Garrett v. Knight

6 Citing cases

  1. Jones v. Williams

    443 P.3d 56 (Colo. 2019)   Cited 11 times

    ¶14 In 1971, borrowing the language from McNamara , we continued down this path and expressly described the warrant requirement as "jurisdictional." See Garrett v. Knight , 173 Colo. 419, 480 P.2d 569, 571 (1971). Knight, a juvenile, was convicted in municipal court without the assistance of counsel and sentenced to ninety days in jail.

  2. Johnson v. Gunter

    852 P.2d 1263 (Colo. 1993)   Cited 6 times

    1990); Mulkey v. Sullivan, 753 P.2d 1226, 1232 (Colo. 1988); Garrett v. Knight, 173 Colo. 419, 421 480 P.2d 569, 570-71 (1971). However, we have established a limited exception to the general rule in situations were a pro se petitioner has asserted claims in a petition for habeas corpus, that, rather than being brought in a habeas petition should have been raised by way of a Crim. P. 35(c) motion.

  3. Moody v. Corsentino

    843 P.2d 1355 (Colo. 1993)   Cited 86 times
    Holding that a litigant's lawsuit against a judge is not sufficient to create a reasonable inference of bias

    Generally, a court will not consider a request for habeas corpus relief unless the petitioner has no other form of relief available. Kodama v. Johnson, 786 P.2d 417, 419 (Colo. 1990) (availability of habeas corpus relief is dependent, in part, on unavailability of other remedies); Garrett v. Knight, 173 Colo. 419, 421, 480 P.2d 569, 570-71 (1971) (habeas corpus not available to petitioner who had an adequate remedy of trial de novo pursuant to an appeal and who failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the Habeas Corpus Act); see also Mulkey, 753 P.2d at 1232 ("Before a defendant can seek a writ of habeas corpus, he must first exhaust his legal remedies."). Consequently, the fact that at the time Moody instituted his action he still had other possible legal recourse, both through the trial court's resolution of his motion to dismiss and through a subsequent appeal if the court denied that motion, should have precluded issuance of the writ as premature.

  4. Mulkey v. Sullivan

    753 P.2d 1226 (Colo. 1988)   Cited 17 times
    Stating that habeas corpus is appropriate to review whether a conviction is void

    Before a defendant can seek a writ of habeas corpus, he must first exhaust his legal remedies. Garrett v. Knight, 173 Colo. 419, 421, 480 P.2d 569, 570 (1971). Mulkey raises the same issue that was presented to this court by the petitioners in Stewart and Martinez, so he had a legal remedy other than habeas corpus.

  5. Evans v. Dist. Ct.

    194 Colo. 299 (Colo. 1977)   Cited 17 times
    Stating converse of foregoing proposition

    Prisoners must comply with the requirement, and the courts may not waive it. Garrett v. Knight, 173 Colo. 419, 480 P.2d 569 (1971). [3,4] Instead of attaching the designated documents, the prisoners filed a motion for leave to file their petition without the necessary accompanying papers.

  6. Pipkin v. Brittain

    713 P.2d 1358 (Colo. App. 1985)   Cited 6 times
    In Pipkin v. Brittain, 713 P.2d 1358 (Colo.App. 1985), the defendant brought a habeas corpus proceeding in the Fremont County District Court to review the ruling of the Denver County District Court regarding his PSC. A division of this court held that the Fremont County District Court lacked jurisdiction and that review of the findings or orders of the Denver County District Court was limited to appellate review.

    Even if we assume the order did represent a violation of defendant's rights, he had the adequate remedy of appealing to this court. See Garrett v. Knight, 173 Colo. 419, 480 P.2d 569 (1971). Hence, we hold that an order of one district court concerning presentence confinement credit may not be challenged by prosecution of a writ of habeas corpus in a district court of another judicial district.