Garcia v. People

12 Citing cases

  1. Vries v. Brumback

    53 Cal.2d 643 (Cal. 1960)   Cited 61 times
    Setting forth California law on conspiracy

    Rozenberg v. Sund, 81 Ga. App. 856 [ 60 S.E.2d 390], and Wilson Cypress Co. v. Logan, 120 Fla. 124 [ 162 So. 489], concerned purchasers in good faith of stolen property. People v. Viets, 79 Cal.App. 576 [ 250 P. 588], and Garcia v. People, 88 Colo. 267 [ 295 P. 491], are criminal cases and are therefore not in point. Appellant argues that his civil liability for the conversion of goods pursuant to a conspiracy is governed by People v. Weiss, 50 Cal.2d 535 [ 327 P.2d 527].

  2. People v. Valenti

    49 Cal.2d 199 (Cal. 1957)   Cited 150 times
    In Valenti, the Supreme Court of California adopted a position similar to our position and denied the State's appeal from an order dismissing an information, when the statute provided for an appeal from an order setting aside an information.

    to be noted that the court by this reiteration emphasized that the order in question was one dismissing theaction.] The motion therefor was made on the trial, after issue joined on the merits by plea of not guilty, and was not based on any ground specified in our law as cause for setting aside an indictment, but was designed solely to prevent the further prosecution of the action . . . The superior court had the power to dismiss the action, and the legislature having restricted the right of appeal by the people to certain specified cases of which this is not one, there can be no review of its action." In accord are People v. Baxter (1953), 119 Cal.App.2d 46, 49-50 [ 258 P.2d 1093]; People v. Morris (1953), 115 Cal.App.2d 585, 587 [ 252 P.2d 681]; People v. Rambout (1936), 12 Cal.App.2d 542 [ 55 P.2d 889]; People v. Newman (1931), 113 Cal.App. 679, 690 [ 298 P. 1044]; People v. Cordosco (1926), 77 Cal.App. 780, 783 [ 246 P. 461]; People v. Depavo (1918), 39 Cal.App. 336 [ 178 P. 731]; People v. Garcia (1931), 120 Cal.App. Supp. 767, 769 [7 P.2d 401]. The People suggest that by an extension of our decision in People v. Burke (1956), 47 Cal.2d 45, 51 [4] [ 301 P.2d 241], we should hold that the order here is appealable.

  3. State v. Houston

    211 N.W.2d 598 (Iowa 1973)   Cited 17 times

    But that would be a separate, subsequent offense by the accountant, not the earlier receiving for which defendant was on trial. State v. Dancyger, 51 N.J. Super. 150, 143 A.2d 753; State v. Vanderhave, 47 N.J. Super. 483, 136 A.2d 296; State v. Fox, 12 N.J. Super. 132, 79 A.2d 76; see also Garcia v. People, 88 Colo. 267, 295 P. 491; 76 C.J.S. Receiving Stolen Goods ยง 1 at 2 ("A receiver of stolen goods is not an accessary to a prior receiving or possessing of the same goods."), ยง 14a at 18 ("a receipt by one of those accused at one time and place, and a subsequent receipt by another at another time and place, will not support the joint charge"). The trial court was correct in holding that the accountant was not an accomplice to the receipt of stolen property for which defendant was on trial.

  4. Brown v. People

    124 Colo. 412 (Colo. 1951)   Cited 13 times

    As to all such items, the application for severance was manifestly inadequate and insufficient and no error resulted from its denial. Robinson v. People, 76 Colo. 416, 419, 232 Pac. 672; Garcia v. People, 88 Colo. 267, 295 Pac. 491; Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 12, 300 Pac. 575. From a study of the record it is clear that when the motion for severance was prepared and filed, as well as when argued before the trial court, reliance was had upon the circumstance that in the event of conviction of all of the defendants upon the principal charge, further proceedings upon the habitual criminal counts necessarily would have to be before the same jury. '45 S.L., page 311, chapter 114, section 3. Such has now become the settled and well-established procedure, the history of its background and development being fully detailed in Wolff v. People, supra. Had the court proceeded on the habitual criminal counts by hearing all nine thereof against all three defendants at one and the same time, commingled and together, it is certain that defendant would be here vigorously alleging error on that account.

