In relevant part, § 240(1) provides that, in the course of altering a structure, all contractors and owners and their agents who contract for — but do not direct or control — the work shall furnish safety equipment to their employees to protect them against the dangers incident to the alteration. We agree with the IAS court that the subject telephone pole and its wiring were a "structure" under the statute ( see Joblon v. Solow, 91 N.Y.2d 457; Lewis-Moors v. Contel of N.Y., 78 N.Y.2d 942, 943; Garrant v. New York Tel. Co., 179 A.D.2d 960, and that stripping the insulation from the subject cable wire was an "alteration" under the statute ( see Weininger v. Hagedorn Co., 91 N.Y.2d 958).

We affirm. Contrary to the defendants' contention, in opposition to their prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment the plaintiff established, as a matter of law, that the installation work he was performing was not routine maintenance, but constituted "altering" within the meaning of Labor Law § 240(1) (see Joblon v. Solow, 91 N.Y.2d 457, 465; Mannes v. Kamber Mgt., 284 A.D.2d 310; Garrant v. New York Tel. Co., 179 A.D.2d 960). We note that, contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment upon searching the record.

Every such inspection shall be conducted by an experienced, designated person ( 12 NYCRR 23-4.1 [a] [emphasis supplied]). The City is not entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action because it did not meet its burden of demonstrating that this regulation is not applicable to plaintiff's accident (see, Bockmier v. Niagara Recycling, 265 A.D.2d 897). Indeed, triable issues of fact exist concerning the applicability of this regulation, given that removal of the sidewalk with a backhoe was an excavation and a light pole can be a "structure" or "utility" within the meaning of this regulation (see, Sponholz v. Benderson Prop. Dev., 273 A.D.2d 791, 792; see also, 12 NYCRR 23-1.4[b][19] [defining the term excavation work to include "(t)he removal of earth, rock or other material in connection with construction or demolition operations"]; Lewis-Moors v. Contel of N.Y., 78 N.Y.2d 942, 943 [telephone pole a "structure" for Labor Law § 240(1) purposes]; Garrant v. New York Tel. Co., 179 A.D.2d 960, 961 [telephone line part of a "structure" under Labor Law § 240(1)]). This regulation appears to primarily be aimed at protecting against collapses associated with a loss of stability created by the excavation.

We affirm. In opposition to the motions for summary judgment, plaintiff had the burden of demonstrating that decedent was performing work necessary and incidental to the construction, renovation or repair of a building or structure for Brookview to be liable under Labor Law § 240 Lab. (see, Nephew v. Barcomb, 260 A.D.2d 821, 823, 688 N.Y.S.2d 751, 753;Perchinsky v. State of New York, 232 A.D.2d 34, 38, lv dismissed, lv denied 91 N.Y.2d 830, lv denied sub nom. Perchinsky v. Granny "G" Prods., 93 N.Y.2d 812). It is well settled that a utility pole is a "structure" within the meaning of Labor Law § 240 Lab. (1) (Garrant v. New York Tel. Co., 179 A.D.2d 960;Lewis-Moors v. Contel of N.Y., 167 A.D.2d 732, 733, affd 78 N.Y.2d 942;Dedario v. New York Tel. Co., 162 A.D.2d 1001, 1002) and that the removal of a utility pole is analogous to the demolition of a structure and, therefore, protected by Labor Law § 240 Lab. (see,Lewis-Moors v. Contel of N.Y., supra, at 734). However, it is clear that the removal of the utility pole upon which decedent was killed was not necessary or incidental to the installation of utilities at the subdivision.

see, Lewis-Moors v. Contel of N.Y., 78 N.Y.2d 942, 943), Niagara Mohawk and Alltel are not liable under Labor Law § 240 Lab. (1) "because they are not `owners' of the television cable line being repaired or altered by plaintiff at the time of the accident ( see, Labor Law § 240 Lab. [1]), and did not otherwise act in the capacity of an owner ( see, Mangiameli v. Galante, 171 A.D.2d 162, 164)" ( Fuller v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 213 A.D.2d 986, 986-987, lv denied 86 N.Y.2d 708; see, Ray v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 256 A.D.2d 1070 [decided Dec. 31, 1998] The court properly granted that part of plaintiff's motion seeking partial summary judgment on liability pursuant to Labor Law § 240 Lab. (1) against Paragon. Paragon is an "owner" within the meaning of Labor Law § 240 Lab. (1) ( see, Wilcox v. Paragon Cable T.V., 241 A.D.2d 914) and the television cable lines plaintiff was installing constitute a "structure" under the statute ( see, Fuller v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., supra; Garrant v. New York Tel. Co., 179 A.D.2d 960, 961). Plaintiff was exposed to the "special hazards" of working at an elevated worksite that called for the use of protective devices of the type listed in section 240 (1) ( Rocovich v. Consolidated Edison Co., 78 N.Y.2d 509, 514; see, Felker v. Corning Inc., 90 N.Y.2d 219, 224), and his injuries were the proximate result of the failure of the devices he was using "to give proper protection" (Labor Law § 240 Lab. [1]; see, Ray v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., supra; Atwell v. Mountain Ltd., 184 A.D.2d 1065). Further, plaintiff is entitled to the protection of Labor Law § 240 Lab. (1) even though he did not fall to the ground ( see, Brown v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 188 A.D.2d 1014) and his injuries did not result solely from the impact of his fall ( see, Gordon v. Eastern Ry. Supply, 82 N.Y.2d 555, 562). Finally, we conclude that plaintiff established as a matter of law that the violation of Labor Law § 240 Lab. (1) was a proximate cause of his injuries and that "the intervening act of

