Opinion
No. 39362.
November 22, 1954.
1. Contracts — forfeitures — condition — strictly construed.
A condition, when relied upon to work a forfeiture, is construed with great strictness.
2. Landlord and tenant — removal of growing crops — time allowed for.
Where grantee of farm land had agreed that grantor could remain on land to gather growing crop until October 15, 1950, and subsequent unconditional bill of sale of the crop from grantor to buyer stated that grantee agreed that crop could be removed on or before October 15, but contained no provision for reverter, grantor's continued occupancy of land after execution and delivery of deed was a form of tenancy, with right to remain on land until October 15, and buyer, who stood in shoes of grantor, had right, after expiration of that time, to reasonable time in which to go upon land and gather the crop. Sec. 1056, Code 1942.
3. Landlord and tenant — matured crops — reasonable time for removal.
Crops, matured and ready to be gathered, are personal property belonging to tenant, and tenant has right after eviction or expiration of lease to a reasonable time in which to go upon the land and gather the matured crops. Sec. 1056, Code 1942.
Headnotes as approved by Lee, J.
APPEAL from the chancery court of Scott County; ROY P. NOBLE, Chancellor.
Osborn G. Idom, Frank F. Mize, Forest, for appellant.
I. It is well settled that when no time is fixed for performance of the contract, it must be performed within a reasonable time, according to circumstances; but the law is equally well settled that where the contract fixes a definite time for completion or performance of the contract, it must be performed within the specified time, unless the failure to perform is caused by an act of God. In the instant case, appellant in nowise prohibited the appellee from entering and gathering the corn, and there is no allegation in the bill to the effect that appellant was in any way responsible for appellee's failure to act. Butler v. McPherson Bros., 95 Miss. 635, 49 So. 257; Clark v. Ingram-Day Lumber Co., 90 Miss. 479, 43 So. 813; Crorow Hardwood Co. v. Burks, 149 Miss. 327, 115 So. 585; Hunter v. Hughes, 135 Miss. 644, 100 So. 371; Ladnier v. Ingram-Day Lumber Co., 135 Miss. 632, 100 So. 369; Miller v. Mims, 167 Miss. 795, 150 So. 191; Moore v. True, 204 Miss. 354, 37 So.2d 494; Rowan v. Carleton, 100 Miss. 177, 56 So. 329; Smith v. Salmen Brick Lumber Co., 151 Miss. 329, 118 So. 179.
Colbert Dudley, L.F. Easterling, Jackson, for appellee.
I. Appellee, as a tenant of appellant, had the right to remove matured corn from the leased premises after the expiration of the lease.
II. Title to the crops growing in the land conveyed by Cooper to Garner did not pass to Garner. Since Garner did not own this corn at any time, there was no sale of the corn by Garner, and no condition subsequent is involved in the transaction. 8 R.C.L., Crops, Sec. 17 p. 372.
III. Under the positive agreement as charged and admitted in the pleadings, the relation of landlord and tenant existed. It was admitted that, as a part of, and contemporaneously with the execution and delivery of the deed, in consummation of the transaction, it was agreed that Cooper, the grantor, had the right to continue to occupy the land conveyed until October 15, 1950, to finish growing and gathering his crops. The payment of rent is not essential to constitute this relationship. The test is, did the land belong to one party and the possession, or right of possession, in another party, claiming under the title of the owner, by virtue of a contract or agreement under which he occupies the land? In this case, Cooper had the right to continue to occupy the land until October fifteenth. This certainly constitutes Garner the landlord, and Cooper the tenant, and we know of no authority to the contrary, nor has any been cited by defendant's counsel. Furthermore, after Garner bought the land he had the right to lease it for any consideration, or no consideration, for a certain period of time, and such agreement, for a term of less than one year, can be made by parol and is not required to be in writing, under the statute of frauds. Therefore, when Cooper sold the corn, on July 29, 1950, to Stuart, Stuart stepped into the shoes of the tenant, with all his rights and remedies, and, in fact, he himself became the tenant on that part of the land on which the corn, then matured, was standing. Certainly he had all the rights, with reference to the said corn, as that of the tenant, Cooper. Hamilton v. Federal Land Bank, 175 Miss. 462, 167 So. 642; Sherrill v. Stewart, 199 Miss. 216, 23 So.2d 915.
