Opinion
1:23-CV-321-SPB-RAL
11-13-2024
JEROME KEON GARDLEY, Plaintiff v. WEXFORD HEALTFI SERVICES, et al., Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER, United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
ECF NO. 14.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss fded by Defendants Michael Holman and Heather Martin [ECF No. 14] be granted, that the claims against Holman and Martin be dismissed with prejudice, and that Holman and Martin be terminated as parties to this action.
This matter has been referred to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
II. Report
A. Background
For purposes of this motion, the following factual allegations are accepted as true. In August of2023, while mcEircerated at the Erie County Prison, Gairdley sent several emails to the prison's medical department requesting dental care. See, generally, ECF No. 7. He generally alleges that medical personnel employed by Wexford Health Services, the entity contracted to provide medical services to inmates at the Erie County Prison, failed to adequately treat his dental needs. Based on these averments, he asserts an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need against three non-moving Defendants: Wexford Health Services, Dr. Kohler, and P.A. Kang. Id.
As pertains to the moving Defendants, Deputy Warden Holman and Counselor Martin, Gardley maintains that he requested grievance forms on numerous occasions so that he could file a grievance against the medical department but that Holman and Martin refused to provide him with the forms. Id. ¶¶ 17-18, 20, 24, 26-27, 34-37. Gardley contends that this violated his “First Amendment right to redress the government.” Id. ¶ 41.
Presently pending is Holman and Martin's motion to dismiss. ECF No. 14. Although he sought and received an extension of time to file a response in opposition to Defendants' motion, see ECF Nos. 19-21, Gardley failed to file a response. As such, this matter is ripe for review.
B. Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff will be likely to prevail on the merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). A complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (rejecting the traditional 12 (b)(6) standard established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). In making this determination, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002).
While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, it must provide more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286). See also McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”).
Expounding on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases, the Third Circuit has articulated the following three-step approach:
First, the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' Second, the court should identify allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' Finally, ‘where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and fieri determine whettier they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.'Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). This determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Finally, because Gardley is proceeding pro se, the allegations of his complaint will be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the court can reasonably read his pro se complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, it must do so despite his failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (petition prepared by a prisoner may be inartfully drawn and should be read “with a measure of tolerance”).
C. Analysis
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. Const, amend. 1. Critically, however, courts have widely held that inmates “do not have a constitutionally protected right to a grievance process.” Jackson v. Gordon, 145 Fed.Appx. 774, 777 (3d Cir. 2005). Consequently, “allegations of improprieties in the handling of grievances” - including the refusal to provide a grievance form - “do not state a cognizable claim under § 1983.” Glenn v. DelBalso, 599 Fed.Appx. 457, 459 (3d Cir. 2015); Scutella v. Erie County Prison, 2320 WL 5366043, at *4 (W.D. Pa Sept. 8, 2020) (“[T]he denial of a grievance form alone does not give rise to a constitutional claim.”) (quoting source omitted). As this Court recently explained:
Neither federal constitutional nor statutory law granted Scutella a right to a grievance process at the ECP. Therefore, although the Defendants'
alleged failure to provide grievance forms to Scutella may have excused his obligation to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit, it did not give rise to an independent cause of action against the Defendants. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants' motion to dismiss as it relates to their alleged denial of grievance forms.Id. The same outcome is warranted here.
As noted in Scutella, Holman and Martin's failure to provide grievance forms might provide a basis for Gardley to successfully argue that the grievance process was “unavailable” to him in the event that any Defendant raises the affirmative defense that Gardley failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See Scutella, 2020 WL 5366043, at *3. It does not, however, give rise to a standalone constitutional violation.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion to dismiss [ECF No. 14] be granted. Defendants Holman and Martin should be dismissed from this action, with prejudice.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).