Opinion
No. 4-214 / 03-1127
July 14, 2004
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Sherman W. Phipps, Judge.
Hazel Garcia appeals the district court's denial of her motion for new trial based upon the jury's finding she had been falsely imprisoned but ordering no damages. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Theodore Sporer of Sporer Ilic, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
John Werner and Elizabeth Katz of Grefe Sidney, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellees.
Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Hecht and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Hazel Garcia sued home improvement store Menard, Inc. as well as manager Robert Klein for false imprisonment and other tortious conduct. The jury found that Garcia was falsely imprisoned but awarded no damages. Finding the jury verdict inconsistent, we reverse and remand for new trial.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Hazel and her mentally ill sister Heidi went to a Menard's store in Clive, Iowa. A store employee told Klein that she saw Heidi conceal some carpet clips in her pocket. Klein located the Garcias through the store's surveillance system and sent another employee to find out where the carpet clips had been placed. While Klein was watching the Garcias on camera, he saw Heidi put items in her pockets on "[a]t least three occasions." On three or four occasions, he also saw Heidi remove items she had placed in her pockets and return them to another shelf in the store. He did not see Hazel engage in similar conduct.
From the camera room, Klein observed the Garcias approach the checkout counter. In their cart, he saw icicle clips, cabinet knobs, and light switch plates. For a moment, Klein lost sight of the Garcias due to the angle of the camera. When he was again able to see the cart, the cabinet knobs and icicle clips were no longer on it.
Klein left the camera room and approached the Garcias at the entrance to the store. He asked Heidi where she had placed the missing merchandise and asked her to empty her pockets. Heidi yelled and swore at him and asked that the police be called. Another employee contacted the police.
Meanwhile, the employee who had initially been asked to approach the Garcias retrieved the hardware clips Heidi had abandoned and brought them to Klein. The remaining missing items were located behind the cash register.
The Garcias left the store. Klein followed and stood behind their car to write down the license plate number. At least three other Menard's employees stood near the car.
The police arrived and spoke with the Garcias and with Klein. "[W]ithin a few minutes" after their arrival, Klein apprised the police that the missing items had been found. Police patted down both Hazel and Heidi, and their pockets and car were searched.
Hazel sued, claiming false imprisonment and arrest, harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation. A jury found for Hazel on the false imprisonment count but awarded no damages. Hazel moved for a new trial, arguing in part that the jury verdict was internally inconsistent. The district court denied the motion and this appeal followed.
II. Motion for New Trial — Inconsistent Verdict
A. Preservation of Error.
As a preliminary matter, the defendants assert that Hazel did not preserve error on her assertion that the jury verdict was internally inconsistent. They concede that Hazel raised this issue in her motion for new trial but maintain that, to preserve error, she was required to raise the inconsistency before the jury was discharged.
The defendants cite federal authority to support their argument. See Brode v. Cohn, 966 F.2d 1237, 1239 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting party's right to seek new trial is waived by failure to seek resubmission of allegedly inconsistent verdicts before jury discharged); see also Republic Serv. of Florida, L.P. v. Poucher, 851 So. 2d 866, 870 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2003) (holding plaintiff's failure to object to inconsistent verdict before jury's discharge constituted waiver of issue for appellate review); but seeLove v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 841 A.2d 931, 936 (N.J.Super.Ct. App. Div. 2004) (rejecting as "draconian" federal approach of requiring objection before jury's discharge). They do not cite any Iowa authority mandating this error preservation procedure. Cf. Cowan v. Flannery, 461 N.W.2d 155, 157, 160 (Iowa 1990) (observing that "[t]he trial court should not discharge the jury until it determines the special verdict is consistent and supported by evidence," but noting that claimed inconsistency was raised in motion for new trial or conditional trial); Neumann v. Serv. Parts Headquarters, 572 N.W.2d 175, 176 n. 1 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997) (suggesting the plaintiff should have made her objections to inconsistent verdict before jury was discharged but stating, "Defendant has not contended by agreeing to a sealed verdict plaintiff did not preserve error and we do not address this issue."). Given the absence of cited Iowa authority on this point and the absence of a record on whether Hazel had an opportunity to object to the verdict before the jury was discharged, we proceed to the merits.
