Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County No. 07CC09059, Patrick T. Madden, Judge.
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
IRION, J.
Suzanne Gardner appeals from a judgment of dismissal after the sustaining of a demurrer to her third amended complaint against defendant Orange County Superior Court (Superior Court) alleging a claim under the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 United States Code section 1983 (section 1983). We conclude that because Superior Court is an arm of the state, sovereign immunity bars a section 1983 claim against it. We therefore affirm the judgment.
Under California Rules of Court, rule 10.1000(b)(1)(B), this appeal was transferred from Division Three to Division One of the Fourth Appellate District.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Gardner's claim against Superior Court arises out of a 1997 case in which she pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor violation of alcohol-related reckless driving and was placed on probation for a period of three years with conditions. Gardner alleges that she complied with the conditions, but was arrested and imprisoned in 2007 under a warrant she contends was reactivated for maintenance purposes and without any legal basis. Gardner filed a complaint for damages under section 1983 arising out of her arrest under the warrant and subsequent imprisonment against defendants Superior Court and the Orange County Sheriff's Department.
The Orange County Sheriff's Department was dismissed in August 2008.
Superior Court demurred generally on a variety of grounds to the complaint, first amended complaint, second amended complaint, and finally to the operative third amended complaint (hereafter, the complaint). The trial court sustained Superior Court's demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend and entered judgment in favor of Superior Court. Gardner appeals from the judgment, contending that the trial court erred in sustaining Superior Court's demurrer to the complaint.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Our review of the sufficiency of a complaint against a general demurrer is de novo, and is guided by well-settled rules. " 'We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.'... When a demurrer is sustained, we determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. And when it is sustained without leave to amend, we decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of discretion and we affirm. The burden of proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on the plaintiff." (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318, citations omitted.)
In the trial court, both parties assumed that Superior Court is a "person" subject to claims under section 1983 and focused their arguments on the adequacy of the complaint's allegations to state a section 1983 claim. The parties also briefed those issues on appeal. However, based on our own review of the record, we asked the parties to submit supplemental briefing on the issue of whether Superior Court is an arm of the state entitled to sovereign immunity from a section 1983 claim. As we will explain, we find that issue to be dispositive and thus focus our subsequent analysis on whether Superior Court is protected by sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
The issue of governmental immunity is appropriately raised for the first time on appeal since it represents a " 'noncurable defect of substance where the question is one of law' " and is a jurisdictional matter. (Woodward Park Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. City of Fresno (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 683, 712, citing9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal, § 394, p. 444; Inland Empire Health Plan v. Superior Court (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 588, 592 [jurisdictional issue can be raised initially in appeal]; see Kemmerer v. County of Fresno (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1426, 1435 [issue of governmental immunity not raised by parties is "a jurisdictional question [that] may be raised on appeal even though not used as a basis for the general demurrer in the lower court"].) Because, as we will explain, this issue is dispositive, we need not, and will not, address the other issues raised by the parties below or on appeal.
B. Superior Court Cannot Be Sued as a "Person" Under Section 1983 and the Demurrer Was Therefore Properly Sustained
In determining whether Gardner's complaint states a valid claim under section 1983, we look to federal law. (Susag v. City of Lake Forest (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1408; Bach v. County of Butte (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 554, 560, citing Donovan v. Reinbold (9th Cir. 1970) 433 F.2d 738, 742.) Section 1983 provides a remedy for citizens deprived of federal and constitutional rights by a "person" under color of law. As we explain below, Superior Court cannot be considered such a "person" within the meaning of section 1983 because it is an arm of the state and protected by sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
Section 1983 provides: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress...."
