Opinion
6:23-cv-00288-MK
05-15-2023
DONALD HARLIN GARDINER JR., Plaintiff, v. DEPUTY SHERIFF DANIEL BARDEN; DOUGLAS COUNTY SHERIFF JOHN HANLIN; DOUGLAS COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE; and GRAND JURY, Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
MUSTAFA T. KASUBHAI UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pro Se Plaintiff Donald Harlin Gardiner (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against Defendants Deputy Sheriff Daniel Barden, Douglas County Sheriff John Hanlin, Douglas County District Attorney's Office (DCDAO), and “Grand Jury” alleging wrongful arrest and false imprisonment, and moves to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). EFC Nos. 1, 2. For the following reasons, Plaintiff's motion to proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED. However, the Clerk of the Court shall not issue process until further order of the Court because Plaintiff's complaint should be DISMISSED with leave to amend, except that Plaintiff's claims against DCDAO and the Grand Jury should be dismissed with prejudice.
BACKGROUND
The complaint alleges that Defendants violated Plaintiff's “civil rights, due process rights and constitutional rights.. .under the fourteenth amendment.” Compl. 3, ECF No. 1. First, he claims that “Sheriff Deputy Daniel Barden with-held crucial evidence[]” and used “false information as an identification point to arrest [him].” Id. at 4. Plaintiff also claims that Deputy Barden provided additional false information relating to a telephone call Plaintiff made while in custody. Id. at 5. With respect to Sheriff Hanlin, Plaintiff alleges that he wrote to him and never received any return communication. Id. at 6. Plaintiff further claims that the District Attorney Allison Eichman “over looked the with-holding evidences from Deputy Barden's Body cam” and that the Grand Jury “allowed no evidence to hold [him] incarcerated.” Id. Plaintiff claims that he spent 150 days incarcerated following his arrest-causing him to default on three loans-and the case was eventually dismissed. Id. at 4. He seeks $3,500 for forfeited bail in another case, $64,000 for his defaulted loans, and $225,000 ($1,500 per day) for his 150 days of incarceration. Id. at 9.
DISCUSSION
I. IFP Application
A review of Plaintiff's application reveals Plaintiff is unable to afford the costs of this litigation. Accordingly, the application is GRANTED. However, as explained in more detail below, the Complaint should DISMISSED with leave to amend, except that Plaintiff's claims against DCDAO and “Grand Jury” should be dismissed with prejudice.
II. Mandatory Screening
A. Standard
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), Congress has mandated that district courts screen IFP applications and dismiss any case that is frivolous or malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In determining the sufficiency of a Pro Se complaint, the court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the plaintiff. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 52021 (1972); see also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (in assessing whether a complaint fails to plead a claim, the court must accept all factual allegations as true); Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996) (allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff).
In addition, a complaint must comply with the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief.” However,
[w]hile a complaint . . . does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the “grounds” of [their] “entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do, see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (on a motion to dismiss, courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).
Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ....Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 555 (citations altered). The Supreme Court has emphasized that, when assessing the sufficiency of any civil complaint, a court must distinguish factual contentions-which allege behavior on the part of the defendant that, if true, would satisfy one or more elements of the claim asserted-and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. In short, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id.
The Court notes that it received mail from Plaintiff on March 12, 2023 which included what Plaintiff believes to be additional proof in support of his claims. The Court responded by forwarding the letter to defense counsel and Plaintiff and notifying the parties that ex parte communications are prohibited. In any event, these documents have not been filed with the Court and are not part of Plaintiff's Complaint. They are not considered in the Court's IFP screening which, as outlined above, concerns the adequacy of the Complaint itself.
B. Analysis
Turning to the specific allegations and liberally construing Plaintiff's claims, Bernhardt v. Los Angeles Cty., 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003); Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 757 (9th Cir. 2003), his allegations are most consistent with a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) claim for wrongful arrest and an Oregon state law tort claim for false imprisonment. For the reasons discussed below, his claims should be dismissed in part for failure to state a claim.
1. Section 1983
Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). To establish a violation of a federal constitutional right under Section 1983, a party must show “(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of State law.” Long v. Cnty. of L.A., 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). The first step in a Section 1983 claim is to “identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.” Albright, 510 U.S. at 271.
Here, Plaintiff's allegations can be liberally construed as a wrongful arrest claim in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. An arrest is unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment if it is not supported by probable cause. See Manuel, 580 U.S. at 365. Probable cause under the Fourth Amendment exists if “under the totality of circumstances known to the arresting officers, a prudent person would have concluded that there was a fair probability that [the defendant] had committed a crime.” United States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 2007) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Smith, 790 F.2d 789, 792 (9th Cir.1986)). Probable cause is an objective standard. Id.
Plaintiff's complaint refers to the Fourteenth Amendment, though his allegations and reference to “wrongful arrest” are consistent with a Fourth Amendment claim. To the extent that Plaintiff's claim is intended as a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, it should be dismissed. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. at 273 (“Where a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process', must be the guide for analyzing these claims”) (internal citation and quotation omitted). A claim for a “wrongful arrest” falls under the Fourth Amendment. See Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 580 U.S. 357, 368, 137 S.Ct. 911, 919, 197 L.Ed.2d 312 (2017). The Court liberally construes it as such.
Liberally construing Plaintiff's complaint, he has stated a claim under Section 1983 as to Deputy Barden, because he alleges that Deputy Barden arrested him despite knowledge that his physical description did not match that of the person who allegedly committed the crime. However, the complaint is less clear as to how Deputy Barden's conduct following Plaintiff's arrest resulted in a Fourth Amendment violation. To the extent Plaintiff alleges that any of Deputy Barden's post-arrest conduct resulted in a Fourth Amendment violation, Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim and should be dismissed.
