Opinion
Civil Action 2:23-cv-00194
03-22-2024
D'AMBROSSE KANE GARLAND, Petitioner, v. WARDEN OF SCI HOUTZDALE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, Respondents.
United States Senior District Judge Joy Flowers Conti
This matter has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b).
CYNTHIA REED EDDY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is the petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed pro se by D'Ambrosse Kane Garland, a state prisoner in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. (ECF No. 1). Garland is challenging the October 2, 2019, judgment of sentence imposed on him by the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County at Criminal Case No. CP-02-CR-0015121-2018. For the reasons below, it is respectfully recommended that the petition be denied and a certificate of appealability likewise be denied.
II. REPORT
A. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the federal habeas statute applicable to prisoners in custody pursuant to a state court judgment. It permits a federal court to grant a state prisoner the writ of habeas corpus “on the ground that he or she is in custody in violation of the Constitution . . . of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Errors of state law are not cognizable in a federal habeas action. Id.; see, e.g., Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Indeed, the Court is bound by the state courts' determinations of state law. See, e.g., Priester v. Vaughn, 382 F.3d 394, 402 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Federal courts reviewing habeas claims cannot ‘reexamine state court determinations on state-law questions'.”) (quoting Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68).
It is a petitioner's burden to establish entitlement to the writ. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) ; see, e.g., Vickers v. Superintendent Graterford SCI, 858 F.3d 841, 848-49 (3d Cir. 2017). There are other prerequisites that a petitioner must satisfy before habeas relief is appropriate. For example, the burden imposed by the standard of review enacted by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) (which is discussed below). But, ultimately, a petitioner cannot receive federal habeas relief unless it is established that the petitioner is in custody in violation of federal constitutional rights. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see, e.g., Vickers, 858 F.3d at 849.
B. Relevant and Procedural Background
The factual background is taken from the memorandum of the Superior Court filed on June 27, 2022, affirming the denial of Garland's PCRA petition. (ECF No. 9-25). Respondents electronically filed as exhibits to their answer (ECF No. 9) relevant parts of the state court record. For ease of reference, the Court uses the page numbers from the CM/ECF header. The Preliminary Hearing Transcript (T19-0027) and Guilty Plea /Sentencing Transcript (T21-1470) are part of the original state court record. The undersigned mailed copies of these transcripts to Garland at his request on March 6, 2024. (ECF No. 15).
Garland's convictions stem from the October 13, 2018 shooting death during the robbery of a Dominos pizza delivery driver. On October 2, 2019, pursuant to a negotiated guilty plea, Garland pled guilty to third degree murder and one count each of robbery, criminal conspiracy, carrying a firearm without a license, and person not to possess a firearm. The trial court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Garland to twenty (20) to forty (40) years of imprisonment on the third degree murder conviction with a ten (10) year period of probation on the robbery conviction to run consecutive to his incarceration. No further penalty was imposed on the remaining charges. A motion for reconsideration of sentence was filed on February 10, 2020, and denied by operation of law pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 720(B)(3)(a). No direct appeals were filed.
On June 5, 2020, Garland, pro se, timely petitioned for relief under Pennsylvania's PostConviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), alleging that plea counsel's ineffectiveness caused him to enter into an invalid guilty plea. PCRA Petition, 6/5/2020 (ECF No. 9-12). The PCRA court (formerly the trial court) appointed Attorney Carrie S. O'Connell as PCRA counsel for Garland, who subsequently filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and a Turner/Finley no-merit letter. (ECF No. 9-14). On December 28, 2020, the PCRA court granted Attorney O'Connell's motion to withdraw and issued a notice of intention to dismiss the PCRA petition. (ECF No. 9-15). On March 4, 2021, the PCRA court dismissed the PCRA Petition. (ECF No. 9-16).
Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.3d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
Garland then pro se filed a notice of appeal. The PCRA court appointed Attorney Suzanne Swan to represent Garland on appeal. (ECF No. 9-18). On PCRA appeal, Garland, through counsel, raised the following issue:
Did the lower court abuse its discretion in denying the PCRA petition, as amended, without a hearing, and allowing PCRA counsel to withdraw, insofar as there was a genuine issue concerning material facts; specifically, that the guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because trial counsel was ineffective for failing to prepare for trial and consult with Petitioner regarding the Commonwealth's evidence against him, rather counsel informed him that he would not represent him if he did not accept the plea offer?(ECF No. 9-22, p.8). On June 27, 2022, the Superior Court affirmed the denial of the PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Garland, No. 514 WDA 2021 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 27, 2022) (ECF No. 9-25). Garland's petition for allowance of appeal was denied by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on October 12, 2022. Commonwealth v. Garland, No. 205 WAL 2022 (Pa. Oct. 12, 2022) (ECF No. 9-29).
