Opinion
Civil Action No. SA-02-CA-0122 NN
March 20, 2003
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS, IN PART AND DENYING MOTION IN PART
The matter before the Court is defendants' renewed motion to dismiss, plaintiff's response thereto and his supplemental reply (docket entries 27, 28 and 43).
In this lawsuit plaintiff alleges that he was not selected for positions with defendant Texas Department of Human Services (TDHS) in May of 2001, although being the most qualified for these positions, because of his race and in retaliation for prior complaints of employment discrimination, in violation of Title VII. He also claims that defendants J.M. Lindsey and Karen B. Lindsey violated his right to equal protection under the law, actionable under the federal civil rights statutes, when they were treated more favorably than he in 1999 and 2000 when he was terminated from employment with TDHS. He also sues former supervisor Genevieve Manley for her role in recommending that he be suspended and eventually fired in 1999 and 2000.
In a previous lawsuit filed in this Court, plaintiff sued these defendants and others for his suspension and termination resulting from his role in placing icons on a co-worker's computer which TDHS determined were inappropriate and non-work related. During the investigation of the incident, Plaintiff admitted to loading the icons on the work computer and later removing them once he knew they would be the subject of an investigation. Initially, plaintiff implicated his supervisor and co-plaintiff, Carlos Segura, in the incident. Later, during an administrative hearing, he recanted and admitted that he had provided a false statement to an agency investigator regarding Segura's involvement. In an Order affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, plaintiff's claims in the prior suit were dismissed in their entirety. Granting summary judgment, the Court found, inter alia, that plaintiff failed to show that similarly situated employees, not in plaintiff's protected group, were treated differently for the same or similar work rule infractions.
Carlos Segura and Juan A. Garcia v. TDHS, et. al., SA-00-CA-229 OG.
Segura v. TDHS, 2001 WL 685730 (W.D.Tex. 2001), affmd., 37 Fed. Appx. 87 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 444 (2002). In that case, the Court also held that plaintiff failed to show that he had exhausted the administrative prerequisites to filing a Title VII claim and that he was a member of protected group.
In the motion now before me defendants ask the Court to dismiss plaintiff's claims, as replead in the first amended complaint filed on May 20, 2002. In an earlier Order, the Court reviewed the plaintiff's complaint and dismissed the ADEA and Title VII claims against the individual defendants, the ADEA claims against TDHS, and the claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 1983 against TDHS and the individual defendants in their official capacities. Plaintiff was invited to replead his sections 1981 and 1983 claims against the individual defendants in their individual capacities. Plaintiff then filed a First Amended Complaint, which the Court construed as an attempt to state a claim under sections 1981 and 1983 against defendants Manley and J.M. Lindsey and Karen B. Lindsey, in their individual capacities. Defendants responded with the motion now before the Court.
Docket entry 11.
Docket entries 13 and 22.
By their motion defendants request dismissal of plaintiff's claims in their entirety. Specifically, they argue that the Title VII claims against TDHS are barred by collateral estoppel in light of the dismissal of earlier claims filed by plaintiff in the prior lawsuit. They further argue that the individual defendants are shielded by qualified immunity from plaintiff's attempt to state a claim against them. Plaintiff has filed lengthy responses to the motion.
This motion is before me pursuant to the parties' consent pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c), and the October 30, 2002 Order of referral and reassignment of this case to me for all purposes.
Discussion Does Collateral Estoppel Bar Plaintiff's Title VII claims?
Defendant TDHS asks the Court to dismiss plaintiff's Title VII claims as barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Specifically, defendant argues that in the prior case discussed above the Court determined that defendant's motivation for suspending and later terminating plaintiff — i.e., his false statement to the investigators regarding his supervisor's participation in placing the icons on the co-worker's computer — was not discriminatory. Because the court determined that plaintiff's dishonesty was a legitimate motivation for an adverse employment action, defendant continues, it is absolved from liability for refusing to re-hire plaintiff for subsequent openings for this reason.
Collateral estoppel, also called "issue preclusion," prevents the relitigation of issues "actually adjudicated, and essential to the judgment, in a prior litigation between the same parties." It protects a defendant from the burden of litigating an issue, when that issue has been fully and fairly tried in a prior action and resolved against the same party-plaintiff. Both collateral estoppel and res judicata involve the fundamental principle of the common law that "rights, questions or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies."
Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Engineering Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530, 535-536 (5th Cir. 1978).
18 Moore's Federal Practice § 132.01[2] (Matthew Bender 3rd Ed.).
Id. at § 132.01[4][a].
