Garrett v. Standard Fire Ins. Co.

4 Citing cases

  1. State Farm Fire Cas. Ins. v. Vandiver

    970 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. App. 1998)   Cited 14 times

    Generally, the insurer must rely on circumstantial evidence to prove the defense. See Polasek, 847 S.W.2d at 282; Garrett v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 541 S.W.2d 635, 638 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The crime of arson, being in defiance of law, is ordinarily conceived in secrecy and executed in such a manner as to avoid detection and exposure; and proof of such an unlawful enterprise must, in the very nature of things, be made by circumstances, and every circumstance which tends to cast light upon the incident is legitimate and proper.

  2. In re United Fire Lloyds

    578 S.W.3d 572 (Tex. App. 2019)   Cited 17 times
    Concluding trial court abused discretion by determining requested discovery was not reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence, where challenged discovery requests showed "reasonable expectation" of obtaining information that would "aid" resolution of dispute involving fraud allegations

    Evidence of prior acts is relevant to Dailey's motive to set the fire or cause the fire to be set. See TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)(2) (permissible purposes for evidence of crimes, wrongs, or other acts include motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident); see alsoGarrett v. Standard Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. , 541 S.W.2d 635, 638 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (in an arson case, "every circumstance which tends to cast light upon the incident is legitimate and proper"). This is particularly true given that circumstantial evidence will likely be necessary for the factfinder to determine whether Dailey planned the fire for purposes of committing insurance fraud.

  3. Evry v. United Services Automobile Ass'n Casualty Insurance Co.

    979 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. App. 1998)   Cited 1 times
    Finding evidence of $44,634 credit card balance, back taxes owed, and $600,000 fraud judgment sufficient to support jury's finding of arson

    It has long been the law in this State that arson may be established by circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., Garrett v. Standard Fire Insurance Company of Hartford, Connecticut, 541 S.W.2d 635, 638 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.), where the court said: The crime of arson, being in defiance of law, is ordinarily conceived in secrecy and executed in such a manner as to avoid detection and exposure; and proof of such an unlawful enterprise must, in the very nature of things, be made by circumstances, and every circumstance which tends to cast light upon the incident is legitimate and proper.

  4. St. Paul Guardian Insurance Co. v. Luker

    801 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. App. 1991)   Cited 27 times
    Conducting legal sufficiency review of jury finding of bad faith, "the court considers only the evidence tending to support the finding, giving effect to all reasonable inferences therefrom, and disregarding all contrary and conflicting evidence"

    Plas-Tex, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. 1989); In re King's Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1952). St. Paul correctly contends that arson may be proved by circumstantial evidence because it is ordinarily conceived and executed in secrecy, citing Garrett v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 541 S.W.2d 635 (Tex.Civ.App. — Beaumont 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Payne v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 409 S.W.2d 591 (Tex.Civ.App. — Beaumont 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.). It also correctly states that its burden of proof at trial was not to show by an absolute certainty but rather by a preponderance of the evidence that the Lukers intentionally set the fire. Bufkin v. Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., 658 S.W.2d 317 (Tex.App. — Tyler 1983, no writ); Payne, 409 S.W.2d at 595.