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Gardner v. State

State of Texas in the Fourteenth Court of Appeals
Jun 20, 2017
NO. 14-15-01043-CR (Tex. App. Jun. 20, 2017)

Opinion

NO. 14-15-01043-CR

06-20-2017

ELIZABETH GARDNER, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee


On Appeal from the 300th District Court Brazoria County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 73657

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Elizabeth Gardner was convicted of assault on a public servant for scratching a police officer. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(b)(1) (West 2011). Appellant argues in her sole issue on appeal that the evidence is legally insufficient to support her conviction. After reviewing the record, we conclude there is legally sufficient evidence that appellant caused bodily injury and that the officer was lawfully discharging an official duty at the time. We therefore affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND

Lieutenant Corey Dunlap of the City of Surfside Beach Police Department was dispatched to a motel in Surfside Beach to investigate a complaint of animal cruelty made by Tammy Coots, who found animal testicles in her car. Coots gave Dunlap a list of three possible suspects. While Dunlap was interviewing the suspects, Coots interrupted and told Dunlap that appellant had just accused Coots of having sex with dogs. Coots pointed out appellant to Dunlap as appellant was walking toward the beach. Coots then left for work at a nearby restaurant.

Appellant returned to the motel while Dunlap was still investigating. Dunlap approached appellant and began interviewing her. Coots then returned to the motel. Visibly upset, she interrupted Dunlap's interview with appellant. Dunlap asked appellant to wait for him so that he could speak with Coots. Coots told him that her co-workers said a woman with wild, wiry hair just came in and accused Coots of having sex with animals. Dunlap went to Coots' workplace and confirmed her story.

After returning to the motel, Dunlap sought out appellant to question her again. Appellant was in the motel office on the phone and uncooperative, so he waited until she finished her phone call. Appellant hung up the phone, told Dunlap she did not have time to speak with him, and attempted to walk away. Again, Dunlap told appellant he needed to speak with her, but she remained uncooperative. Appellant took an aggressive stance and started cursing at Dunlap. Because she was becoming more aggressive, Dunlap detained appellant by placing her in handcuffs. As Dunlap was leading appellant out of the motel office with his hand on her handcuffed wrist, she twisted around and scratched him on the arm. Dunlap testified that the scratch drew blood and was painful.

The jury convicted appellant of assault on a public servant, sentenced her to four years' confinement, and recommended community supervision. The trial court suspended appellant's sentence and placed her on community supervision for four years. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

In her sole issue, appellant argues the evidence is legally insufficient to support her conviction. Specifically, she argues the evidence is insufficient to show that appellant scratched Dunlap and that he was lawfully discharging an official duty.

I. Standard of review and applicable law

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we determine "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Johnson v. State, 364 S.W.3d 292, 293-94 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). The jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to afford testimony. Montgomery v. State, 369 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The jury alone decides whether to believe eyewitness testimony, and it resolves any conflicts in the evidence. Price v. State, 502 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.). Therefore, the testimony of a single eyewitness can be enough to support a conviction. Id.

A person commits assault on a public servant by intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing bodily injury to a person the actor knows is a public servant while the public servant is lawfully discharging an official duty. Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 22.01(a)(1), 22.01(b)(1). The actor is presumed to know a person is a public servant if the person is wearing a distinctive uniform or badge indicating the person's employment as a public servant. Id. § 22.01(d).

II. The evidence is legally sufficient to support appellant's conviction.

After reviewing the record, we conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to show the two elements of the crime challenged by appellant: that appellant caused bodily injury to Dunlap and that Dunlap was lawfully discharging an official duty at the time.

A. There is legally sufficient evidence to show appellant caused bodily injury to Lieutenant Dunlap.

Appellant argues there is insufficient evidence that she caused bodily injury to Dunlap. She points out that the State failed to offer any pictures of the scratch or testimony from a doctor.

