(Rest.2d Torts, § 924, com. d, p. 525 [“the difference, viewed as of the time of trial, between the value of the plaintiff's services as they will be in view of the harm and as they would have been had there been no harm”]; Fein , supra , 38 Cal.3d at p. 153, fn. 10, 211 Cal.Rptr. 368, 695 P.2d 665 [adopting Restatement].) Because these damages turn on the plaintiff's earning capacity , the focus is “not [on] what the plaintiff would have earned in the future[,] but [on] what she could have earned.” (Hilliard , supra , 148 Cal.App.3d at p. 412, 196 Cal.Rptr. 117, italics added; Gargir v. B'Nei Akiva (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1281, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 557 (Gargir ) [same]; Storrs , supra , 134 Cal. at p. 93, 66 P. 72 [“it is what [the plaintiff] was capable of earning, rather than what he was actually earning, that was to be considered by the jury”]; Strosk v. Howard Terminal Co. (1954) 129 Cal.App.2d 797, 799–800, 277 P.2d 828 [same]; Rodriguez v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 626, 656, 151 Cal.Rptr. 399 (Rodriguez ) [“ ‘[one's] earning capacity is not a matter of actual earnings' ”], overruled on other grounds in Coito v. Superior Court (2012) 54 Cal.4th 480, 499, 142 Cal.Rptr.3d 607, 278 P.3d 860.) Consequently, proof of the plaintiff's prior earnings, while relevant to demonstrate earning capacity, is not a prerequisite to the award of these damages (e.g., Neumann v. Bishop (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 451, 462, 130 Cal.Rptr. 786 (Neumann ) [no “proof of actual earnings or income either before or after the injury” required]; Heiner v. Kmart Corp. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 335, 348, fn. 6, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 854 (Heiner ) [same] ),

“ ‘Loss of earning power is an element of general damages that may be inferred from the nature of the injury, with or without proof of actual earnings or income either before or after the injury. [Citations.]’ ” (Gargir v. B’Nei Akiva (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1282.) Consistent with these rules, the jury in this case was instructed to award damages for loss of future earnings if plaintiff proved “the amount of money he would have been reasonably certain to earn if the injury had not occurred.”

And, contrary to Ukran's contentions, expert testimony is not vital to a claim for loss of earning capacity. ( Gargir v. B'Nei Akiva (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1282, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 557 ["it is not necessary for a party to produce expert testimony on future earning ability ..."].) Finally, Ukran contends the court erred in characterizing Lewis's future earnings claim as "loss of earning capacity."

None of the language in the advertisement, however, refers to half hams or full hams. Not only was the trial court entitled to discredit Wood's testimony on this point (see Gargir v. B'nei Akiva (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1277 [trier of fact can "exercise[] its common sense to reject all of plaintiff's testimony even without" an instruction on the issue]; Hansen v. Sunnyside Products, Inc. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1511 [trier of fact can reasonably reject testimony "as belying common sense"]), the trial court was entitled to conclude that, even if Wood were confused by the "starting at" language, a reasonable consumer would not have been. (Cf. B.V.D. Co. v. Davega-City Radio, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 1936) 16 F.Supp. 659, 660-661 [advertisements stating that customers could buy for $2.74 women's swim suits that were "'[r]egularly up to $5.00'" and had "'[v]alues up to $5.00'" were deceptive because the store only included in the sale swim suits that regularly sold for $3.95].

Czternasty was not required to introduce expert testimony to establish his lost profits or lost earning capacity. (See Gargir v. B'nei Akiva (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1280; Haning et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Personal Injury (The Rutter Group 2015) ¶ 3:74, p. 3-81; id. at ¶ 3:125, p. 3-95.) He testified his injuries prevented him from working and forced him to abandon his business.

Furthermore, the trial court could disbelieve appellants' testimony as a whole after having concluded they falsified the Golden arrest report. (Gargir v. B'Nei Akiva (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1277 [trier of fact may entirely distrust testimony of witness believed to have testified falsely on material issue].) Appellants repeatedly cite the District Attorney's discretionary decision not to prosecute them criminally, specifically over a concern about Riske's credibility.

Thus, appellants are incorrect to insist that permanent disability or expert testimony about the loss of future earnings is required in this case. (See also Gargir v. B'nei Akiva (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1280 [no expert testimony required to establish 16 year old with a knee injury and at risk for a knee replacement would be impaired in her chosen career as a preschool teacher].) The evidence established that Barry suffered a permanent injury that affected his ability to perform his function as a camera operator and director of photography.

As a result, "neither the giving nor the refusing of such commonplace principles applicable to the weighing of evidence by juries will warrant the reversal of a judgment which is otherwise valid." (Ibid.; accord, Gargir v. BNei Akiva (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1277-1278.) People v. Murillo (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1104, 1108, explains that the absence of the instruction does not result in prejudice because this is a commonsense defense that counsel may effectively present in closing argument without the need for an instruction to that effect.