Opinion
Civil No. 00-1433 ADM/FLN
July 30, 2001
Randall J. Fuller, Esq., Babcock, Neilson, Mannella, LaFleur Klint, Anoka, MN, on behalf of Plaintiff.
Roylene Ann Champeaux, Esq., Assistant United States Attorney, Minneapolis, MN on behalf of Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 12, 2000, Plaintiff Barbara Garrison ("Plaintiff") filed an action seeking review of a final decision by an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") [Doc. No. 1]. This matter now is before the undersigned United States District Judge pursuant to Plaintiff's Objections [Doc. No. 18] to the June 5, 2001, Report and Recommendation ("RR") of Chief Magistrate Judge Franklin L. Noel [Doc. No. 17]. In the RR, Judge Noel recommends that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 10] be denied and Defendant's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 15] be granted. For the reasons set forth below, the RR is adopted.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff applied for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") under the Social Security Act, claiming that a car accident aggravating a shoulder injury rendered her disabled since August 17, 1990. The state agency denied her application. Plaintiff appealed, appearing before the ALJ, who rendered a decision favorable for Plaintiff, finding she was entitled to a period of disability and DIB commencing August 17, 1990.
A routine disability review by the state agency on August 28, 1997, revealed Plaintiff's impairments were no longer considered disabling. Plaintiff appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration. After a hearing, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's disability ended in August 1997 and her entitlement to disability and DIB ended effective October 31, 1997. After the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, the ALJ's decision stands as the final decision of the Commission of Social Security. Further factual background for this matter is adequately set forth in the RR and is incorporated by reference for the purposes of Plaintiff's present objections.
III. DISCUSSION
A district court must make an independent, de novo evaluation of those portions of an RR to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); D. Minn. LR 72.1(c)(2).
When reviewing a denial of benefits, the ALJ's final decision must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Warburton v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1047, 1050 (8th Cir. 1999); Whitehouse v. Sullivan, 949 F.2d 1005, 1006 (8th Cir. 1991). Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the ALJ's conclusion. Whitehouse, 949 F.2d at 1006 (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). In assessing the substantiality of the evidence, a court must consider evidence that detracts from the ALJ's decision as well as evidence that supports it. Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993); Locher v. Sullivan, 968 F.2d 725, 727 (8th Cir. 1992); Baker v. Heckler, 730 F.2d 1147, 1150 (8th Cir. 1984). This standard "allows for the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions, thus it embodies a zone of choice within which the [ALJ] may decide to grant or deny benefits without being subject to reversal on appeal." Turley v. Sullivan, 939 F.2d 524, 528 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing Bland v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 533, 535 (8th Cir. 1988)). A court may not reverse the ALJ's decision "merely because substantial evidence would have supported an opposite decision." Baker, 730 F.2d at 1150.
The ALJ's findings are consistent with the determination that Plaintiff's disability ceased and the denial of DIB. The ALJ found that Plaintiff's earnings were not presumptive of the level of substantial gainful activity. The ALJ next determined that Plaintiff did not have any impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled any listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of the Regulations No. 4, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d) and 416.920(d). Tr. 27. The ALJ also found that Plaintiff experienced medical improvement which was related to her ability to work. The ALJ concluded Plaintiff could perform a significant number of jobs in the State of Minnesota. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision.
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in finding her medical condition improved since the disability decision in 1993. Supporting the ALJ's decision, state agency physician Dr. Hadden stated, "there has been both medical . . . and functional improvement." Tr. 430-31. Furthermore, medical improvement is determined by a "comparison of prior and current medical evidence which must show that there have been changes (improvement) in the symptoms, signs or laboratory findings associated with that impairment(s)." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(c)(1). After comparing the prior and current medical evidence, the ALJ identified documented improvement in both observable medical signs and Plaintiff's report of symptoms. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision.
Plaintiff next objects to the RR alleging it "omits any mention of several factual errors made by the ALJ in his decision." Objections at 3. However, the omission of any alleged factual errors by the ALJ does not provide a basis for rejecting the RR where the claimed errors were inconsequential in light of the overall evidence supporting the decision. See Benskin v. Bowen, 830 F.2d 878, 883 (8th Cir. 1987). Inconsequential factual errors by the ALJ are insufficient to reject the RR. Plaintiff further challenges the RR's conclusion that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's RFC finding. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Steiner changed his testimony regarding the weight she could lift from fifteen pounds to five to ten. However, a careful review of the record reveals Dr. Steiner maintained that the Plaintiff should be able to lift fifteen pounds. The record contains substantial additional evidence of medical improvement supporting the ALJ's RFC finding. Because the record does not support Plaintiff's argument, her objection to the ALJ's RFC finding is without merit. Plaintiff also alleges that the RR mistakenly characterized her complaints of disabling symptoms as not fully credible. Plaintiff suggests that the ALJ relied disproportionately on a description of her daily activities, failing to state more specific reasons for the criticism. Contrary to Plaintiff's contention, the ALJ cited numerous factors detracting from her allegations. These include the lack of a supporting, reliable medical opinion, normal clinical findings, her failure to seek regular medical care, use of only over-the-counter medications, and a demanding daily schedule. Furthermore, the failure to articulate specific reasons in the RR does not implicate reversal where the ultimate finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing Reynolds v. Chater, 82 F.3d at 316, 319 (8th Cir. 1995)). The ALJ's finding is warranted. Finally, Plaintiff fails to elaborate on two objections, referencing only her initial Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting memorandum. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ incorrectly applied the burden of proof. While the ALJ's decision did not specifically state who bears the burden of persuasion, a review of the record indicates it was placed on the Commissioner. Contrary to Plaintiff's next objection, the ALJ properly considered Dr. Kearney's opinions, determining they supported the ALJ's RFC findings. A review of the record reveals there is adequate evidence to support the ALJ's conclusion.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon the RR of Judge Noel, all of the files, records and proceedings herein, and for the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
(1) The RR [Doc. No. 17] is ADOPTED;
(2) Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 10] is DENIED;
(3) Defendant's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 15] is GRANTED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.