Opinion
No. 04-05-00538-CV
Delivered and Filed: June 21, 2006.
Appeal from the 49th Judicial District Court, Zapata County, Texas, Trial Court No. 5694, Honorable Manuel R. Flores, Judge Presiding.
Affirmed.
Sitting: Alma L. LÓPEZ, Chief Justice, Sandee Bryan MARION, Justice, Rebecca SIMMONS, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal of a summary judgment in a declaratory judgment action seeking to interpret a 1957 warranty deed. The trial court concluded that the deed was unambiguous and conveyed all of the surface estate and all of the oil, gas and other minerals that the grantors owned in the described tract of land. The appellants assert that the trial court erroneously construed the deed or, in the alternative, that the deed was ambiguous. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
In 1957, the appellants' predecessors executed a deed conveying certain land to the appellees' predecessors. The deed conveyed the following:
all that certain lot, tract or parcel of land, situated in the County of Zapata, State of Texas, more particularly described as follows, to-wit:
Eighteen (18) acres of land, more or less, undivided, being all out right, title and interest in and to 891.30 acres of land, more or less, in Porciones Nos. 34 and 35, Zapata County, Texas, and being all of the tract described as 899 acres in Quit Claim Deed from Dionicio Garcia to Santiago Garcia Benavides dated March 31, 1944, and recorded in Volume 52, Pages 601-02 of the Zapata County Deed Records, which tract is designated as Parcel Z-253-B in Judgment on Declaration of Taking No. 6, in Civil Action No. 529, In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas Laredo Division, United States of America, Plaintiff vs. 85,237 acres of land, more or less, in Zapata County, State of Texas, Flumencio Munoz, et al., which Judgment on Declaration of taking No. 6, is recorded in Volume 70, Pages 429-433 of the Zapata County Deed Records, to which reference is hereby made for a metes and bonds description of said 891.30 acre tract of land, and for any and all other purposes.
This conveyance is expressly made subject to all rights acquired by the United States of America in said 891.30 acre tract, under and by virtue [of] that certain proceeding in Condemnation in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Laredo Division by Civil Action No. 529, styled United States of America, Plaintiff vs. 85,237 acres of land, more or less, in Zapata County, State of Texas, Flumencio Munoz, et al, Defendants, and reference is here made to all orders and judgments entered by said court in Civil Action No. 529 for all purposes, but in this connection it is the intention of the Grantors herein to sell and convey to the Grantee herein all interest of every kind and character, and from whatever source acquired, in and to said entire 891.30 acre tract.
In April of 2004, the appellees filed a petition seeking a declaratory judgment to construe the deed as conveying all of the right, title, and interest the grantors owned as of the date of the deed, which the petition asserted to include eighteen surface acres and an undivided 60.2395 oil, gas and other mineral acres. After the appellants filed a general denial, the appellees filed a traditional motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment concluding that the deed was unambiguous and conveyed all of the interest the grantors owned in both the surface and mineral estates.
Discussion
The party moving for summary judgment carries the burden of establishing that no material fact issue exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel, 997 S.W.2d 217, 223 (Tex. 1999). When interpreting a deed just as in interpreting a contract, the intent of the parties is to be determined from the express language found within the four corners of the document. Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 461-63 (Tex. 1991); Walker v. Foss, 930 S.W.2d 701, 704 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ). Construction of an unambiguous deed is a question of law to be resolved by the court. Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 461; Walker, 930 S.W.2d at 704. All parts of the deed are to be harmonized, construing the instrument to give effect to all of its provisions. Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 462; Walker, 830 S.W.2d at 704.
The construction of the deed in this case is governed by a line of cases that discuss the effect of a general granting clause that broadens a specific granting clause. See, e.g. Holloway's Unknown Heirs v. Whatley, 131 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. 1939); Sun Oil Co. v. Burns, 84 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. 1935); Katz v. Bakke, 265 S.W.2d 686 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1954, writ ref'd). Each of these cases is instructive.
In Whatley, F.H. Holloway conveyed three tracts of land in Liberty County to M.H. Reed, excepting from the conveyance by reservation in the deed an undivided one-half interest in the minerals. 131 S.W.2d at 90. Approximately three years later, Holloway conveyed additional land in Liberty County to Jacob C. Baldwin. Id. The deed specifically described two tracts of land and then provided:
If there is any other land owned by me in Liberty County, Texas, or any land, the title to which stands in my name, it is hereby conveyed, the intention of this instrument being to convey all land owned by me in said County.
Id. at 90. A subsequent dispute arose over whether the second deed conveyed to Baldwin the one-half interest in minerals that was reserved in the first deed. Id. The Texas Supreme Court concluded that the clause in the deed quoted above intended to include the previously excepted mineral estate. Id. at 92. The court noted, "Unless its purpose is to enlarge the grant described in the immediately preceding language, it has no purpose at all. . . ., the language in its entirety is rendered certain by the concluding statement of the description that it was the grantor's intention to convey all of the land owned by him in Liberty County." Id. at 91-92.
