Section 5060, C. O. S. 1921. Under that rule the contract in question must be construed to provide for occupancy of the premises by the defendants for a reasonable time. Garland v. Hunter, 77 Okla. 201, 187 P. 466. The trial court correctly construed the provision of the contract to mean a lease for "a reasonable length of time" and by its instructions left to the jury the determination of "what constitutes a reasonable length of time" to be determined "from all of the facts and circumstances and evidence in this case, and from your own knowledge and experience."

The result of these acts of waiver in the further performance of the contract, as a legal proposition, would have given defendant Sporn a reasonable time within which to have met the title objections just as if no time had been specified, if, in fact, such objections were the reasons of refusal by plaintiff to complete the contract. Section 5060, C. O. S. 1921; Garland v. Hunter, 77 Okla. 201, 187 P. 466; Quincy Show Case Works v. Briscoe, 126 Okla. 144, 259 P. 128; Stewart v. Ludlow, 127 Okla. 144, 259 P. 835. Plaintiff's failure of response to defendant Sporn's request for the abstracts is a strong circumstance showing that he did not intend that his letter of March 22 should be regarded as a proposal to call off the trade as is contended by him, but, on the contrary, shows a refusal to further proceed to its ultimate conclusion notwithstanding defendant Sporn's readiness to fulfill his part of the contract of which plaintiff was advised.

"In a suit on account for services rendered, where there is more or less uncertainty as to the grounds of recovery, there may be properly joined in the petition a count upon express contract and a count upon quantum recruit, and the question of granting or overruling a motion to require plaintiff to elect upon which count he will stand is addressed to the sound legal discretion of the court." In the case of Garland v. Hunter, 77 Okla. 201, 187 P. 466, the first paragraph of the syllabus states: "While it is not proper pleading for a plaintiff to include and intermingle three grounds of recovery in one count, yet, in the absence of a motion to separately state and number, a demurrer or a motion to require him to elect on which cause of action he will rely, he may introduce evidence on any theory set out in his petition or recover on any of the grounds there claimed."

We observe that no exception was taken to this instruction by the defendant in the trial court. Counsel for Ludlow, with at least some degree of justification, in support of his contention, cites Puls v. Casey, 18 Okla. 142, 92 P. 388, also Garland v. Hunter, 77 Okla. 201, 187 P. 466, holding that: "If no time is specified in the contract for the performance of an action required to be performed, a reasonable time is allowed."

In this class of cases, where there is no time of performance fixed in the contract as here, the law implies that performance will be had within a reasonable time. Section 5060, C. O. S. 1921; Garland v. Hunter, 77 Okla. 201, 187 P. 466; Akers et al. v. Brooks, 103 Okla. 98, 229 P. 544; Crooker v. Holmes, 65 Me. 195. The relevant part of section 5060, supra, is as follows: "If no time is specified for the performance of an act required to be performed, a reasonable time is allowed. * * *"