Opinion
No. C 02-1948 SI
October 8, 2003
JUDGMENT
Summary judgment in favor of defendant has been granted. Judgment in favor of defendant and against plaintiff James E. Garner is entered accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANT'S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff James E. Garner ("Garner") brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a decision by the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") finding that plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act (Tr. at 8-18) and therefore denying plaintiffs claim for disability insurance and benefits under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Plaintiff now moves for summary judgment or in the alternative, remand of this matter for a new hearing. Defendant has filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. Having considered the papers submitted, the Court DENIES plaintiffs motion and GRANTS defendant's motion.BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits on August 30, 1999, claiming that he has been unable to work since June 24, 1999. Tr. 76-78, 81. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that he suffered from headaches, dizziness, back and neck pain. The Social Security Administration ("SSA") denied the claim initially and on reconsideration, and plaintiff requested a hearing. Tr. at 59-70. Following a hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld the denial of benefits in a decision dated August 16, 2001. Tr. 30-56. The ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. This finding was based on the evidence in the record which included a report from plaintiffs treating physician, progress notes from the Veterans1 Administration Hospital where plaintiff was treated on numerous occasions, MRI reports and reports from a consultative examiner, Dr. Rebecca Jordan, employed by the Social Security Administration to evaluate plaintiff.
Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint in this Court on April 22, 2002 seeking judicial review of the ALJ's decision. Plaintiffs complaint alleges that the ALJ's decision was in error because the ALJ did not give proper weight to the treating physician's opinion. Further, plaintiff alleges that the ALJ failed to apply the proper analysis before making a finding that the plaintiffs alcohol abuse was material to his disability.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A district court's review of a disability determination is limited, and a final administrative decision may be altered "only if it is based on legal error or if the fact findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 1987). Substantial evidence is that relevant evidence in the entire record "which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001). Substantial evidence consists of "more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance." Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 183 (9th Cir. 1990). The court must consider the entire record, including evidence that both supports and detracts from the ALJ's decision.Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001).
Conflicts in evidence should be resolved by the ALJ whose decision must be upheld if the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation. Alien v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 726 F.2d 1470, 1473 (9th Cir. 1984). But, when the conflict is between the opinion of the treating physician and a consultative examiner (the physician who performs the examination for the Social Security Administration) it is the rule in this Circuit that "if the ALJ wishes to disregard the opinion of the treating physician, he or she must make findings setting forth specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on substantial evidence in the record." Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983).
The Social Security Act regulations establish a five-step procedure for evaluating disability and claims. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, 416.920 (2001); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-141 (1987). First, in order to be eligible, the claimant must not be doing substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b), 416.920(b) (2001). Second, the physical or mental impairment must be or have been severe for the required statutory period. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c), 416.920(c) (2001). Third, if the claimant's disability is comparable to a disability listed in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Part 404 of the regulations, the claimant will be found disabled without consideration of age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d), 416.920(d) (2001). Fourth, the claimant is evaluated for residual functional capacity and the physical and mental demands of his past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e), 416.920(e) (2001). Finally, the claimant must be unable to perform other work, taking into account residual functional capacity, age, work, and past work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (f), 416.920(f) (2001).
An individual is not disabled within the meaning of the Act if alcoholism would be a contributing material factor to the disability finding. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C); Bustamonte v. Massanari, 62 F.3d 949, 954-955 (9th Cir. 2001).
DISCUSSION
1. Plaintiff's Argument
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's rejection of the treating physician's opinion in favor of the opinion of the consultative examiner was an abuse of discretion. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to provide "specific" and "legitimate" reasons for rejecting the treating physician's opinion. Lester v. Charter, 81 F.3d at 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996). Dr. Magloire, plaintiff s treating physician, stated in his report that plaintiff has non-exertional limitations and cannot engage in sustained activities involving concentration, persistence and pace (Tr. at 160). Plaintiff submits that this opinion was well-founded as it was based on treatment and evaluations of the plaintiff over time and consequently, should be given controlling weight. In contrast, plaintiff contends that the consultative examiner's opinion did not consider the MRI reports or state the specialty of the examiner and was based on only one examination of the plaintiff.
Plaintiff further states that the ALJ committed legal error by finding that the plaintiffs alcohol abuse was material to the issue of disability without applying the "substantial evidence" analysis to that question, as required by statute. See Chavez v. Brown, 844 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1988) (Commissioner may only find that alcohol abuse is material to plaintiffs disability, and thus that the plaintiff is not entitled to disability benefits, if substantial evidence shows that, absent alcohol abuse, the plaintiffs impairments are non-disabling).
