Opinion
C. A. 3:21-1715-JMC-SVH
06-23-2021
Jerome S. Garcia, Plaintiff, v. Donna Strom, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Shiva V. Hodges, United States Magistrate Judge
Jerome S. Garcia (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed this complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against South Carolina Family Court Judge Donna Strom (“Defendant”). Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends this matter be dismissed with prejudice.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff alleges on February 22, 2018, Defendant held a hearing regarding his child support, after he refused to sign an agreement regarding his obligations. [ECF No. 1-1 at 1]. He alleges Defendant acted without jurisdiction and “defaulted” him without due process. Id. at 2.
On June 11, 2021, the undersigned issued an Order and Notice advising Plaintiff this case was subject to summary dismissal because Defendant is entitled to judicial immunity, but permitting Plaintiff to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on June 22, 2021. He argues Defendant is not entitled to judicial immunity because she was not performing a judicial act and because she was allegedly acting without jurisdiction. ECF Nos. 8-1 at 5; 8-2 at 6.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Plaintiff filed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990). Although the court must liberally construe a pro se complaint, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
B. Analysis
Judicial immunity is designed to protect the judicial process. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 226-27 (1988) (“If judges were personally liable for erroneous decisions, the resulting avalanche of suits, most of them frivolous but vexatious, would provide powerful incentives for judges to avoid rendering decisions likely to provoke such suits.”). Judicial immunity protects a judge from any suit for damages based on judicial acts regardless of whether those claims are brought against him in his official capacity or in his individual capacity. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-11 (1991) (per curiam). Additionally, judicial immunity is absolute immunity; it does not merely protect a defendant from assessment of damages, but also protects a judge from damages suits entirely. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11; see also Hamilton v. Murray, 648 Fed.Appx. 344, 344-45 (4th Cir. 2016) (“Judges possess absolute immunity for their judicial acts and are subject to liability only in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.'” (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356- 57 (1978))). Judicial immunity still applies even if the judge commits “grave procedural errors” or commits judicial acts that allegedly were “done maliciously or corruptly.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 355-56, 359; see also Dean v. Shirer, 547 F.2d 227, 231 (4th Cir. 1976) (stating that a judge may not be attacked for exercising judicial authority even if done improperly).
The bar of absolute judicial immunity may be overcome in two limited sets of circumstances: (1) “for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity”; and (2) “for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12. A judge acts in a judicial capacity when the function is one “normally performed by a judge” and when the parties “dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 362. The “relevant inquiry is the ‘nature' and ‘function' of the act, not the ‘act itself.'” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12-13 (citing Stump, 435 U.S. at 362).
Here, although Plaintiff alleges Defendant was acting in an executive function, he attaches an order signed by Defendant as “Judge of the Family Court.” [ECF No. 8-2 at 12]. Therefore, Plaintiff has not alleged facts to show Defendant was acting in a non-judicial capacity. Plaintiff also argues Defendant was acting without jurisdiction. He appears to be claiming that the interaction of the South Carolina Department of Social Services (“DSS”) and the court violates separation of powers. [ECF No. 8-2 at 4 (“The administrative child support process' current structure violates the constitutional constraints on separation of powers ”)] This argument appears to be a state law claim, as the United States Constitution does not define the separation of powers in state governments.This court is unable to conclude based on the allegations of Plaintiff's complaint that Defendant acted without jurisdiction. Therefore, Defendant is entitled to judicial community.
The cases cited by Plaintiff to support his claim that Defendant was without jurisdiction primarily consist of cases from other states that are not binding on this court and appear to be rulings on state laws and state constitutions.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends this case be dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 901 Richland Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).