B. Merits.
Verdicts that cannot be reconciled "in any reasonable manner consistent with the evidence and its fair inferences, and in light of the instructions of the court" must be set aside. Hoffman v. Nat'l Med. Enter., Inc., 442 N.W.2d 123, 126-27 (Iowa 1989); accordBangs v. Pioneer Janitorial of Ames, Inc., 570 N.W.2d 630, 632 (Iowa 1997) ("If a verdict is internally inconsistent . . . and there is no way to determine the jury's intent, the proper remedy is a new trial.").
The jury was instructed in Instruction No. 7 that Hazel would have to prove all of the following propositions to establish her claim of false imprisonment:
The body of the instruction does not state that the tort being defined is that of false imprisonment. The parties, however, do not dispute this fact. This instruction mirrors the uniform jury instruction on false arrest. See Iowa Civil Jury Instructions 2800.1 (1988). False arrest is one way of committing the tort of false imprisonment and the two torts are essentially indistinguishable. Children v. Burton, 331 N.W.2d 673, 678 (Iowa 1983).
1. The plaintiff was detained against her will.
2. The detention was done by the defendants.
3. The detention or restraint was proximate cause of the plaintiff's damage.
4. The amount of plaintiff's damage.
The jury was further instructed, "If the plaintiff has failed to prove any of these propositions, the plaintiff is not entitled to damages. If the plaintiff has proved all of these propositions, you will consider the defense of shopkeeper's immunity as explained in Instruction No. 10." Instruction No. 7 plainly required Hazel to prove "all" the enumerated propositions, including damage proximately caused by the detention, and the amount of damage. See Hoekstra v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 382 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 1986) (stating court assumes jury follows instruction given); Larimer v. Platte, 243 Iowa 1167, 1170-1171, 53 N.W.2d 262, 264 (Iowa 1952) (stating jury has a duty to follow court's instructions and decide questions submitted to it). Therefore, to have found that the defendants falsely imprisoned Hazel, the jury necessarily had to find that Hazel sustained a certain amount of damage.
Instruction No. 10 stated:
Defendants cannot be held liable for false imprisonment if they have proven all of the following:
1. The person detaining plaintiff was a peace officer, merchant, merchant's employee.
2. The detention was for a reasonable length of time and conducted in a reasonable manner.
3. The person conducting the search had reasonable grounds to believe the person detained or searched was attempting to conceal property with the intent to deprive the owner of the unpurchased property.
If the defendants have failed to prove any of the foregoing elements, then the defendants have not established the defense of shopkeeper's immunity.
The jury did not so find. After deliberating, the jury answered the following questions in the following manner:
Question No. 1: Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that defendants falsely imprisoned plaintiff?
Answer: "yes" or "no."
Answer: yes
Question No. 2: If you answered "yes" to Question No. 1, do you find by the preponderance of the evidence that the defendants have proven the defense of shopkeeper's privilege?
Answer: "yes or "no."
Answer: no
* * * *
Question No. 5: If you answered "no" to Question No. 2 above, what is the amount of damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff?
Past Mental Pain and Suffering $ 0
Future Mental Pain and Suffering $ 0
We believe the jury rendered an inconsistent verdict by awarding zero damages after finding that 1) Hazel proved her false imprisonment claim and 2) the defendants did not prove the shopkeeper's defense. These findings cannot be reconciled with Instruction No. 7. Cf. Cowan, 461 N.W.2d at 160 (finding "illogical" jury's failure to award pain and suffering damages after awarding medical expenses for headaches, neck, and back pain). Because damage is an element of the false imprisonment tort as defined in Instruction No. 7, the jury was required to award some amount of damages. Id. at 159. Its failure to do so mandates a new trial.
In reaching this conclusion, we recognize that the jury was also instructed in a separate instruction that it " may award a plaintiff such damages for false imprisonment as you find she has proven." (Emphasis added). This instruction would have permitted the jury to award zero damages if the jury believed no damages were proven. Here, however, the jury must have found damages were proven, as this was an element of the false imprisonment claim that it accepted. Therefore, it could not award zero damages and this additional instruction does not alter our conclusion that the verdict is inconsistent.