2. Defendant's argument
Defendant argues that the ALJ's rejection of the treating physician's opinion was based on specific and legitimate reasons that were supported by substantial evidence in the record. The defendant submits that Dr. Magloire's reasons were not supported by his own progress notes.
In contrast to the treating physician's opinion, defendant argues that the consultative examiner's opinion was based on substantial evidence. Under these circumstances, defendant argues that the ALJ's decision to "reject the unsupported solitary opinion of internist Dr. Magloire" was reasonable. Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 4:4.
Finally, defendant submits that having found plaintiff not disabled, the ALJ was not required to address the materiality of plaintiff s alcohol use to his disability claim. Therefore, defendant argues that the alleged inadequacy of the ALJ's analysis of the materiality of plaintiffs alcoholism is not a sufficient basis for overturning the decision.
3. The ALJ's decision
The ALJ's decision stated that Dr. Magloire's statement that Garner was "unable to perform any type of work" was not a medical opinion about the nature and severity of his impairment, but rather a legal conclusion and therefore "could never be entitled to controlling weight." Based on the finding that Dr. Magloire's opinion was not a "medical opinion," the ALJ evaluated it to determine whether it was "supported by the record as a whole or contradicted by persuasive evidence," Tr. at 15.
The ALJ's statement is correct that controlling weight should not be given to opinions on issues reserved for the Commissioner, such as whether an individual is able to work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927. While Dr. Magloire's report does contain a conclusion on an issue reserved for the Commissioner, it also contains a medical opinion. Dr. Magloire states that the plaintiff has "recurrent headaches" which limit his ability to "concentrate and perform any tasks." Tr. at 160. The ALJ's characterization of the entire opinion as a legal conclusion was in error. This error, however, had no bearing on the outcome of the decision, since the ALJ went on to evaluate it and discredit the opinion on other grounds — mainly that it was not supported by the evidence in the record. Therefore, any analytical errors did not affect the outcome of the ALJ's decision.
Dr. Magloire's report was written on a form issued by the Alameda County Social Services Agency which is used by that agency to determine whether applicants and recipients of General Assistance are employable, and whether they can consequently be required to participate in the welfare-to-work program. That form asks the physician to check one of three boxes. The first box is labeled "Class I — No Work Restriction"; the second box is labeled "Class II — (includes capacity for sedentary work) Employable with the Following Restrictions . . ."; the third box is labeled "Class III — Unable to perform any type of work (including sedentary) Because Of:". Tr. at 160. Dr. Magloire checked the third box on this form. Apparently, it was the third checked box that led the ALJ to conclude that the entire report was merely a "legal conclusion.".
There is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's finding that plaintiff is not disabled. The ALJ gave the progress reports from the Veteran's Hospital significant weight on the grounds that these reports were from a treating source, but found that these reports did not provide a basis for finding disability. Additionally, the reports from the consultative examiner which concluded that plaintiff was not disabled contained findings consistent with those from the Veterans Administration Hospital, a treating source. The ALJ's finding that neither the report submitted by Dr. Magloire nor the progress notes from the Veterans Administration Hospital supported a conclusion that plaintiff was disabled was based on substantial evidence.
The ALJ gave significant weight to the finding of the consultative examiner, Dr. Rebecca Jordan, that while plaintiff suffered from severe headaches which, when they occurred, limited his ability to function, overall plaintiff was able to work with no severe limitations. Dr. Jordan's finding of severe headaches and dizziness as plaintiffs chief complaint is consistent with the evidence in the record including the report from Dr. Magloire which found "recurrent headaches" which limit ability to "concentrate and perform any tasks." Tr. at 160.
Further, the ALJ's statements about plaintiffs alcoholism did not affect the outcome of the ALJ's decision. The ALJ's opinion stated that plaintiff was not disabled, but if plaintiff were disabled, plaintiff would still not be entitled to benefits because his alcoholism would be material to the disability finding. This speculation was clearly dictum and did not affect the ALJ's ultimate conclusion that plaintiff was not disabled. Therefore, reversal or remand for this reason is in appropriate.
The ALJ appropriately considered all medical opinions in evidence including those from the consultative examiner and treating sources. The ALJ's conclusions based on those opinions were based on substantial evidence. The record as a whole contains substantial evidence in support of the ALJ's finding that plaintiff is not disabled. Therefore the ALJ's decision is sustained.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby DENIES plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and GRANTS defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment [Docket ## 10 and 12.]
IT IS SO ORDERED.