Opinion
No. 04-04-00642-CV
Delivered and Filed: April 20, 2005.
Appeal from the 38th Judicial District Court, Uvalde County, Texas, Trial Court No. 02-10-23,219-CV, Honorable Mickey R. Pennington, Judge Presiding.
Affirmed.
Sitting: Alma L. LÓPEZ, Chief Justice, Sandee Bryan MARION, Justice, Phylis J. SPEEDLIN, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Isaul Garcia appeals the trial court's judgment declaring that the parties had entered into a binding Rule 11 settlement agreement. Garcia contends that the trial court erred because the agreement dictated into the record did not contain a release or dismissal of the pending claims or state that the agreement was in settlement of the pending case. Garcia further contends that the agreement did not sufficiently describe the property to be sold, the terms of payment, or the method of financing. Because the issues in this appeal involve the application of well-settled principles of law, we affirm the trial court's judgment in this memorandum opinion. See Tex.R.App.P. 47.4.
An agreement to settle a case is enforceable by the trial court if it complies with Rule 11 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See Padilla v. LaFrance, 907 S.W.2d 454, 460 (Tex. 1995). To comply with Rule 11, the agreement must be either: (1) in writing, signed and filed with the papers as part of the record; or (2) made in open court and entered of record. Tex. R. Civ. P. 11; Padilla, 907 S.W.2d at 459. A valid Rule 11 agreement, whether written or oral, must contain all essential terms of the agreement and must be complete in every material detail. See Padilla, 907 S.W.2d at 460; Neasbitt v. Warren, 105 S.W.3d 113, 116 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). The purpose of the rule is to avoid disputes over the terms of oral settlement agreements. Padilla, 907 S.W.2d at 461. Whether a Rule 11 agreement fails for lack of an essential term is a question of law unless there is ambiguity or unless surrounding facts and circumstances demonstrate a factual issue as to an agreement. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Brannon, 67 S.W.3d 294, 298 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.); Ronin v. Lerner, 7 S.W.3d 883, 888 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet); see also McLendon v. McLendon, 847 S.W.2d 601, 606 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied) (holding apportionment of liability for indemnification was not an essential term because the record reflected the essential terms with sufficient detail to determine the obligations of the parties); CherCo Properties, Inc. v. Law, Snakard Gambill, P.C., 985 S.W.2d 262, 266 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, no pet.) (time for performance is not a material term). Although a valid agreed judgment cannot be rendered if one party has withdrawn consent to a Rule 11 agreement, a settlement agreement that complies with Rule 11 can be enforced by the trial court after proper notice and a hearing. Neasbitt, 105 S.W.3d at 117.
In this case, the following was dictated into the record in open court:
MR. TARSKI: This is No. 02-10-23,219-CV, Ricardo R. Rendon and Rosa Rendon versus Isaul Garcia, Jr., d/b/a Vista Builders. I am Paul Tarski, attorney for the plaintiffs, and we have a Rule 11 agreement that we have reached with regard to resolving this matter that we would like to dictate into the record.
We have agreed that on or before Friday, December 5, 2003, the parties will exchange the names of at least two appraisers apiece, which is to be exchanged via Fax before December 5, and the appraiser will appraise two pieces of property on Leona Street. I don't know the addresses.
MR. GONZALEZ [Garcia's attorney]: I think one is 127.
MS. TOOMBS: 127, yes.
MR TARSKI: 127 and 125 I would think.
MS. TOOMBS: 125 or 123.
MR. TARSKI: Anyway, 127 East Leona and the house directly adjacent to it on the west side. They are going to be appraised. Also, if we have one of the same names of an appraiser on each of our lists we will then use that appraiser and split the cost of the appraisal. If we don't have the same name then each of us will pick one appraiser and pay the cost of that appraiser. We will then average the two appraised values in order to determine the price at which Mr. Garcia will purchase the property currently owned by the Rendons. I believe that is our agreement.
MR. GONZALEZ: That's my understanding of the agreement and my client and I are in agreement on that.
MR. TARSKI: As are we.
Because the parties made their agreement in open court and entered it into the record, the parties entered into a valid Rule 11 agreement unless the agreement, as Garcia asserts, did not contain every material detail. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 11 (allowing agreement to be made in open court and entered of record); Padilla, 907 S.W.2d at 460 (requiring agreement to contain every material detail).
Garcia initially contends that the agreement was not complete because it did not contain a release or a statement that the parties would dismiss their respective claims. Garcia, however, cites no authority that directly supports this contention, and his contention is contrary to the facts set forth in one of the seminal cases involving Rule 11 agreements. In Padilla v. LaFrance, the Texas Supreme Court held that a binding Rule 11 agreement existed even though the writings considered by the court did not include language regarding a release or a dismissal of the pending litigation.
We acknowledge that in Roeglin v. Daves, 83 S.W.3d 326, 330 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002, pet. denied), the Austin court stated that a letter lacked the completeness required by Rule 11 because it failed to address: (1) whether the plaintiffs, the Daves, would release the defendant seeking to enforce the agreement, Scott Roeglin, from liability; and (2) whether the Daves would dismiss their suit against Roeglin. We consider this statement to be dicta because the thrust of the Austin court's holding was that the letter did not contain the signature of Roeglin or his attorney. Furthermore, the Austin court recognized that the same letter, which did not refer to a release or a dismissal, confirmed the settlement of disputes between the Daves and Universal Underwriters Insurance Company, the defendant to which the letter was addressed. See id. In fact, the court noted that the letter was originally filed with the district-court clerk "as a Rule 11 agreement between the Daves and Universal." Id. at 329.
Garcia next contends that the agreement is incomplete because it "does not state that it is a settlement of the case." The Rendons' attorney, however, did state that the parties had "a Rule 11 agreement that we have reached with regard to resolving this matter." The use of the term "resolving" as opposed to "settling" does not render the agreement incomplete. See Kilroy v. Kilroy, 137 S.W.3d 780, 785-86 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (describing agreement referring to parties' desire to resolve issues as Rule 11 agreement); see also Massey v. Galvan, 822 S.W.2d 309, 313 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (noting dictionary definition of the term "resolved" included to deal with successfully; clear up doubts or a dispute; to find an answer to; to reach a firm decision).
Finally, Garcia contends that the agreement did not require a purchase of property because it did not describe the property with specificity or mention the terms of payment. The time for performance or payment, however, has been held not to be a material term. CherCo Properties, Inc. v. Law, Snakard Gambill, P.C., 985 S.W.2d at 266. Furthermore, the agreement contained the addresses for the properties which sufficiently identified the properties for purposes of Rule 11. Finally, the agreement stated that the appraisals would "determine the price at which Mr. Garcia will purchase the property," thereby binding Mr. Garcia to purchase the property at the determined price.
Because the Rule 11 agreement contained all the material details, the trial court did not err in concluding that the agreement was binding. The trial court's judgment is affirmed.