Garcia v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist.

37 Citing cases

  1. McClung v. Employment Development Dept.

    113 Cal.App.4th 335 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 2 times

    Courts have held the Tort Claims Act presentation requirements do not apply to FEHA claims, even where emotional distress is alleged as a damage component. (Snipes v. City of Bakersfield (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 869-870 (Snipes); Garcia v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 701, 711-712 (Garcia).) The California Supreme Court has also held a plaintiff need not exhaust the FEHA administrative remedy before filing an action for damages alleging related but non-FEHA causes of action such as intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of sexual harassment in the workplace.

  2. Murray v. Oceanside Unified School Dist.

    79 Cal.App.4th 1338 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 82 times
    Holding that "a claim for emotional and psychological damage, arising out of employment, is not barred where the distress is engendered by an employer's illegal discriminatory practices"

    A California Tort Claims Act: Background In Garcia v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 701, 712 ( Garcia), the Court of Appeal described the purposes of the general claims presentation requirement, "which are to give the public entity an opportunity to settle a claim before suit is brought, to permit early investigation of the facts, to facilitate fiscal planning for potential liabilities, and to avoid similarly caused injuries or liabilities in the future. [Citation.

  3. Cole v. City of Los Angeles

    187 Cal.App.3d 1369 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 13 times

    (7) The showing required of a petitioner seeking relief under section 946.6 on the grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect is the same as the showing required under Code of Civil Procedure section 473 for relieving a party from a default judgment. ( Garcia v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 701, 708 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 544].) Although only "neglect" is qualified by the adjective "excusable," it is uniformly held that for relief on any or all of the stated grounds it must be shown that one's misconception was reasonable, or that it might have been the conduct of a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances.

  4. Mastache v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist.

    No. D070504 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 31, 2017)

    We observe that, contrary to the court's ruling, in view of plaintiff's allegations as to her EEOC complaint, claims presentation requirements do not extend to her claims brought under FEHA. Such actions are excused from the government claim filing requirements. (See Murray v. Oceanside Unified School District (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1360; Garcia v. Los Angeles Unified School District (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 701, 711; Snipes v. City of Bakersfield (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 861.) In Garcia, the plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC alleging discrimination based on sex, national origin and retaliation for filing an earlier EEOC complaint, obtained a right to sue letter, and filed an action in superior court alleging harassment and discrimination resulting in humiliation, mental anguish and emotional distress.

  5. Barragan v. County of Los Angeles

    184 Cal.App.4th 1373 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 42 times
    In Barragan, the plaintiff was rendered quadriplegic in a car accident, and she endured a lengthy hospitalization and recovery that extended over 10 months.

    "It is precisely because theories of third party liability are subtle, complex, and often not readily apparent to a layman that due diligence requires at least consultation with legal counsel." ( DoT, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 46; see Harrison v. County of Del Norte (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 1, 7-8 [ 213 Cal.Rptr. 658]; cf. Garcia v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 701, 708 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 544] [similar analysis with respect to lack of knowledge of claim filing requirements].) Because of this, the Munoz court stated that there is a "rule[]" that "a [claimant] may not successfully argue excusable neglect when he or she fails to take any action in pursuit of the claim within the six-month period.

  6. State Dept. of Transportation v. Superior Court (Kimberley L. Fairfax)

    No. B217319 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 24, 2009)

    Thus, they fail to show the “minimum” effort required to establish excusable neglect under section 946.6. (Ebersol, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 439.) To the contrary, plaintiffs’ situation is more akin to that of the plaintiff in Garcia v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 701 (Garcia). In that case, in order to establish excusable neglect, the plaintiff submitted her own declaration that she was unaware of the filing requirement and was never advised of it.

  7. Sanchez v. City of Los Banos

    No. F052641 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2008)

    ” (Id. at p. 9.) In Garcia v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 701, plaintiff resigned her teaching post with the district on April 25, 1983. On August 3, 1983, she filed a complaint with the EEOC, alleging harassment and discrimination by the district.

  8. Munro v. Regents of University of California

    215 Cal.App.3d 977 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 124 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding physician has no duty to inform patient of course of treatment or diagnosis that is not generally accepted

    Plaintiffs note that an exception to the rule exists where the new theory presents a strict question of law and is based on the pleadings and declarations before the trial court and contained in the record on appeal. ( Garcia v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 701, 709 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 544].) They argue that under this exception they are entitled to raise the issue whether testing for Tay-Sachs was performed by asking plaintiffs whether they are Jewish.

  9. People v. Sue Sarkis Bail Bonds

    182 Cal.App.3d 650 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 5 times
    In People v. Sue Sarkis Bail Bonds, supra, 182 Cal.App.3d at page 655, the Court of Appeal considered whether the imposition of an assessment of $50 for a portion of the county's costs in sending out bench warrants was a "just" condition of vacating the bail forfeiture within the meaning of section 1305.

    A contention based on undisputed facts which presents only a question of law may be considered on appeal even though the contention was not raised in the trial court. ( Garcia v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 701, 709 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 544]; La Mancha Dev. Corp. v. Sheegog (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 9, 14 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 59].) (7) The issue belatedly raised by appellant involves a mixed question of law (construction of section 1305) and fact (the trial court's practice of imposing conditions pursuant to the statute). As to the question of fact the evidentiary record is silent, appellant having adduced no evidence below in support of its present claim of discrimination based on the trial court's asserted inconsistency in imposing conditions for the vacation of forfeiture of the various forms of pretrial release.

  10. Hunter v. FCA U.S., LLC

    22-cv-06777-HSG (N.D. Cal. Jul. 27, 2023)   Cited 1 times

    The Court finds no reasonable basis to dispute that “punitive damages” under the CLRA must be a subset of “damages,” which are a type of legal rather than equitable relief. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422 (explaining that a “punitive damages remedy is legal, not equitable, relief”) (citation omitted); Garcia v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 173 Cal.App.3d 701, 710 (1985) (explaining that “punitive damages are legal not equitable remedies”). And Plaintiff's caveat that he only seeks such relief “to the extent available under governing law” (which counsel now argues really means “and the extent to which punitive damages are available is ‘not at all'”), Remand Reply at 5 (citing Compl., Prayer for Relief)