On February 7, 2023, the Clerk's office received the instant petition and memorandum of law filed pro se by Garland. (ECF Nos. 1 and 2). Respondents filed a timely response (ECF No. 9), to which Garland filed a reply. (ECF No. 13). The matter is ripe for disposition.
C. The Standard for Habeas Relief Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
“The writ of habeas corpus stands as a safeguard against imprisonment of those held in violation of the law.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 91 (2011). Federal courts reviewing habeas corpus petitions “must be vigilant and independent . . . a commitment that entails substantial judicial resources.” Id. This case is governed by the federal habeas statute applicable to state prisoners, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by AEDPA, “which imposes significant procedural and substantive limitations on the scope” of the Court's review. Wilkerson v. Superintendent Fayette SCI, 871 F.3d 221, 227 (3d Cir. 2017).
A finding of fact made by a state court, including credibility determinations, always has been afforded considerable deference in a federal habeas proceeding. Vickers, 858 F.3d at 850 (even in pre-AEDPA cases, “ ‘federal habeas courts [had] no license to redetermine credibility of witnesses who demeanor ha[d] been observed by the state trial court, but not by them' ”) (quoting Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434 (1983)). AEDPA continued that deference and mandates that “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Garland has the “burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” Id.
AEDPA also put into place a new standard of review, which is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). It applies to any federal habeas claim “that was adjudicated on the merits” by the state courts and it prohibits a federal habeas court from granting relief unless the petitioner established that the Superior Court's “adjudication of the claim”:
Here, there is no dispute that the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed Garland's ineffective assistance claim on the merits. Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of an appeal without an explanatory opinion, Commonwealth v. Garland, No. 205 WAL 2022 (Pa. 2022) (unpublished table decision) (ECF No. 9-29), the federal habeas court considers, or “look[s] through” to, the last reasoned decision, which is the Pennsylvania Superior Court's opinion. See Henderson v. Attorney General of Pennsylvania, No. 23-1325, 2024 WL 545723, at *2, n.3 (3d Cir. Feb. 12, 2024) (unpublished opinion) (citing Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122, 130 (2018) (concluding that “federal habeas law employs a ‘look through' presumption[,]”, in which the federal court “ 'look[s] through' the silent state higher court opinion to the reasoned opinion of a lower court in order to determine the reasons for the higher court's decision)).
was (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,' or (2) based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”Becker v. Sec'y Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 28 F.4th 459, 460 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). For the purposes of § 2254(d), a claim has been “adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” when the state court made a decision that finally resolves the claim based on its substance, not on a procedural, or other, ground. See, e.g., Richter, 562 U.S. at 98-100; Robinson v. Beard, 762 F.3d 316, 324 (3d Cir. 2014).
If the Superior Court did not adjudicate a federal habeas claim on the merits, this Court must determine whether the absence of an adjudication is because petitioner did not raise the claim to the Superior Court and, as a result, it is now procedurally defaulted. If the claim is procedurally defaulted, this Court should deny it for that reason. If the claim is not defaulted, or if a petitioner established grounds to excuse the default, the standard of review at § 2254(d) does not apply and this Court reviews the claim de novo. See, e.g., Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2001).
Section 2254(d)(1) applies to questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact. In applying it, this Court's first task is to determine what law falls within the scope of the “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “The clearly established law” is “ ‘the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.' ” Dennis v. Sec'y, Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 834 F.3d 263, 280 (2016) (en banc) (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (3d Cir. 2003)).
Once the “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” is identified, this Court must determine whether the state court's adjudication of the claim at issue was “contrary to” that law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-05 (explaining that the “contrary to” and “unreasonable application of” clauses of § 2254(d)(1) have independent meaning). A state-court adjudication is contrary to clearly established Federal law “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,” id. at 405, or “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” Id. at 406.
A “run-of-the-mill” state-court adjudication applying the correct legal rule from Supreme Court decisions to the facts of a particular case will not be “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 406. For that reason, the issue in most federal habeas cases is whether the adjudication by the state court survives review under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1).
“A state court decision is an ‘unreasonable application of federal law' if the state court ‘identifies the correct governing legal principle,' but ‘unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.' ” Dennis, 834 F.3d at 281 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). To satisfy the burden under this provision of AEDPA's standard of review, a petitioner must do more than convince this Court that the state court's decision was incorrect. Id. The petitioner must show that it “‘was objectively unreasonable.'” Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409) (emphasis added by Dennis). This means that Garland must prove that the state court's decision “was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. As the Supreme Court noted:
It bears repeating that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable. See Lockyer, supra, at 75, 123 S.Ct. 1166. If this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be. As amended by AEDPA, § 2254(d) stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal-court relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings. Cf. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996) (discussing AEDPA's “modified res judicata rule” under § 2244). It preserves authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with this Court's precedents. It goes no further.Id. at 102.