III. Disposition
The next question is whether the new trial should be on damages alone or on liability and damages. New trials are generally granted on all issues, unless a defendant's liability is definitely established. Householder v. Town of Clayton, 221 N.W.2d 488, 493 (Iowa 1974). Specific issues may be retried, instead of a new trial on all issues, when "it appears that the other issues have been rightly settled and that an injustice will not be occasioned." Brandt v. Bockholt, 532 N.W.2d 801, 805 (Iowa 1995). It is unclear how the jury arrived at a zero award of damages having found the defendants liable for a false imprisonment claim that included a damage element. See Cowan, 461 N.W.2d at 159 (stating party who has suffered personal injury as result of another's negligence or fault is entitled to actual or substantial damages). Because the jury was instructed that damage was a predicate to liability, but was also instructed that it "may" award damages, it is possible that jurors "misapprehend[ed] their duty" with respect to an award of damages. Householder, 221 N.W.2d at 493. In light of this potential confusion, we conclude the false imprisonment claim should be retried in its entirety. We reverse and remand for a new trial on Hazel's false imprisonment claim.
We find it unnecessary to address Hazel's challenge to the false imprisonment instruction or to the instruction on shopkeeper's immunity, as the jury ruled in favor of Hazel on both issues, rendering any error harmless. See Blessam v. Howard County Bd. of Supervisors, 295 N.W.2d 836, 847 (Iowa 1980); Blume v. Auer, 576 N.W.2d 122, 125 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). We also find it unnecessary to address Hazel's remaining challenges to the false imprisonment verdict.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Hecht, J., concurs; Vogel, P.J., dissents.
I respectfully dissent with the majority's decision to reverse and remand for new trial based on plaintiff's claim of verdict inconsistency. Because counsel for plaintiff failed to lodge an objection to or suggest clarification of Instruction No. 7 based on its lack of definition, the jury was bound to decide the case on the instructions before them, whether or not they were sound. See Roberts v. Leon Loan Abstract Co., 63 Iowa 76, 80, 18 N.W. 702, 704 (1884).
The majority states, "The jury was instructed in Instruction No. 7 that Hazel would have to prove all of the following propositions to establish her claim of false imprisonment. . . ." (Emphasis added). However, Instruction No. 7 did not include the words "to establish her claim of false imprisonment." It was a definitional instruction that omitted the term it was attempting to define. The majority concedes this point by adding in footnote 1, "The body of the instruction does not state that the tort being defined is that of false imprisonment." Instead, they reason Instruction No. 7 contains the elements of "false imprisonment" and therefore the jury should be able to connect the dots and answer Verdict Form No. 1, Question No. 1 — "Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that defendants falsely imprisoned plaintiff?" — with reference to Instruction No. 7. However, because Instruction No. 7 was not set up as a definitional instruction it did not bind the jury. See Roberts, 63 Iowa at 80, 18 N.W. at 704 (holding that the jury is bound to follow the instructions of the court, whether or not the instructions were sound). We cannot read more into the jury instructions than what is before the jury within the confines of the jury room.
Instruction No. 7 lacked the typical verbiage used in our Uniform Instructions when a word or term is defined that must be proven. See II Iowa Civ. Jury Instructions 2800.1 (1988) ("False Arrest — Essentials For Recovery. False arrest is the unlawful restraint of an individual's personal liberty or freedom of movement. The plaintiff must prove all of the following propositions: . . ."). Here, the instruction is not so clear as it does not state, "False imprisonment is. . . ." Moreover, the majority continues on in footnote 1 stating Instruction No. 7 "mirrors the uniform jury instruction on false arrest," but clearly it does not because it omits the essential definitional posture of the False Arrest instruction.
Therefore, I maintain the lack of clear definition in Instruction No. 7 left the jury free to answer Verdict Form No. 1, Question No. 1, in the affirmative without making the legal inference that the majority concludes the jury must make. ("Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that defendants falsely imprisoned plaintiff? Answer: Yes."). That also left the jury free to move to Verdict Form No. 1, Question No. 5: "[W]hat is the amount of damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff?" (Emphasis added). Because the jury answered "$0," I would conclude that they looked at the "if any" language and decided the plaintiff sustained no damages even though they found the defendants "falsely imprisoned" her.
As no objections to Instruction No. 7 were made regarding clarification that it was setting forth the elements of false imprisonment or that it lacked a definition of false imprisonment, I do not believe the district court abused its discretion in failing to grant plaintiff a new trial based on an assertion of verdict inconsistency.