Opinion
Civil Action No. 05-3479.
April 28, 2006
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Now pending before this court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, by a petitioner currently incarcerated in the State Correctional Institution at Smithfield, in Huntingdon, Pennsylvania. For the reasons which follow, it is recommended that the petition be denied and dismissed.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 27, 1999, following a jury trial presided over by the Honorable William H. Platt, petitioner was convicted of criminal homicide, murder in the first degree. Specifically, petitioner was convicted of shooting the victim, Byron Lamont Jones, to death. On October 13, 1999, the trial court sentenced petitioner to a term of life imprisonment.
Petitioner filed a direct appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. On March 30, 2001, the Superior Court affirmed petitioner's judgement of sentence. Petitioner never filed a petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
On April 2, 2002, petitioner filed a petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541, et seq. Counsel was appointed by the court on April 18, 2002. On January 7, 2003, counsel filed an amended PCRA petition. The PCRA court held a hearing on May 13, 2003. On October 13, 2003, the PCRA court dismissed the petition.
On October 30, 2003, petitioner filed a notice of appeal to the Superior Court. The Superior Court affirmed the PCRA court's decision on August 16, 2004. Petitioner then filed a request for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which was denied on June 16, 2005.
On July 7, 2005, petitioner filed the instant petition seeking habeas corpus relief, claiming:
1. Petitioner's verdict was against the weight of the evidence;
2. There is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for murder in the first degree;
3. The trial court abused its discretion by asking the jury to continue to deliberate after seven hours of deliberation;
4. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to suppress the testimony of certain witnesses; and
5. A conflict of interest existed with petitioner's public defender.
Respondents retort that petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief. Respondents contend that petitioner's first claim is not a cognizable federal habeas claim. Respondents argue that petitioner's second and fourth claims are without merit. Finally, respondents contend that petitioner's third and fifth claims are procedurally defaulted, as they were not properly presented to the state courts, and cannot be presented there now, and thus, the petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be dismissed. We agree.
II. PROCEDURAL DEFAULT
We find petitioner's third and fifth claim are procedurally defaulted.
Before a federal court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner, the prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court.O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999). A petitioner is not deemed to have exhausted the remedies available to him if he has a right under state law to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (1994); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 350, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1059, reh'g denied, 490 U.S. 1076, 109 S. Ct. 2091 (1989). In other words, a petitioner must invoke "one complete round of the state's established appellate review process," in order to exhaust his remedies. O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845. A habeas petitioner retains the burden of showing that all of the claims alleged have been "fairly presented" to the state courts, which demand, in turn, that the claims brought in federal court be the "substantial equivalent" of those presented to the state courts. Santana v. Fenton, 685 F.2d 71, 73-74 (3rd Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1115, 103 S. Ct. 750 (1983). In the case of an unexhausted petition, the federal courts should dismiss without prejudice, otherwise they risk depriving the state courts of the "opportunity to correct their own errors, if any." Toulson v. Beyer, 987 F.2d 984, 989 (3rd Cir. 1993).
However, "[i]f [a] petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred . . . there is procedural default for the purpose of federal habeas . . ." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S. Ct. 2546, reh'g denied, 501 U.S. 1277, 112 S. Ct. 27 (1991); McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 260 (3rd Cir. 1999). The procedural default barrier precludes federal courts from reviewing a state petitioner's federal claims if the state court decision is based on a violation of state procedural law that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729. "In the context of direct review of a state court judgment, [this] doctrine is jurisdictional . . . [b]ecause this Court has no power to review a state law determination that is sufficient to support the judgment." Id. "In the absence of [the procedural default doctrine] in federal habeas, habeas petitioners would be able to avoid the exhaustion doctrine by defaulting their federal claims in state court." Id., at 732.
As noted above, respondents contend that petitioner's third and fifth claim were never properly exhausted in state court and petitioner can no longer bring this claim in state court, hence it is procedurally defaulted. In the event a petitioner brings claims which are procedurally defaulted, he is not entitled to federal habeas review unless he can show that his default should be excuse. Such excuse is allowed only where the petitioner can show "cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.
We find petitioner's third and fifth claim are procedurally defaulted.
Petitioner's third claim is that the trial court abused its discretion by asking the jury to continue to deliberate after seven hours of deliberation. This claim is procedurally defaulted. The claim was never raised in either Pennsylvania Superior Court or the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Petitioner did present a version of this claim as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his PCRA petition. However, an ineffective assistance claim involves a different legal theory and does not exhaust the underlying claim of trial court error in asking the jury to continue their deliberations. Petitioner has failed to exhaust this claim in state court and no longer has the option of doing so. Because petitioner has neither shown that he was unable to comply with the state procedural rules nor alleged a fundamental miscarriage of justice, this Court is precluded from addressing petitioner's claim. Petitioner's third claim is procedurally defaulted and must be dismissed.
Petitioner's fifth claim is that a conflict of interest existed with petitioner's public defender. Petitioner claims that the public defender's office represented both the petitioner and a Commonwealth witness in pretrial hearings. This claim was never presented at an state court level. This claim has not been exhausted and is procedurally defaulted. This court is precluded from now reviewing this claim and it must be dismissed as procedurally defaulted.