IV. After the termination of the lease, the tenant had a reasonable time to take away all his effects, and this is just as much true of the cotton which stood matured in the stalk as of the household furniture or other character of personalty. It is possible that crops which have matured may be considered growing crops within the meaning of some statutes and for some purposes; but this cannot be held as between the landlord and tenant on the expiration of the lease, for the purpose of diverting title from the tenant and vesting it in the landlord. After the expiration of the lease, within a reasonable time, all of the effects of the tenant must be taken therefrom, and if this is not done the landlord may remove it; but he can never obtain title because the tenant fails to remove it. If the tenant leaves personal effects on the premises after the termination of the lease, the landlord may not only remove them after a reasonable time, but if necessary in order to get the use of his property, may destroy them; but he cannot get title simply because the personal property is left on the premises after the termination of the lease. Opperman v. Littlejohn, 98 Miss. 636, 54 So. 77.
V. Even if this was a case where, as a part of the consideration for the conveyance of the land by Cooper, it was contemporaneously understood and agreed between the seller and the buyer that Cooper, the seller, was to retain possession of the land until October 15, 1950, in order to cultivate and gather his crops on the land, this became a tenancy by agreement of the parties, whereby, as a part of the consideration of the conveyance, the seller was to retain possession for the purposes mentioned, until October 15, 1950, he therefore became a tenant by agreement. Such a lease would not be void under the statute of frauds. An oral lease is good for one year, or less; and where the relationship of landlord and tenant exists, then the tenant or subtenant or assign is entitled to the same right that the tenant himself would be entitled to, that is, the right to finish and gather the crops growing upon the land, and that, after the end of the term, he still has a reasonable time in which to gather and remove the crops, the reasoning being that the tenant owns the crops. It is his, and by failing to remove it by the particular date, does not deprive him of that which is his. Opperman v. Littlejohn, supra.
VI. Appellant contends that the failure on the part of appellee to enter and gather the corn by October 15, 1950, operated as a forfeiture of the corn, that this constituted a condition subsequent, which divested title to the corn out of appellee. However, it is admitted that Garner never acquired title to the corn under the deed; that there was a parol agreement coincident with and a part of the execution and delivery of the deed, reserving title in Cooper to all crops growing on the land conveyed by the deed. Garner acquired no title to the corn. The title to the crops remained in Cooper, and therefore was not and could not have been subject to a sale by Garner with a condition subsequent, or any other kind of condition, since Garner never, as understood and agreed by the parties at the time of the sale, received any title to the corn at all.
VII. The crops matured and ready to be gathered were personal property belonging to the tenant, and the tenant had the right, after eviction, or after his lease expired, to a reasonable time in which to go upon the land and gather the matured crops. Harris v. Harris, 150 Miss. 729, 116 So. 731; Joiner v. Leflore Groc. Co., 145 Miss. 31, 110 So. 857; Opperman v. Littlejohn, supra; Parks v. Kline, 118 Miss. 119, 79 So. 81; Wood v. Pace, 164 Miss. 187, 143 So. 471; Secs. 1045-6, Code 1942.
VIII. Under our statutes and decisions, matured crops are not classed as real estate, but are treated as chattels; and those crops raised and cultivated by the efforts of men are classified as personal property, and belong to the one who produces them. Opperman v. Littlejohn, supra.
IX. Failure to remove the crop within five days after the termination of the right Cooper occupied, does not forfeit the corn, and does not, and cannot, vest title thereto in the defendant, no more than if it had been a tractor which had belonged to the tenant and which he had sold to complainant, and which had been left on the property and was not removed on the day of the expiration of the lease.
This cause was tried in the Chancery Court of Scott County on bill of the complainant, The Stuart Company, a partnership, and answer and demurrer of the defendant, David Garner. The controversy was over the title to, and the conversion of, 150 bushels of corn. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court rendered a decree for the complainant in the sum of $150.00, and the defendant appealed.