Thus, the determinative issue is whether plaintiff was engaged in "altering" the paper machine. To resolve this issue, we first look to case law where, consistent with the legislative intent, "altering" has been liberally construed to include such acts as removing storm windows ( see, Ferrari v Niasher Realty, 175 AD2d 591, 592), installing cable television on a utility pole ( see, Dedario v New York Tel. Co., 162 AD2d 1001, 1003), affixing fire alarm tubing to a structural portion of a building ( see, Tate v Clancy-Cullen Stor. Co., 171 AD2d 292, 295), placing weatherguarding on a telephone line ( see, Garrant v New York Tel. Co., 179 AD2d 960, 962) and switching cable television attachments from a utility pole ( see, Tauriello v New York Tel. Co., 199 AD2d 377, 379). On the other hand, activities such as changing a light bulb in an illuminated sign ( see, Smith v Shell Oil Co., 85 NY2d 1000, 1002), replacing a leaking tube on a car wash machine ( see, Rennoldson v Volpe Realty Corp., 216 AD2d 912, lv dismissed 86 NY2d 837), and replacing a plywood shelf ( see, Edwards v Twenty-Four Twenty-Six Main St. Assocs., 195 AD2d 592, 593) have been found to be acts of routine maintenance outside the ambit of Labor Law § 240 (1).

The court erred in denying defendants' cross motion. A utility pole is a "structure" within the meaning of the statute (see, Lewis-Moors v. Contel of N.Y., 78 N.Y.2d 942, 943) and the lines attached thereto may also be considered a structure (see, Garrant v. New York Tel. Co., 179 A.D.2d 960). Also, we conclude that the work being performed by plaintiff constituted a repair or alteration of the structure within the meaning of the statute (see, Dedario v. New York Tel. Co., 162 A.D.2d 1001). Defendants are not liable under Labor Law § 240 (1), however, because they are not "owners" of the television cable line being repaired or altered by plaintiff at the time of the accident (see, Labor Law § 240), and did not otherwise act in the capacity of an owner (see, Mangiameli v. Galante, 171 A.D.2d 162, 164).

Indeed, in Lombardi v. Stout (supra), which involved the removal of a tree from a building site, and Izrailev v. Ficarra Furniture ( 70 N.Y.2d 813), relating to repair work on an electrical sign on the building in question therein, the Court declined to so restrict the ambit of Labor Law § 240. As the Court of Appeals explained in Lewis-Moors v. Contel of N.Y. ( 78 N.Y.2d 942, 943), when it found a telephone pole having hardware, cable and support systems to constitute a structure within the meaning of Labor Law § 240 (1), "a `structure' is `any production or piece of work artificially built up or composed of parts joined together in some definite manner'" (see also, Atwell v Mountain Ltd., 184 A.D.2d 1065; Garrant v. New York Tel. Co., 179 A.D.2d 960). Consequently, plaintiff should have been granted summary judgment on his claim pursuant to Labor Law § 240.

The job involved threading the cable through an air vent and then through the ceiling a distance of 65 feet to the terminal where the tenant's equipment was to be attached. That work constitutes the alteration of a structure within the meaning of Labor Law § 240 (1) (see, Garrant v. New York Tel. Co., 179 A.D.2d 960; Dedario v. New York Tel. Co., 162 A.D.2d 1001). We reject Rochester Telephone Corporation's argument that plaintiffs did not establish as a matter of law that a violation of the statute was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.

[5] Given its ownership of the cable and "lock box" attached to the building, Cablevision could possibly also be held liable as an owner under Appellate Division, Fourth Department precedent (see, Girty v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 262 AD2d 1012, 1013 [4th Dept]; Wilcox v Paragon Cable T.V., 241 AD2d 914 [4th Dept]). Given that this court has found Cablevision to be a general contractor, it need not determine whether Cablevision is an owner under the Fourth Department rule or whether the Fourth Department rule would apply in the Second Department (see, Lynch v City of New York, supra, 209 AD2d, at 591 [2d Dept]; cf., Garrant v New York Tel. Co., 179 AD2d 960, 961 [3d Dept]). [6] Paragraph (4) (e) of Mucip's contract with Cablevision provides that: "[Mucip] shall provide for and oversee all safety orders, precautions and programs necessary for the safety of the Work.