III. COGNIZABLE FEDERAL HABEAS CLAIM
Petitioner's first claim is not a cognizable claim in a federal habeas petition. Petitioner claims that petitioner's verdict was against the weight of the evidence. A weight of the evidence claim does not present a federal constitutional issue. A weight of the evidence claim requires an evaluation of the credibility of the evidence presented at trial, and a state court's credibility findings are binding on a federal habeas court. Challenges to the weight of the evidence produced at trial are not cognizable in federal habeas proceedings. See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42-45 (1982); see also Alamo v. Frank, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 274 (E.D.Pa. January 15, 1999). Therefore, this claim is not a cognizable federal habeas claim and must be dismissed without consideration on the merits.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW ON MERIT CLAIMS
Petitioner's remaining claims -2, and 4- are subject to the following standard of review.
Under the current version of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), an application for Writ of Habeas Corpus from a state court judgment bears a significant burden. Section 104 of the AEDPA imparts a presumption of correctness to the state court's determination of factual issues — a presumption that petitioner can only rebut by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (1994). The statute also grants significant deference to legal conclusions announced by the state court as follows:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a state court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
The United States Supreme Court, in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-05, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000), interpreted the standards established by the AEDPA regarding the deference to be accorded state court legal decisions, and more clearly defined the two-part analysis set forth in the statute. Under the first part of the review, the federal habeas court must determine whether the state court decision was "contrary to" the "clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." As defined by Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority of the Court on this issue, a state court decision can be contrary to Supreme Court precedent in two ways: (1) "if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law," or (2) "if the state court confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court]." Id. She explained, however, that this "contrary to" clause does not encompass the run-of-the-mill state court decisions "applying the correct legal rule from Supreme Court cases to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 406.
To reach such "run-of-the-mill" cases, the Court turned to an interpretation of the "unreasonable application" clause of § 2254(d)(1). It found that a state court decision can involve an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent: (1) "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from the Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case," or (2) "if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from our precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply." Id. at 407-08. The Court specified, however, that under this clause, "a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id. at 410.
v. DISCUSSION OF MERITS
Petitioner's claim 2 and 4 have been properly exhausted in the state courts and will now be addressed on the merits.
Petitioner's second claim is that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for murder in the first degree.
When evaluating a claim for insufficiency of due process of law, the court must determine "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). It is of no matter whether this court believes that the evidence at trial established petitioner's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See id., 443 U.S. at 318-19.
In the case at bar, petitioner fails to explain why any rational trier of fact couldn't have found the essential elements of first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally, petitioner offers no compelling argument that verdict reached by the jury was irrational in nature. A review of the evidence show several witnesses who testified to seeing petitioner at the location of the murder, several witnesses who witnesses the shooting of the victim and testified that the shooter wore the same outfit that petitioner was seen wearing that day and was with the same people petitioner was seen with that day. In addition there were witnesses who testified that petitioner admitted to them that he killed the victim. It is clear that this evidence of petitioner's culpability introduced at trial was more than necessary for a first degree murder conviction, and thus petitioner cannot meet the Jackson standard. As such, petitioner is unable to prove that the state court decision involved an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.See Williams, 529 U.S. at 407-08. Therefore, we must dismiss the habeas petition as to this claim.
Petitioner's fourth claim is that trial counsel failed to provide effective assistance. When reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, this court must view the totality of the evidence before the trial court and determine whether the petitioner has shown that the decision reached is reasonably likely to have been different, absent the alleged ineffectiveness of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695, 104 S. Ct. 2052, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267, 104 S. Ct. 3562 (1984). The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution recognizes the right of every criminal defendant to effective assistance of counsel. U.S. Const., amend. VI. The Supreme Court has set forth a two-prong test — both parts of which must be satisfied — by which claims alleging counsel's ineffectiveness are adjudged. Id. at 668. First, the petitioner must demonstrate that his trial counsel's performance fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness." Id. The Supreme Court has explained that:
A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstance of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action "might be considered sound trial strategy." Id. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 76 S. Ct. 158, 163-64 (1955)).
A convicted defendant asserting ineffective assistance must therefore identify the acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the result of reasoned professional judgment. Id. at 690. Then the reviewing court must determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside "the wide range of professionally competent assistance."Id. Under Pennsylvania law, counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise baseless or frivolous issues. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 393 A.2d 1141, 1143 (Pa. 1978).
Second, the petitioner must demonstrate that his counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional error, the result of the proceeding would have been different."Id. at 694. A reviewing court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before considering whether the petitioner suffered any prejudice as a result of the alleged deficiency. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim for lack of the requisite prejudice, that course should be followed. Id. at 697.
In the case at bar, petitioner's fourth claim is that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to suppress the testimony of certain witnesses. Petitioner claims these witnesses were unreliable. The PCRA court reviewed this claim and found that it was meritless. We also find no merit to this claim. Pre-trial motions had already been filed at the time trial counsel became involved in the case. Moreover, the deadline for filing for suppression had expired at the time trial counsel entered his appearance. Counsel can not be found ineffective for failing to file a suppression motion, when counsel was procedurally barred from doing so. Thus counsel cannot be considered ineffective in this instance, and we must dismiss the habeas petition as to this claim and in its entirety.
Therefore, I make the following: