anchorman did not misrepresent the law and the facts but rather put forth a well-reasoned, good faith argument for why Gilliam is distinguishable from the instant dispute and why a different result should hold. Accordingly, Anchorman’s motion cannot be deemed frivolous under that statute. Accordingly, for the following reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that defendant Anchorman Construction LLC’s motion for spoliation and discovery sanction under CPLR 3126 is denied; and it is further
ORDERED that plaintiff Joyce Garrison’s cross motion for sanctions under 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1 is denied; and it is further
ORDERED that counsel for the parties shall appear at 60 Centre Street, Courtroom 341, New York, New York at 9:30 a.m. on March 19, 2024, for a status conference with the Court; and it is further
ORDERED that counsel for plaintiffs shall serve a copy of this order, along with notice of entry, on all parties within ten (10) days of entry.
This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.