The standard of review set forth at § 2254(d)(2) applies when a petitioner “challenges the factual basis for” the state court's “decision rejecting a claim[.]” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 18 (2013). “[A] state court decision is based on an ‘unreasonable determination of the facts' if the state court's factual findings are ‘objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding,' which requires review of whether there was sufficient evidence to support the state court's factual findings.” Dennis, 834 F.3d at 281 (quoting § 2254(d)(2) and citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003)). “‘[A] state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.' ” Titlow, 571 U.S. at 18 (quoting Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010)); see also Becker, 28 F.4th at 464 (stating that “close calls - decisions upon which reasonable minds might disagree - are essentially insulated from federal court reversal AEDPA, which requires federal judges to defer to the reasonable state trial court findings . . .).
Sections 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1) “express the same fundamental principle of deference to state court findings[,]” and federal habeas courts “have tended to lump the two provisions together as generally indicative of the deference AEDPA requires of state court factual determinations.” Lambert, 387 F.3d at 235. Our Court of Appeals has instructed that§ 2254(d)(2), when it applies, provides the “overarching standard” that a petitioner must overcome to receive habeas relief, while 2254(e)(1) applies to “specific factual determinations that were made by the state court, and that are subsidiary to the ultimate decision.” Id.
When a habeas petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel, “review is ‘doubly deferential,' because counsel is ‘strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment'.” Woods v. Etherton, 578 U.S. 113, 116 (2016) (quoting Titlow, 571 U.S. at 22).
Various standards must be met before the Court can review the merits of Garland's habeas petition.
D. Procedural Benchmarks - Exhaustion and Procedural Default
The undersigned agrees with Respondents that the instant federal habeas petition was timely filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
Among AEDPA's procedural prerequisites is a requirement that the petitioner “has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State” before seeking relief in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). The “exhaustion doctrine” requires that a state prisoner raise his federal constitutional claims in state court through the proper procedures before he litigates them in a federal habeas petition. See, e.g., Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997). It is “grounded in principles of comity; in a federal system, the States should have the first opportunity to address and correct alleged violations of state prisoner's federal rights.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991).
If a claim has not been fairly presented “to the state courts but state law clearly forecloses review, exhaustion is excused, but the doctrine of procedural default may come into play.” Carpenter v. Vaughn, 296 F.3d 138, 146 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). The doctrine of procedural default serves as a corollary to the exhaustion requirement and provides a basis for a federal court to refuse to review a habeas claim. Federal courts may not consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless the petitioner can demonstrate “cause” to excuse the default and “actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation.” Preston v. Superintendent Graterford SCI, 902 F.3d 365, 375 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Davila v. Davis, 582 U.S. 521, 528 (2017) (quoting Wainwright v. Skyes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977)). The burden lies with a petitioner to demonstrate circumstances that would excuse a procedural default. See Sweger v. Chesney, 294 F.3d 506, 520 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.
A petitioner, alternatively, can overcome a procedural default by demonstrating that the court's failure to review the defaulted claim will result in a “miscarriage of justice.” See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 748 (1991); McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 225, 260 (3d Cir. 1999). “However, this exception is limited to a ‘severely confined category [] [of] cases in which new evidence shows ‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted [the petitioner]'.” Preston v. Superintendent Graterford SCI, 902 F.3d 365, 375 n.11 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 395 (2013) (internal alteration in original) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 514 U.S. 298, 329 (1995)).
In this case, it is not disputed that Garland has satisfied both the exhaustion and procedural default requirements.
E. Analysis
In this habeas petition, Garland raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, contending that his:
Sixth & Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when plea counsel James Sheets, Esq., advised / coerced him to enter a guilty plea to third degree murder and related offenses where Mr. Sheets failed to consult with Mr. Garland regarding the Commonwealth's evidence against him, thus, barring him from being able to make an informed decision prior to entering a guilty plea.Memo. of Law at 9-10 (ECF No. 2). Respondents argue that Garland's claim should be denied because, under the AEDPA standard of review, the Superior Court's decision was neither contrary to clearly established Federal law nor based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.