In addition, Plaintiff has not stated a Section 1983 claim as to any of the other Defendants. In particular, it is unclear which conduct by which Defendant forms the basis of this claim, and how such conduct amounts to a deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim against Defendants Hanlin, DCDAO, and Grand Jury should be dismissed.
2. Common law wrongful arrest/false imprisonment
The Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Plaintiff's allegations are also consistent with common law false imprisonment/arrest under Oregon law, which he explicitly states in the Complaint. Compl. at 8 (ECF No. 1). This tort has four elements: “(1) defendant must confine plaintiff; (2) defendant must intend the act that causes the confinement; (3) plaintiff must be aware of the confinement; and (4) the confinement must be unlawful.” Hiber v. Creditors Collection Serv. of Lincoln Cnty., Inc., 154 Or.App. 408, 413, 961 P.2d 898, 901 (1998) (internal citation omitted); see also Fossen v. Clackamas Cnty., 271 Or.App. 842, 847, 352 P.3d 1288 (2015) (noting that torts of false arrest and false imprisonment have the same four elements).
Liberally construing Plaintiff's complaint, he has alleged the elements of false imprisonment as to Deputy Barden based on his initial arrest. However, Plaintiff's state-law claim faces the same deficiencies as his Section 1983 claim with respect to Deputy Barden's post-arrest conduct as well as his claims against the remaining Defendants. It is unclear whether and how these Defendants are alleged to have falsely imprisoned Plaintiff under Oregon state law, or even whether this tort is alleged as to any Defendants besides Deputy Barden at all. For that reason, this claim should be dismissed as to the remaining Defendants.
C. Leave to Amend
Ordinarily Pro Se litigants are given leave to amend. Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623-24 (9th Cir. 1988). But if it is “absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment,” leave to amend need not be given. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court should dismiss Plaintiff's complaint with leave to amend. However, for the reasons discussed below, the Section 1983 claims against DCDAO and Grand Jury should be dismissed with prejudice because amendment would be futile.
1. DCDAO
The claims against DCDAO should be dismissed with prejudice because it is not a “person” under § 1983 and because it is entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
With respect to the Section 1983 claim, that statute applies only to “person[]s” and the U.S. Supreme Court has held that “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons' under § 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989); see also Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 951 (9th Cir. 2004) (“State agencies.. .are not ‘persons' within the meaning of § 1983, and are therefore not amenable to suit under that statute”) (citing Will, 491 U.S. at 70). Accordingly, DCDAO, as a state agency, is not a proper defendant under Section 1983.
In addition, with respect to both the Section 1983 claim and false imprisonment claim, “[t]he Eleventh Amendment bars citizens from bringing suits in federal court against a state for prospective relief or for money damages unless immunity is waived by the state or abrogated by the United States Congress.” Erwin v. Oregon ex rel. Kitzhaber, 231 F.Supp.2d 1003, 1007 (D. Or. 2001) (citing Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 90-91, 102 S.Ct. 2325, 72 L.Ed.2d 694 (1982), aff'd sub nom. Erwin v. Oregon, 43 Fed.Appx. 122 (9th Cir. 2002). Here, there is no question that DCDAO is a state agency to whom the Eleventh Amendment applies. Given its pending motion to dismiss (ECF No. 8), the State has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity here, and Section 1983 does not abrogate that immunity. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 240-41 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979). Because Plaintiff's claims against DCDAO are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, these claims cannot be cured by amendment and should be dismissed with prejudice.
2. Grand Jury
The claims against the Grand Jury should also be dismissed with prejudice because grand jurors are entitled to absolute immunity:
Like other officers of the court, the grand jury enjoys absolute immunity from civil or criminal suit for its acts, which prevents any inquiry into the grand jury's motivations. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n. 20, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) (Grand jurors possess absolute immunity because like a judge they must “exercise a discretionary judgment on the basis of evidence presented to them.”); Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 403 (2d Cir.1926) (Grand jurors and other judicial officers are not liable “in a civil suit for a judicial determination, however erroneous it may be, and however malicious the motive which has produced it.”). See, e.g., Turpen v. Booth, 56 Cal. 65 (1880); Hunter v. Mathis, 40 Ind. 356 (1872). It is the fact that its judgments are unreviewable and its deliberations unknowable that gives the grand jury its independence.United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184, 1201 (9th Cir. 2005). Because this immunity is absolute, there are no set of facts which Plaintiff could plead which would entitle him to relief against the Grand Jury for these claims. Amendment is therefore futile and Plaintiff's claims against the Grand Jury should be dismissed with prejudice.
As to the claims not dismissed with prejudice, Plaintiff is warned that a failure to file an amended complaint as ordered will result in the dismissal of this action. The Court also reminds Plaintiff that, should he elect to file an amended complaint, he must reallege each of his claims, including the specific facts underlying each claim, and “may not incorporate any part of [his] prior pleading[s] by reference.” LR 15-1(a)(3). Plaintiff is advised to review the District of Oregon's website, which contains a webpage titled “Information about Representing Yourself in Court,” that is available to the public at https://ord.uscourts.gov/index.php/representing-yourself/information-about-representing-yourself.
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons explained above, Plaintiff's motion to proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED. However, the Complaint should DISMISSED with leave to amend to cure, if possible, the deficiencies outlined above. Plaintiff's claims against Defendants DCDAO and Grand Jury should be dismissed with prejudice.
This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment or appealable order. The Findings and Recommendation will be referred to a district judge. Objections to this Findings and Recommendation, if any, are due fourteen (14) days from today's date. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).