" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gardner v. East Rock Lodge, 96 Conn. 198, 205-06, 113 A. 308 (1921). See also Vycas v. St. George Guard Society, 97 Conn. 509, 514, 117 A. 692 (1922) ("It is, of course, not denied that if the proceedings before the court of the society were in accordance with the constitution and the by-laws of the society and those bylaws were not in themselves illegal, the plaintiff was bound to exhaust his remedies within the society before resorting to the courts.").

By the same token, an expulsion in violation of the rules of the society is illegal. Supreme Lodge of A.O.U.W. v. Zuhlke, 1889, 129 Ill. 298, 21 N.E. 789; Gardner v. East Rock Lodge No. 141, 1921, 96 Conn. 198, 113 A. 308; Lahiff v. St. Joseph's Total Abstinence Benev. Society, 1904, 76 Conn. 648, 87 A. 692, 65 L.R.A. 92; People ex rel. Deverell v. Musical Mutual Protective Union, 1889, 118 N.Y. 101, 23 N.E. 129.

" Id., 330-31; Savelli v. Shapiro, 152 Conn. 705, 706, 206 A.2d 647 (1965). A judgment in the absence of written pleadings defining the issues would not be merely erroneous, it would be void. Gardner v. East Rock Lodge, 96 Conn. 198, 211-12, 113 A. 308 (1921). A void judgment is not subject to judicial reincarnation by the filing of written pleadings postjudgment.

As applied to a court, the word "jurisdiction" means the power to hear and determine a cause. Shelton v. Hadlock, 62 Conn. 143, 151, 25 A. 483; New Haven Sand Blast Co. v. Dreisbach, 104 Conn. 322, 329, 133 A. 99; Gardner v. East Rock Lodge, 96 Conn. 198, 209, 113 A. 308; Woodmont Assn. v. Milford, 85 Conn. 517, 524, 84 A. 307. Jurisdiction of the subject matter is derived from the government creating the court. Low v. R. P. K. Pressed Metal Co., 91 Conn. 91, 97, 99 A. 1. It can never be conferred by consent of the parties.

The extent of the rule relied on is that the procedure, within the society, which is prescribed by its by-laws must be resorted to and exhausted before recourse is had to the courts. McGuinness v. Court Elm City, F. of A., 78 Conn. 43, 60 A. 1023; Gardner v. East Rock Lodge, 96 Conn. 198, 113 A. 308. We find in the record no by-law regulating prosecution of claims in the defendant society and so have no basis for considering this contention.

The other reason of appeal seems to be based upon the narrow construction of § 2 which we have already rejected. It is, of course, not denied that if the proceedings before the court of the society were in accordance with the constitution and by-laws of the society and those by-laws were not in themselves illegal, the plaintiff was bound to exhaust his remedies within the society before resorting to the courts. Mead v. Stirling, 62 Conn. 586, 27 A. 591; Gardner v. East Rock Lodge, 96 Conn. 198, 113 A. 308; White v. Greene, 96 Conn. 265, 270, 114 A. 112.

It is, of course, conceded by the plaintiffs that they must first exhaust their remedies in the order before appealing to the courts. Mead v. Stirling, 62 Conn. 586, 27 A. 591; Gardner v. East Rock Lodge, 96 Conn. 198, 113 A. 308. This they claim to have done by taking their appeal from the order of suspension to the next session of the Supreme Lodge. It must also be conceded that while their appeal is pending the plaintiffs must submit to the laws of the order, and § 19 of Article IX of the Supreme Statutes provides that "all rulings and decisions by the Supreme Chancellor during the recess of the Supreme Lodge shall be binding until affirmed or reversed by the Supreme Lodge." The jurisdiction of the Superior Court to preserve the status quo pending the appeal turns upon the application of this section to the facts appearing of record.

It is fundamental in our law that the right of a plaintiff to recover is limited to the allegations of his complaint. Nash Engineering Co. v. Norwalk, 137 Conn. 235, 239; Lamb v. Burns, 202 Conn. 158, 172. A judgment upon an issue not pleaded would not only be erroneous, but it would be void. Telesco v. Telesco, 187 Conn. 715, 720; citing therein Gardner v. East Rock Lodge, 96 Conn. 198, 211-12; Tehrani v. Century Medical Center, 7 Conn. App. 301, 308. It is also axiomatic that an appellant will not consider issues which are brought to the court's attention for the first time by way of the appellant's brief. Robinson v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 2 Conn. App. 308, 314. It cannot be seriously disputed that this court sits in that same capacity in these cases.

Furthermore, it is clear that pursuant to the provisions of the constitution and by-laws, he did have a right of appeal from the action of the supreme assembly, which he has not exercised. The constitution and by-laws expressly provide that a member shall exhaust all remedies given to him by the by-laws within the order before seeking redress in court. The plaintiff does not dispute that he was required to exhaust all remedies within the order as a general rule of law, nor indeed could this be disputed, since that is not only the general rule of law, but a member is more stringently bound to exercise these remedies when the provisions of the by-laws themselves compel him to take advantage of them, as pointed out in Gardner vs. East Rock Lodge, 96 Conn. 199. The plaintiff, however, says that he was under no obligation to attend the meeting of the supreme assembly, although notified of its time and place of meeting, and that his suspension did not require him to seek any redress within the order, because this suspension resulted from action by the defendant which was taken without any jurisdiction. The plaintiff cites as authority the Gardner case above noted.

The conclusion is therefore reached that the executive board was without power or authority to indefinitely suspend plaintiff and that its attempt to do so was illegal and void. This being so, he was not obliged to seek redress by appeal within the order. Gardner vs. East Rock Lodge, 96 Conn. 198. Damages in this case are more or less speculative. It is impossible to find how much wages he may have lost because of his suspension from the union.