Because Garland's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was adjudicated on the merits by the Superior Court, this Court's decision is governed by AEDPA's standard of review: whether the Superior Court's adjudication of the claim was (1) contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established law or (2) based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1) and (2). The state court's factual determinations are presumed to be correct under § 2254(e)(1) unless the petitioner rebuts that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 392 (3d Cir. 2010); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 201 (3d Cir. 2007) (“the § 2254(e)(1) presumption of correctness applies regardless of whether there has been an ‘adjudication on the merits' for purposes of § 2254(d).”) (citing Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2001)).
The clearly established ineffective assistance of counsel standard as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States is the familiar two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 674 (1984). A habeas petitioner must demonstrate that: (1) counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, the result would have been different. Id. at 687. For the deficient performance prong, “[t]he proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Id. at 688.
Whether a guilty plea is voluntary for purposes of the United States Constitution is a question of federal law, but the determination of the historical facts surrounding the plea is subject to the deferential “presumption of correctness” found in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 431 (1983); see also Zilich, 36 F.3d at 320. Habeas petitioners challenging the knowing and voluntary nature of their guilty pleas face a heavy burden. Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320 (3d Cir. 1994).
When the state court has decided the claim on the merits, “[t]he question ‘is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination' under the Strickland standard ‘was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable a substantially higher threshold.' ” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (quoting Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007)). “And, because the Strickland standard is a general standard, a state court has even more latitude to reasonably determine that a defendant has not satisfied that standard.” Id.
The Superior Court set forth the following ineffective assistance of counsel standard of review:
In order to obtain relief based on an [ineffective assistance of counsel] claim, a petitioner must establish: (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable basis existed for counsel's actions or failure to act; and (3) petitioner has suffered prejudice as a result of counsel's error such that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different absent such error. Trial counsel is presumed to be effective and [an a]ppellant bears the burden of pleading and proving each of the three factors by a preponderance of the evidence.Superior Court Memo., 6/27/2022 at 5 (quoting Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 191-3 (Pa. Super. 2013). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit previously has held that the ineffectiveness assistance of counsel test relied upon by the Superior Court is not contrary to the Supreme Court's Strickland standard. See Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 204 (3d Cir. 2000).
The Superior Court then set forth its standard when reviewing a challenge to a guilty plea:
Our law presumes that a defendant who enters a guilty plea was aware of what he was doing. He bears the burden of proving otherwise.
...
The longstanding rule in Pennsylvania is that a defendant may not challenge a guilty plea by asserting that he lied while under oath, even if he avers that counsel induced the lies. A person who elects to plead guilty is bound by the statements he makes in open court while under oath and may not later assert grounds for withdrawing the plea which contradict the statements he made at his plea colloquy.
...
A defendant who elects to plead guilty has a duty to answer questions truthfully. We cannot permit a defendant to postpone the final disposition of his case by lying to the court and later alleging that his lies were induced by the prompting of counsel.Superior Court Memo., at 6-7 (quoting Commonwealth v. Yeomans, 24 A.3d 1044, 1047 (Pa. Super. 2011). “The law does not require that the defendant be pleased with the outcome of the decision to enter a plea of guilty: All that is required is that his decision to plead guilty be knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made.” Superior Court Memo., at 7 (quoting Commonwealth v. Timchak, 69 A.3d 765, 770 (Pa. Super. 2013).
This standard also is not contrary to the clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, for determining the validity of a guilty plea: “whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970).
As the “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” has been identified, the analysis now turns to whether the state court's adjudication of the claim at issue was “contrary to” that law.
In evaluating trial counsel's effectiveness, the Superior Court focused on whether the underlying claim, the validity of the guilty plea, had arguable merit. As stated above, the test for determining the validity of a guilty plea under clearly established Federal law is: “whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970). A guilty plea may be constitutionally infirm if a defendant failed to understand the constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty or had an incomplete understanding of the charges lodged against him. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 n.13 (1976). See also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (nothing that plea must be made with “sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences”). Significantly, “the representations of the defendant, his lawyer, and the prosecutor at [a plea] hearing, as well as any findings made by the judge accepting the plea, constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings. Solemn declarations made in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977).
