Opinion
No. 99 C 1817
March 7, 2002
OPINION
In my Order of December 17, 2001 (the "12/17/01 Order"), I addressed the res judicata argument in defendant's motion for summary judgment. I further addressed plaintiff's request to bring in an expert, allowing plaintiff's their expert but deferring a decision on the scope of the expert discovery until the parties fully briefed, and I ruled on, two issues presented in the motion for summary judgment: plaintiffs' exemption argument and defendant's standing argument.
I asked the parties to address the threshold issue of whether the plaintiffs' Fair Housing Act claims fail because the Village's occupancy codes are exempt from the Act's coverage. As I noted in my 12/17/01 Order, the Village argues that Section 3607(b)(1) of the Fair Housing Act entirely exempts from the Act's coverage "any reasonable local, State, or Federal restrictions regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling." See 42 U.S.C. § 3607 (b)(1). In response, although my 12/17/01 Order specifically required that plaintiffs' response to the summary judgment motion "explain why, in light of prevailing jurisprudence, the [Village's] restriction is unreasonable," plaintiffs' response concedes the reasonableness of the occupancy code and goes on to argue the Village's discriminatory enforcement of such code.
The Village charges that Salvator Garcia does not have standing to bring any claims based on occupancy code violations because the record shows that Garcia has not been harmed by the Village's enforcement of its occupancy codes. I find, however, that Garcia does allege an injury that, while small, is sufficient to meet the liberal standing requirement of the Fair Housing Act. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982) (finding the sole requirement for standing under the Fair Housing Act is the Article III minima of injury in fact); Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that the Supreme Court has long held that claims brought under the Fair Housing Act are to be judged under a "very liberal standing requirement").
Garcia only need allege that as a result of the Village's alleged discriminatory conduct "he suffered a distinct and palpable injury." Havens v. Coleman, 455 U.S. at 372. Garcia alleges that he was required by the Village to move a resident from the basement upstairs to the first floor presumably because the number of people in the basement violates the Village's occupancy code. Salvator Garcia Dep. at 107. Although plaintiffs concede the reasonableness of the occupancy code, plaintiffs continue to press the matter of discriminatory enforcement. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Garcia as the non-movant, as I must on this motion for summary judgment Garcia's allegation is sufficient to meet this standard.
Finally, returning to where I left off in my 12/17/01 Order, expert testimony may begin but I am limiting plaintiffs' expert to an exploration of the Village's discriminatory enforcement of its housing code.
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment [33-1] is GRANTED in part, DENIED in part, and all claims not addressed here or in my 12/17/01 Order are continued.