It is settled law that a state is not a "person" within the meaning of section 1983 and therefore may not be sued under section 1983 in either federal or state court. (Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police (1989) 491 U.S. 58, 71; Venegas v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 32 Cal.4th 820, 829.) Likewise, "governmental entities that are considered 'arms of the state' for Eleventh Amendment purposes" do not qualify as persons under section 1983 because they, too, are afforded sovereign immunity. (Will, at p. 70,citing Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle (1977) 429 U.S. 274, 280; accord Kirchmann v. Lake Elsinore Unified School Dist. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1100-1102, 1105-1115.) Because state law determines whether a state-created governmental entity is an arm of the state, we turn to California law to determine whether Superior Court is an arm of the state of California. (Mt. Healthy,at p. 280.)
By contrast, a municipality can be held liable as a "person" under section 1983 where its policy or custom violates constitutional rights or exhibits deliberate indifference to constitutional rights and thereby causes such a violation. (Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services (1978) 436 U.S. 658, 694; Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nev. (9th Cir. 2002) 290 F.3d 1175, 1185-1186.)
Under the California Constitution, a superior court of the State of California, wherever it is located, is an arm of the State of California. (Sacramento etc. D. Dist. v. Superior Court (1925) 196 Cal. 414, 432 ["the superior courts of the state, although located and functioning in the several counties, are not local or county courts, but constitute a system of state courts in which the judicial power of the state is vested by the express terms of the constitution"]; Cal. Const., art. 6, § 1 [judicial power of the state is vested in the Supreme Court, courts of appeal and superior courts].) As an arm of the state, Superior Court enjoys immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, and is not a "person" subject to suit under section 1983. (Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness v. Zolin (9th Cir. 1987) 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 [holding that California state courts are arms of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes]; Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court (9th Cir. 2003) 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 [noting settled law holds that prisoner cannot state claim against court because such suits are barred by the Eleventh Amendment].)
In an attempt to avoid Eleventh Amendment immunity, Gardner contends Superior Court is actually an arm of both the county and the state. We disagree. Under California law, Superior Court is a part of the judicial branch of the state, not an agency or subdivision of local government. (Hart v. County of Alameda (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 766, 782, citing Sacramento County Employees Organization v. County of Sacramento (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 845, 853 [superior courts are not governmental subdivisions nor agencies of local government].) As such, Superior Court is entitled to sovereign immunity against Gardner's section 1983 claim.
C. Denial of Leave to Amend Was Proper
We next determine whether the trial court abused its discretion sustaining Superior Court's demurrer without leave to amend. Denial of leave to amend is not an abuse of discretion where " 'there is no reasonable possibility or probability that the defect can be cured by amendment.' " (Harshbarger v. City of Colton (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 1335, 1349 (Harshbarger); Schonfeldt v. State of California (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1465 [if there is no liability as a matter of law, leave to amend should not be granted]; Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency (9th Cir. 1984) 733 F.2d 646, 650.) It is plaintiff's burden to show how the complaint can be amended to change its legal effect. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 (Goodman).)
Because Superior Court's sovereign immunity for section 1983 claims absolutely precludes imposition of liability against it on Gardner's claim, Gardner cannot meet her burden to show her complaint could be amended to cure the defect in this case. Gardner could not successfully amend her pleading by stating different facts, because sovereign immunity protects Superior Court from a section 1983 claim under any set of facts. (Harshbarger, supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at p. 1349 [" 'Governmental immunity is jurisdictional [citation] and can properly preclude a cause of action....' "].) Nor is it possible for Gardner to state a different claim for a constitutional violation against Superior Court, because there is no cause of action other than section 1983 that authorizes a suit to obtain money damages for a violation of federal constitutional rights. (Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 1992) 973 F.2d 704, 705, cert. den. (1993) 506 U.S. 1081.) We therefore conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend. (Goodman, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 349.)
Gardner suggests it is possible "discovery will reveal that the policy(ies) at issue here were promulgated by officials answerable to the County of Orange," but that would not save Gardner's claim against Superior Court. We need not address whether Gardner's complaint could state a claim against any other entity or individual.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of dismissal is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: McCONNELL, P. J., HALLER, J.