  5. Kolkman v. People

    89 Colo. 8 (Colo. 1931)   Cited 31 times
    In Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 300 Pac. 575, we said: "In Van Wyk v. People, 45 Colo. 1, 99 Pac. 1009, the defendants were charged with the crime of murder, and the trial court instructed the jury on the law of conspiracy, and this was assigned as error. Upon this question, at page 11, in disposing of this contention, this court said: `It is true that the defendants were not charged with having conspired and confederated together to kill and murder, but they were jointly informed against and charged with murder.

    We have held that, unless the bill of exceptions discloses the admission of prejudicial evidence, no error is committed in denying a motion for a severance; Stone v. People, 71 Colo. 162, 167, 204 P. 897; Sarno v. People, 74 Colo. 528, 531, 223 P. 41. We have also held that the motion for a severance, or the affidavit supporting the same, must set forth the incompetent and prejudicial evidence so as to advise the trial court in determining the question of granting or denying the motion; Robinson v. People, 76 Colo. 416, 419, 232 P. 672; Garcia v. People, 88 Colo. 267, 295 P. 491. The defendant seeks to avoid the rule announced in the Robinson and Garcia cases, supra, by alleging in his verified motion for a separate trial that he "cannot more definitely advise the court as to what the testimony to be offered by the People and which may or will be competent as against Roy Kolkman, and wholly incompetent and prejudicial as to the defendant, will be," and, of course, if the truth of this statement is borne out by the evidence offered at the trial, the motion for a severance would not be insufficient because of defendant's failure to do the impossible.

  6. In re Anthony

    236 Cal.App.4th 204 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015)   Cited 8 times

    โ€œ โ€˜To affect the People's substantial rights[,] an order โ€œmust in some way affect the judgment or its enforcement or hamper the further prosecution of the particular proceeding in which it is made.โ€ โ€™ [Citation.]โ€ (People v. Leonard (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1300, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 57 (Leonard ); McGuire, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 700, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 12 ; People v. Benavides (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 100, 104, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 755 (Benavides ); People v. Garcia (1931) 120 Cal.App.Supp. 767, 770, 7 P.2d 401 (Garcia ).) The California Rules of Court require the appellant's opening brief to include a statement that โ€œthe judgment appealed from is final, or explain why the order appealed from is appealable.โ€

  7. People v. Benavides

    99 Cal.App.4th 100 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 12 times
    Agreeing with Leonard's conclusion that a postconviction order denying the People's request for a no-contact order is not appealable under subdivision

    They claim this concern is particularly true here where the defendant has been sentenced to death and the People are precluded from executing the sentence until postconviction review is completed. "In People v. Garcia (1931) 120 Cal.App.Supp. 767, the court stated in order to affect the People's substantial rights an order 'must in some way affect the judgment or its enforcement or hamper the further prosecution of the particular proceeding in which it is made. [Citations.]' ( Id. at p. Supp. 770.)" ( People v. McGuire (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 687, 701.)

  8. People v. Leonard

    97 Cal.App.4th 1297 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 9 times

    "[I]n order to affect the People's substantial rights an order 'must in some way affect the judgment or its enforcement or hamper the further prosecution of the particular proceeding in which it is made.'" ( People v. McGuire (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 687, 700, quoting People v. Garcia (1931) 120 Cal.App.Supp. 767, 770; People v. Superior Court of Orange County (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 600, 621.) The order denying the People's request for a no-contact order does not affect their substantial rights.

  9. People v. McGuire

    14 Cal.App.4th 687 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 130 times
    In People v. McGuire (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 687, the defendant, like defendant in this case, was convicted of, and sentenced for, both driving under the influence of a controlled substance and being under the influence of methamphetamine.

    (ยง 1238, subd. (a)(5).) In People v. Garcia (1931) 120 Cal.App. Supp. 767 [7 P.2d 401], the court stated in order to affect the People's substantial rights an order "must in some way affect the judgment or its enforcement or hamper the further prosecution of the particular proceeding in which it is made. [Citations.

  10. State v. Torres

    780 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. App. 1989)   Cited 4 times

    McCarthy, however, concerned a jury trial and did not decide when jeopardy attaches in a bench trial. It, however, cites Rosser v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. 1028, 167 S.E. 257 (1933) and People v. Garcia, 120 Cal.App. Supp. 767, 7 P.2d 401 (1931) for the above proposition. Neither of these cases holds that jeopardy attaches in a bench trial when the first witness is sworn.