The Superior Court conducted an in depth analysis of the plea hearing proceeding. It found that Garland acknowledged in both oral and written colloquies undertaken during the plea hearing the following:
his overall satisfaction with representation by counsel; his comprehension of the elements of each offense for which he entered a guilty plea; his understanding of the maximum penalty for each offense to which he pled guilty; his understanding of the nature of his lea and the rights he surrendered by entering a guilty plea, including his right to trial by a jury of his peers and his right to a presumption of innocence until found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by a unanimous jury; his understanding that the entry of a guilty plea waived the right to appeal certain issues; confirmation that he received no promises or threats which caused him to plead guilty; and, that his decision to plead guilty was made voluntarily.Superior Ct. Memo., at 2. Based on these findings, the Superior Court concluded that,
[Garland's] arguments directly contradict [Garland's] statements within his oral and written guilty plea colloquies attesting to his thorough discussions with counsel, understanding the charges and terms of his plea agreement, admission to the factual and evidentiary basis for the plea, satisfaction with counsel's services, voluntary entrance of the guilty plea, and denial that he was threatened, forced, or coerced to enter his guilty plea.1 See Guilty Plea Explanation of Defendant's Rights, 10/2/19, at 2, 5, 8,and 9-10; N.T. Guilty Plea and Sentencing, 10/2/19, at 67, 11, 15, and 16. Appellant is bound by his prior statements, thus his contrary arguments must fall. (citation omitted).
1Moreover, we note that on April 15, 2019, the trial court prohibited plea counsel from giving [Garland] copies of certain evidence due to [Garland's] dissemination of that evidence over social media in his efforts to intimidate the witnesses against him. See Trial Court Order, 4/15/19. [Garland] cannot now claim that plea counsel was ineffective for the consequence of his own bad faith acts, i.e., that he never received copies of evidence prohibited from his view by the trial court.
Because [Garland] is bound by his statements within his written and oral colloquies, and because [Garland's] sole arguments before this Court improperly seek only to contradict those statements made under oath, we conclude that [Garland] failed to raise any issue of material fact that would warrant an evidentiary hearing. (citation omitted). Accordingly, the PCRA court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing [Garland's PCRA petition without an evidentiary hearing.
Superior Court Memo., at pp. 7 - 8.
After an independent review of the written guilty plea explanation of defendant's rights (ECF No. 9-9), the guilty plea/ sentencing hearing transcript (T21-1470) and the PCRA court's findings of facts (ECF No. 9-21), the undersigned concludes that the Superior Court accurately depicted what transpired during the guilty plea / sentencing hearing.
The record reflects that on the date of the guilty plea and sentencing, Garland was subjected to a lengthy and extensive guilty plea colloquy. He was specifically questioned with respect to his understanding of the nature of the charges and penalties, whether he was content with his representation by trial counsel, and his full understanding of the nature and consequences of hisplea. Thereafter, the sentencing court determined that Garland had made a knowingly and voluntarily decision to enter the guilty plea.
Under AEDPA “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Garland has the “burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. The undersigned finds that Garland has not met this burden.
Further, the Turner/Finley no merit letter submitted by Attorney Swan indicated that upon her investigation and conversations with trial /plea counsel that his testimony would indicate that he met several times with Garland and explained the case in detail with Garland, which was corroborated by Garland's plea colloquy.
For these reasons, the undersigned concludes that the state court's determination that Garland failed to demonstrate that counsel's actions or inactions resulted in Garland entering a guilty plea unknowingly or involuntary was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. Nor did the Superior Court's decision result in an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the written answers to the guilty plea explanation of defendant's rights or Garland's responses during the guilty plea hearing.
F. Certificate of Appealability
AEDPA codified standards governing the issuance of a certificate of appealability for appellate review of a district court's disposition of a habeas petition. It provides that “[u]nless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from . . . the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). It also provides that “[a] certificate of appealability may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2).
“When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, a [certificate of appealability] should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. When the district court has rejected a constitutional claim on its merits, “[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Id. Applying those standards here, jurists of reason would not find it debatable that Garland's ineffective assistance of counsel claim should be denied. Thus, it is recommended that a certificate of appealability be denied.
III. Conclusion
For all the above reasons, it is recommended that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be denied and that a certificate of appealability be denied.
Any party is permitted to file written specific Objections to this Report and Recommendation to the assigned United States District Judge. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d) and 72(b)(2), and LCvR 72.D.2, Petitioner, because he is a non-electronically registered party, must file written objections, if any, to this Report and Recommendation by April 8, 2024. Respondents, because they are electronically registered parties, must file objections, if any, by April 5, 2024. The parties are cautioned that failure to file objections “will waive the right to appeal.” Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Siers v. Morrash, 700 F.2d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 1983). See also EEOC v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 100 (3d Cir. 2017) (describing standard of appellate review when no timely and specific objections are filed as limited to review for plain error).
cc: D'AMBROSSE KANE GARLAND
NY8889
SCI HOUTZDALEP.O. Box 1000 209 Institution Drive
Houtzdale, PA 16698-1000
(via U.S. First Class Mail)
Ashley N. Oravetz
Allegheny County District Attorney's Office
(via ECF electronic notification)