Id. at 847 (quoting Nat'l Can Corp. v. Whittaker Corp., 505 F.Supp. 147, 148 n. 2 (N.D.Ill. 1981)). See People v. Thorpe, 52 Ill.App.3d 576, 10 Ill.Dec. 351, 367 N.E.2d 960, 963 (1977) ("Where two or more appellate districts are in conflict the circuit [trial] court should follow the decision of the appellate court of its district."); Garcia v. Hynes Howes Real Estate, Inc., 29 Ill.App.3d 479, 331 N.E.2d 634, 636 (1975) (holding that "[t]he opinions of any Appellate Court necessarily are binding on all Circuit [trial] Courts across the State, but not on the other branches of the Appellate Court"). The rule of these two cases is known as the Thorpe-Garcia rule and was approved by the Supreme Court of Illinois, which, citing Thorpe and Garcia, stated that a trial court "faced with conflicting decisions from the various appellate districts and, in the absence of controlling authority from its home district, . . . [is] free to choose between the decisions of the other appellate districts."
In a case in which no supreme court decision exists and the appellate district of proper state venue has not yet taken a position on an issue, Commercial Discount would require a federal court to follow the law as declared by the other appellate districts. Commercial Discount, 552 F. Supp. at 848 (citing People v. Thorpe, 52 Ill. App.3d 576, 579, 10 Ill.Dec. 351, 354, 367 N.E.2d 960, 963 (2d Dist. 1977) and Garcia v. Hynes Howes Real Estate, Inc., 29 Ill. App.3d 479, 482, 331 N.E.2d 634, 636 (3d Dist. 1975)). However, the very fact that the various Illinois appellate districts sometimes conflict on an issue of law indicates the problem inherent in the state trial court approach.
It acted properly under the Illinois rule of stare decisis between the various districts of the appellate court. ( Garcia v. Hynes Howes Real Estate, Inc. (1975), 29 Ill. App.3d 479, 331 N.E.2d 634.) Under that rule, in the absence of a supreme court decision directly in point, a circuit court should follow the precedent of the appellate court of its district, if such precedent exists.
( Gogginv. Fox Valley Construction Corp. (1977), 48 Ill. App.3d 103, 365 N.E.2d 509; Garcia v. Hynes Howes Real Estate, Inc. (1975), 29 Ill. App.3d 479, 331 N.E.2d 634; Hanavan v. Dye (1972), 4 Ill. App.3d 576, 281 N.E.2d 398; and Weck v. A:M Sunrise Construction Co. (1962), 36 Ill. App.2d 383, 184 N.E.2d 728.) The alleged defects in the residence had to render the home uninhabitable.
The decisions of an appellate court are binding precedent on all circuit courts regardless of locale. (See, e.g., Garcia v. Hynes Howes Real Estate, Inc., 29 Ill. App.3d 479, 481 (1975). Cf. United Mine Workers of America Hospital v. United Mine Workers of America District No. 50, 52 Ill.2d 496, 499 (1972).
Therefore, opinions of any one branch of the appellate court, while binding on the circuit courts in Illinois, are not binding on the other branches of the appellate court. See Garcia v. Hynes Howes Real Estate, Inc., 331 N.E.2d 634, 636 (Ill.App.Ct. 1975). Under the New Mexico GBMI scheme, if a defendant asserts a defense of insanity, the trial court provides the jury with a special verdict form of GBMI and instructs the jury that it may return a verdict of GBMI instead of a verdict of guilty or not guilty. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-9-3(E).
Although Sundstrand Corp. was unsuccessful in the Second District of the Appellate Court of Illinois, Huber might have obtained a different result in the Fourth District where it would have filed. Decisions of the various Districts of the Appellate Court of Illinois are not binding on other Districts. Garcia v. Hynes Howes Real Estate, Inc., 29 Ill.App.3d 479, 482, 331 N.E.2d 634 (3rd Dist. 1975). Because the district court was without jurisdiction to decide this case on the merits, its judgment is vacated.
This Court has frequently expressed its view of the real mandate of Erie in a situation where (as in Illinois) state law includes a substantive rule requiring trial courts to adhere to currently-viable intermediate appellate court decisions, even where a trial judge believes the state's highest court might reach a different decision if given the opportunity (e.g., Rizzo v. Means Services, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 1115, 1131-33 (N.D.Ill. 1986); Abbott Laboratories, 573 F. Supp. at 196-200). But the very nature of the distinction between holdings and dicta (see United States v. Crawley, 837 F.2d 291 (7th Cir. 1988)) explains why the rule in such cases as People v. Thorpe, 52 Ill.App.3d 576, 579, 10 Ill.Dec. 351, 354, 367 N.E.2d 960, 963 (2d Dist. 1977) and Garcia v. Hynes Howes Real Estate, Inc., 29 Ill.App.3d 479, 482, 331 N.E.2d 634, 636 (3d Dist. 1975) does not force Illinois trial courts to follow dicta from their own appellate courts. In turn, a federal district court is in no different (or lesser) position under Erie.
But not one of those statements has dealt in terms with the situation (which may or may not be unique to Illinois) where an integral part of Illinois substantive law — which we federal judges are duty-bound to adhere to and follow under Erie — is a rule that mandates every Illinois trial court to follow current opinions in its own Appellate District, even if it might prefer the differing views of another Appellate District (or even if it believed the Illinois Supreme Court, given the opportunity, might opt for the other District's view). People v. Thorpe, 52 Ill. App.3d 576, 579, 10 Ill.Dec. 351, 354, 367 N.E.2d 960, 963 (2d Dist. 1977); Garcia v. Hynes Howes Real Estate, Inc., 29 Ill. App.3d 479, 482, 331 N.E.2d 634, 636 (3d Dist. 1975). Ordinarily the job of a state trial court, in the absence of controlling state supreme court precedent, is to make its best effort to decide what its supreme court would do if faced with the same problem. That task really accounts for the opinions that express a federal court's responsibilities in the same terms where state law is to provide the rule of decision.
Illinois' "internal" choice of law rule is that a state trial court is bound by the decisions of all the intermediate Appellate Courts, but is bound by the Appellate Court in its own district when the Appellate Courts differ. People v. Thorpe, 52 Ill. App.3d 576, 579, 10 Ill.Dec. 351, 354, 367 N.E.2d 960, 963 (2d Dist. 1977); Garcia v. Hynes Howes Real Estate, Inc., 29 Ill. App.3d 479, 482, 331 N.E.2d 634, 636 (3d Dist. 1975). And see this Court's further discussion in Commercial Discount, 552 F. Supp. at 851 n. 8.