Bodily injury means "physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(8) (West 2011). This definition is purposefully broad and includes relatively minor physical contacts so long as the contact is more than mere offensive touching. Lane v. State, 763 S.W.2d 785, 786 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). The terms "physical pain," "illness," and "impairment of a physical condition" are terms of common usage that a person of ordinary intelligence is capable of understanding. Id. at 787.

Dunlap testified that appellant twisted around and scratched him on the arm as he was leading her out of the motel office. A jury may reasonably infer from testimony that a person felt physical pain because people of common intelligence understand what naturally causes pain. Id. at 787; Wingfield v. State, 282 S.W.3d 102, 105 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref'd). In this case, however, no inference was necessary: Dunlap testified the scratch drew blood and that it caused pain.

As noted above, testimony from a single eyewitness is legally sufficient to support a conviction. Price, 502 S.W.3d at 281. Additional evidence, such as pictures of the scratch or testimony from a doctor, were not necessary to prove appellant caused bodily injury. Dunlap's testimony is legally sufficient evidence to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant caused him bodily injury as that term is defined in the Penal Code.

B. There is legally sufficient evidence that Lieutenant Dunlap was lawfully discharging an official duty.

Appellant also argues there is insufficient evidence that Dunlap was lawfully discharging an official duty. She argues Dunlap was not lawfully discharging his duty when he handcuffed her because Dunlap's animal cruelty investigation had ended. Additionally, appellant argues Dunlap never explained a police department policy that an officer must state his purpose to detain a suspect and reason for doing so and warn the suspect that force will be used.

A police officer is lawfully discharging his duty so long as he is acting within his capacity as a peace officer. Hall v. State, 158 S.W.3d 470, 474 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). This determination depends on the circumstances of the encounter, such as whether the police officer was in uniform, on duty, and on regular patrol at the time of the assault. Id. Whether the police officer lawfully arrested or detained a person is not relevant to whether the officer is "lawfully discharging an official duty." Id.; see also Mays v. State, 318 S.W.3d 368, 388 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Hughes v. State, 897 S.W.2d 285, 297-98 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). Lawfully discharging an official duty in this context means the public servant "is not criminally or tortiously abusing his office as a public servant by acts of, for example, official oppression or violations of the civil rights of a person in custody or the use of unlawful, unjustified force." Hall, 158 S.W.3d at 474-75 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Given this understanding of lawful discharge, it is unnecessary for us to determine whether Dunlap's investigation had ended or whether he lawfully detained appellant. Id.; see also Hughes, 897 S.W.2d at 297-98. Further, there is no evidence that Dunlap violated a police department policy. Even if there was, it would not necessarily mean he was unlawfully discharging an official duty when appellant scratched him. See Hall, 158 S.W.3d at 476 ("[E]vidence of the violation of internal . . . policies and procedures does not suffice to raise a valid, rational conclusion that [the officer] was criminally or tortiously abusing his official office or duties at the time of the assault.").

The record shows that Dunlap was on duty when he was dispatched to the motel to investigate an animal cruelty complaint. He was wearing his police uniform throughout his investigation and during the encounter with appellant. Dunlap handcuffed appellant when she took an aggressive stance toward Dunlap and started cursing at him. Dunlap testified he detained appellant for his and appellant's safety. This evidence is legally sufficient for a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Dunlap was acting within his capacity as a peace officer and therefore lawfully discharging an official duty when appellant scratched him. See Hall, 158 S.W.3d at 474.

We therefore overrule appellant's sole issue on appeal.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled appellant's issue, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

/s/ J. Brett Busby

Justice Panel consists of Justices Boyce, Busby, and Wise.
Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).


Summaries of

Gardner v. State

State of Texas in the Fourteenth Court of Appeals
Jun 20, 2017
NO. 14-15-01043-CR (Tex. App. Jun. 20, 2017)
Case details for

Gardner v. State

Case Details

Full title:ELIZABETH GARDNER, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Court:State of Texas in the Fourteenth Court of Appeals

Date published: Jun 20, 2017

Citations

NO. 14-15-01043-CR (Tex. App. Jun. 20, 2017)