Wayne Cooper, in 1950, was the owner of certain land in Scott County, on which he planted and cultivated a crop, which included about five acres of corn. On May 2, 1950, he conveyed the land by warranty deed to Garner. At the same time, the parties agreed that Cooper could remain on the land to finish the growing crop, and that he would have until October 15, 1950 to gather the same; and, if he sold any of the agricultural products to another, the purchaser would have the same period for that purpose.
On July 29, 1950, Cooper executed a bill of sale to the Stuart Company for the five acres of corn. The instrument recited that it was agreeable with David Garner that the corn could be removed on or before October 15. Thereafter on August 2, Cooper moved off of the place. The Stuart Company did not gather the corn by October 15, but sought to do so on October 20. Garner refused to permit the removal at that time, claimed that the corn then belonged to him, gathered it, and converted it to his own use.
(Hn 1) Appellant contends that, when the Stuart Company did not remove the corn on or before October 15, it forfeited its right thereto. He cites Board of Supervisors vs. Newell, 213 Miss. 274, 56 So.2d 689. But that case recognizes the rule to be that "A condition, when relied upon to work a forfeiture, is construed with great strictness." He also contends that, under certain cases, especially Clark vs. Ingram-Day Lumber Company, 90 Miss. 479, 43 So. 813, the Stuart Company had no right after October 15, to enter upon the land to remove the corn. In the cited case, the Cowarts sold the timber with the express agreement that it should be removed within three years from the date of the deed. (Hn 2) In the case here, Cooper sold the corn unconditionally. His bill of sale recited that it was agreeable with Garner for the corn to be removed on or before October 15, but it contained no provision for a reverter either to himself or to Garner. After the execution and delivery of the deed, his continued occupancy was obviously a form of tenancy. He had the right to remain on the land until October 15. His vendee, The Stuart Company, stood in his shoes and had the same right.
In Opperman vs. Littlejohn, 98 Miss. 636, 54 So. 77, 35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 707, Littlejohn was a tenant of Opperman for the year 1909. Prior to the expiration date of the lease, Opperman advised Littlejohn that the premises had to be surrendered on December 31. Following the expiration date of the lease, four bales of cotton remained unpicked in the field. Opperman was asserting no claim against this cotton for rent or advances, but he refused Littlejohn permission to go upon the premises and gather it. However, in spite of Opperman's protest, Littlejohn went upon the land and gathered the cotton. The case held that, as between landlord and tenant, the annual crop raised on the leased premises, when matured during the term of the tenant's lease, becomes his personal property, and he has a reasonable time, after the expiration of the lease, to gather and remove his crop. The Court used this language: "After the expiration of the lease, within a reasonable time, all of the effects of the tenant must be taken therefrom, and if this is not done the landlord may remove it; but he can never obtain title because the tenant fails to remove it. If the tenant leaves personal effects on the premises after the termination of the lease, the landlord may not only remove them after a reasonable time, but, if necessary in order to get the use of his property, may destroy them; but he cannot get title simply because the personal property is left on the premises after the termination of the lease. The tenant rented this land for the purpose of maturing this crop, and on maturity it became his crop."
(Hn 3) In Wood v. Pace, 164 Miss. 187, 143 So. 471, there was a re-examination of Opperman vs. Littlejohn, supra, with the conclusion that the adopted view is that crops matured and ready to be gathered are personal property belonging to the tenant, "and that the tenant had the right, after eviction, or after his lease expired, to a reasonable time in which to go upon the land and gather the matured crops."
This principle is applied by statutory enactment as to crops in the instances mentioned in Section 1056, Code of 1942.
Reasonable compensation to Garner for gathering the crop was agreed upon by the parties. His right to compensation for the use of the land by the Stuart Company in gathering the corn was not, of course, involved, inasmuch as he did not permit the company to use it.
It follows therefore that the decree of the lower court is correct and should be, and is, affirmed.
Affirmed.
McGehee, C.J., and Hall, Holmes, and Ethridge, JJ., concur.