Defendant argues that the issue now before this court was litigated fully and fairly in the prior suit. I cannot agree. In the prior suit the court held that plaintiff failed to show that defendants suspended or terminated him for unlawful, discriminatory reasons. The defendants argued that plaintiff's dishonesty motivated their adverse actions, but the Court stopped short of adopting this position as its finding, for the reason that plaintiff failed to prove that he belonged to a protected group or that he was treated differently than similarly situated co-workers. The issue before this Court in this lawsuit is whether a separate employment decision in 2001 was based on discriminatory reasons. The issues in the present suit turn on different actions by presumably different supervisors over different periods of time. Plaintiff's failure to prove unlawful motivation with respect to the 1999 and 2000 suspension and termination decisions, does not preclude him from attempting to prove that discrimination was the motivation for the 2001 non-selection decision. Accordingly, collateral estoppel does not preclude him from asserting unlawful discrimination in this case, and the defendant's motion to dismiss his Title VII claims against TDHS is denied.
SA-00-CA-229, Memorandum and Recommendation, pp. 29-36, and Order, pp. 4-6, attached to docket entry 27 as Exhibits A and B.
It remains unclear who was responsible for the decision not to hire plaintiff for the May 2001 opening, as defendant submitted its motion based on legal arguments. Given defendant's reliance on collateral estoppel, it is not surprising that its motion was submitted without evidence, such as affidavits explaining who made the decision not to hire plaintiff and why that decision was made.
To underscore the lack of development of this case, plaintiff has thus far failed to plead his Title VII claim as traditionally expected — with reference to his prima facie burden — nor has he submitted a copy of his charge filed with the EEOC. However, his failure to plead the specific facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination does not, at this juncture of the case, warrant dismissal. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002) (reversing order granting motion to dismiss, the Court held that a complaint in an employment discrimination lawsuit need not contain specific facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas, but must contain only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief).
See e.g., Smith v. Western Elec. Co., 770 F.2d 520, 525 (5th Cir. 1985); and Crawford v. Western Electric Co., 614 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1980), on second appeal, 745 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1984) (court refused to apply collateral estoppel in later employment discrimination case to hold that application of employee grading system, found in prior lawsuit to have been discriminatorily applied to four specific employees, was discriminatory in its application to other employees).
Does qualified immunity bar these claims against the individual defendants?
Defendants urge that the remaining claims against the individual defendants are barred by qualified immunity. The defense of qualified immunity need not be addressed in this case as plaintiff has failed to prove a violation of a well-established constitutional right. With respect to defendants J.M. Lindsey and Karen B. Lindsey plaintiff alleges that they were employees of TDHS, and were owners of or employed by a private contractor that provided janitorial services to the Pearsall TDHS office. Plaintiff alleges that the Lindseys violated a work rule which required approval of outside employment, which they had not obtained, and that the Lindseys were not disciplined as severely as he was for the infraction. Plaintiff attempts to couch these allegations as presenting an equal protection claim against the Lindseys. The flaw in his attempt is that even if these facts presented a colorable equal protection claim, the Lindseys are not the "actors" who treated plaintiff differently. Rather, the Lindseys are the beneficiaries of the purported unequal treatment, and as such would not be liable for an equal protection violation.
See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991); and Hayter v. City of Mount Vernon, 154 F.3d 269, 274 (5th Cir. 1998).
Plaintiff's claim against defendant Manley fails as well, but for different reasons. Plaintiff's only references to defendant Manley, in his amended complaint as well as his responses to the motion to dismiss, concern Manley's involvement in his suspension and ultimate termination in 1999 and 2000. In the lawsuit presently before the Court plaintiff complains about his non-selection for a position in May 2001. Insofar as plaintiff attempts to premise a claim on facts surrounding the 1999 and 2000 suspension and termination, any such claim was fully litigated in the prior lawsuit and therefore is barred by res judicata. To the extent he attempts to attach liability to Manley for his non-selection in 2001, he has failed to plead specific facts that connect Manley to any civil rights violation implicated by his non-selection. Accordingly, plaintiff's claims against the individual defendants are dismissed.
The prerequisites to application of res judicata are:
1. Identity of parties, including parties in privity with those in the original suit,
2. Prior judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction,
3. Entry of final judgment on the merits in the original suit, and
4. Same claim or transaction involved in both cases.
Travelers Ins. Co. v. St. Jude Hosp. of Kenner, 37 F.3d 193, 195 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1065 (1995). Both plaintiff Garcia and defendant Manley were parties to the earlier suit, final judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction and affirmed on appeal, and the prior lawsuit involved claims of discrimination arising out of the adverse employment actions which took place in 1999 and 2000. Clearly, res judicata prevents plaintiff from relitigating his claims of discrimination for those adverse actions in this suit.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims against the individual defendants in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 1983 is GRANTED and those claims are ORDERED DISMISSED with prejudice. Defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's Title VII claims is DENIED.