We affirm. In opposition to the motions for summary judgment, plaintiff had the burden of demonstrating that decedent was performing work necessary and incidental to the construction, renovation or repair of a building or structure for Brookview to be liable under Labor Law § 240 Lab. (see, Nephew v. Barcomb, 260 A.D.2d 821, 823, 688 N.Y.S.2d 751, 753;Perchinsky v. State of New York, 232 A.D.2d 34, 38, lv dismissed, lv denied 91 N.Y.2d 830, lv denied sub nom. Perchinsky v. Granny "G" Prods., 93 N.Y.2d 812). It is well settled that a utility pole is a "structure" within the meaning of Labor Law § 240 Lab. (1) (Garrant v. New York Tel. Co., 179 A.D.2d 960;Lewis-Moors v. Contel of N.Y., 167 A.D.2d 732, 733, affd 78 N.Y.2d 942;Dedario v. New York Tel. Co., 162 A.D.2d 1001, 1002) and that the removal of a utility pole is analogous to the demolition of a structure and, therefore, protected by Labor Law § 240 Lab. (see,Lewis-Moors v. Contel of N.Y., supra, at 734). However, it is clear that the removal of the utility pole upon which decedent was killed was not necessary or incidental to the installation of utilities at the subdivision.

see, Lewis-Moors v. Contel of N.Y., 78 N.Y.2d 942, 943), Niagara Mohawk and Alltel are not liable under Labor Law § 240 Lab. (1) "because they are not `owners' of the television cable line being repaired or altered by plaintiff at the time of the accident ( see, Labor Law § 240 Lab. [1]), and did not otherwise act in the capacity of an owner ( see, Mangiameli v. Galante, 171 A.D.2d 162, 164)" ( Fuller v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 213 A.D.2d 986, 986-987, lv denied 86 N.Y.2d 708; see, Ray v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 256 A.D.2d 1070 [decided Dec. 31, 1998] The court properly granted that part of plaintiff's motion seeking partial summary judgment on liability pursuant to Labor Law § 240 Lab. (1) against Paragon. Paragon is an "owner" within the meaning of Labor Law § 240 Lab. (1) ( see, Wilcox v. Paragon Cable T.V., 241 A.D.2d 914) and the television cable lines plaintiff was installing constitute a "structure" under the statute ( see, Fuller v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., supra; Garrant v. New York Tel. Co., 179 A.D.2d 960, 961). Plaintiff was exposed to the "special hazards" of working at an elevated worksite that called for the use of protective devices of the type listed in section 240 (1) ( Rocovich v. Consolidated Edison Co., 78 N.Y.2d 509, 514; see, Felker v. Corning Inc., 90 N.Y.2d 219, 224), and his injuries were the proximate result of the failure of the devices he was using "to give proper protection" (Labor Law § 240 Lab. [1]; see, Ray v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., supra; Atwell v. Mountain Ltd., 184 A.D.2d 1065). Further, plaintiff is entitled to the protection of Labor Law § 240 Lab. (1) even though he did not fall to the ground ( see, Brown v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 188 A.D.2d 1014) and his injuries did not result solely from the impact of his fall ( see, Gordon v. Eastern Ry. Supply, 82 N.Y.2d 555, 562). Finally, we conclude that plaintiff established as a matter of law that the violation of Labor Law § 240 Lab. (1) was a proximate cause of his injuries and that "the intervening act of

The court erred in denying defendants' cross motion. A utility pole is a "structure" within the meaning of the statute (see, Lewis-Moors v. Contel of N.Y., 78 N.Y.2d 942, 943) and the lines attached thereto may also be considered a structure (see, Garrant v. New York Tel. Co., 179 A.D.2d 960). Also, we conclude that the work being performed by plaintiff constituted a repair or alteration of the structure within the meaning of the statute (see, Dedario v. New York Tel. Co., 162 A.D.2d 1001). Defendants are not liable under Labor Law § 240 (1), however, because they are not "owners" of the television cable line being repaired or altered by plaintiff at the time of the accident (see, Labor Law § 240), and did not otherwise act in the capacity of an owner (see, Mangiameli v. Galante, 171 A.D.2d 162, 164).