Opinion
NO. 01-16-00898-CV
10-24-2017
TRENTON GARRETT, Appellant v. PROLOGISTIX, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 2 Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1076687
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Trenton Garrett accepted a one-day work assignment from a temporary staffing agency, Prologistix. Prologistix paid him for his work 23 days later. After Garrett received his wages, he sued Prologistix, asserting that his wage payment was impermissibly late in violation of Texas's Payday Law, which requires employers to pay discharged employees their full wages within six days. Prologistix sought dismissal of Garrett's suit, arguing that Garrett failed to establish subject-matter jurisdiction in the trial court for his administrative claim. Garrett filed pleadings in response, but none of his pleadings addressed the jurisdictional challenge. The trial court granted Prologistix's motion.
Because Garrett failed to meet his burden to establish jurisdiction, we affirm the dismissal.
Garrett Did Not Meet Burden to Establish Jurisdiction
Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a trial court to decide a case. Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993). The plaintiff has the burden to allege facts affirmatively demonstrating that the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004).
In deciding whether the court has subject-matter jurisdiction, we consider the plaintiff's pleadings, which we construe liberally in the plaintiff's favor, and the evidence pertinent to the jurisdictional inquiry, without regard to the case's merits. See id.; Cty. of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002).
Prologistix challenged the subject-matter jurisdiction of the trial court through its motion to dismiss. Garrett did not respond with argument or evidence in support of jurisdiction. Instead, the jurisdictional evidence demonstrates that Garrett was suing for an untimely wage payment for work performed mid-February 2016. He argued that the late payment violated Section 61.014(a) of the Labor Code because he was not paid within six days. See TEX. LAB. CODE § 61.014(a).
The same chapter of the Labor Code also requires that administrative claims for late wage payments be brought within 180 days. Id. § 61.051(c). And trial courts do not obtain jurisdiction over Section 61.014(a) claims unless and until the claimant has instituted and exhausted the administrative process. See id. § 61.062(a) (authorizing suit after exhausting administrative remedies); Holmans v. Transource Polymers, Inc., 914 S.W.2d 189, 191-92 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, writ denied) (explaining that statutory provision requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies for claims based entirely on remedy created by statute and not found at common law is mandatory); see also Coleman v. Sitel Corp., No. 04-00-00681-CV, 2001 WL 220033, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 7, 2001, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (applying Holmans to Section 61.014(a) claim for late wage payment and holding that exhaustion of administrative remedies was mandatory, leaving trial court without jurisdiction).
Garrett's October 2016 filings and statements to the trial court—made more than 180 days after the date he asserts his wages became due for payment— concede that he did not pursue an administrative claim and, therefore, negated the jurisdiction of the trial court. Dismissal was required.
At the October 2016 hearing on Prologistix's motion to dismiss, Prologistix asserted that Garrett had yet to file an administrative claim. Garrett did not refute that statement; instead, he argued that the administrative action was not required.
Prologistix's Request for Sanctions
Prologistix requests that we sanction Garrett for filing a frivolous appeal and award it damages, including its attorney's fees and costs incurred on this appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 45.
Rule 45 permits courts of appeals to award "just damages" to a prevailing party on the objective determination that an appeal is frivolous. Id. "An appeal is frivolous when the record, viewed from the perspective of the advocate, does not provide reasonable grounds for the advocate to believe that the case could be reversed." Woods v. Kenner, 501 S.W.3d 185, 198 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.). "Rule 45 does not mandate that this court award just damages in every case in which an appeal is frivolous." Glassman v. Goodfriend, 347 S.W.3d 772, 782 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied). Rather, the decision to award damages for frivolous appeals is a matter within the court's discretion. Id.; see Smith v. Brown, 51 S.W.3d 376, 381 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). We deny Prologistix's request for sanctions.
Conclusion
We affirm.
Harvey Brown
Justice Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Bland, and Brown.