Similarly, in Sun Oil Co., an oil and gas lease specifically described a tract of land that was subject to the lease. 84 S.W.2d at 443. Following the specific description was the following:
It being the intention, however, of lessor to include within the terms of this lease not only the above described land, but also any and all other land owned or claimed by lessor in said survey or surveys in which the above described land is situated or in adjoining surveys and adjoining the above described land.
Id. The sole question presented on appeal was whether the lease covered a tract of land immediately south of the tract specifically described in the lease. Id. In holding that the lease included the other tract, the Texas Supreme Court reasoned:
This language [quoted above] needs no construction. It is not fairly susceptible of more than one interpretation. It not only shows, but it declares in plain and unmistakable terms, the intention of the grantor to include within the lease, not only the land particularly described, but also any other land owned or claimed by the lessor in the same survey or in adjoining surveys and adjoining the land particularly described.
Id. at 444. The court noted that a particular description only controls over a general description if there is a conflict or repugnance. Id. at 446-47. All rules of construction relating to particular and general descriptions are "not to be used when the grantor's true intention clearly and unmistakably appears, as in our opinion it does in this case, from the language of the entire instrument. A general description will prevail over a particular description when it is apparent from the instrument that the parties intended that the general should control." Id. at 445-46 (citations omitted).
Finally, in Katz, the appellant, Sid Katz, received a deed describing the royalty interest he purchased from Reconstruction Finance Corporation ("RFC") as an undivided one-eighth non-participating interest in all mineral royalties in, on and under a specifically described tract of land for a period of fifteen years. 265 S.W.2d at 687. At the time of the conveyance to Katz, RFC had retained another undivided one-eighth mineral interest in the same tract which it subsequently conveyed to W.E. Bakke. Id. The deed to Bakke conveyed the interest for so long as the oil and gas were produced in paying quantities. Id. The deed further provided:
It being intended hereby to convey to the Grantee herein all the right, title, interest and estate in and to any and all minerals owned by the undersigned in or under said land hereinabove described, except as to those minerals hereinafter specifically excepted from this conveyance.
Id. The deed then excepted uranium, thorium, and other fissionable materials. Id. Bakke later conveyed his interest to T.J. Goad. Id.
When fifteen years had passed from the date of the deed to Katz, the producer advised him that his term royalty had expired. Id. at 687. Katz filed suit urging that it was the intent of the parties for RFC to convey the royalty for so long as oil, gas or other minerals were produced in paying quantities. Id. Goad claimed that he owned the reversionary interest that arose at the end of the fifteen year term by reason of the above-quoted language by which RFC conveyed all of its right, title, interest and estate to all minerals owned in or under the specifically described land. Id. at 688. In rejecting Katz's position, this court reasoned:
Nor is the 1951 deed to Bakke ambiguous. There is no repugnance between the blanket granting clause and the particular granting clause. The blanket clause broadens and enlarges upon the particular. An attorney examining an abstract for Bakke or Goad could see and understand at once that the term royalty to Katz would revert fifteen years after May 21, 1937; and would understand that a deed which thereafter expressly conveyed "any and all minerals" owned by RFC "in and under said land," describing such lands, would include that reversionary interest.
Id.
The appellants in this case largely rely on Cullers v. Platt, 16 S.W. 1003 (Tex. 1891), to contend that the general description should not be used to enlarge the specific description. However, the Texas Supreme Court explained the reason for its holding in Platt in Sun Oil Co. See Sun Oil Co., 84 S.W.2d at 446. The court noted that the rule of construction announced in Platt is not given broad application and effect. Id. The court concluded that the particular description was held to control in Platt because "there was a repugnance between the description by metes and bounds and the general description, since the two tracts particularly described were not in fact all of the Tyson survey except the Montgomery tract, as the general description stated." Id. In this case, no conflict or repugnance exists between the specific and general descriptions.
The appellees also cite to the Texas Supreme Court's recent opinion in J. Hiram Moore, Ltd. v. Greer, 172 S.W.3d 609 (Tex. 2005). In Greer, however, as in Platt, the deed contained a repugnance. The deed in Greer initially conveyed all mineral royalties in a specific tract of land in Wharton County, Texas. 172 S.W.3d at 612. The deed then provided,
it is the intent of this instrument to convey, and this conveyance does so include, all of grantors [sic] royalty and overriding royalty interest in all oil, gas and other minerals in the above named county or counties, whether actually or properly described herein or not, and all of said lands are covered and included herein as fully, in all respects, as if the same had been actually and properly described herein.
Id. The problem with the deed in Greer was that the specific description referred to a survey in which the grantor owned no interest. Id. at 614. The court concluded, "The deed in effect states that Greer conveys nothing, and that she conveys everything." Accordingly, the court held that it could not construe the deed as a matter of law given its ambiguity.
Because the deed in this case does not contain a conflict or repugnance, we agree with the trial court that the deed is unambiguous and that the general description enlarges on the particular description. As Justice Hecht noted in his concurring opinion in Greer, "[s]ituations in which general grants cannot be given effect have not arisen frequently" and "it only rarely happens that general grants cannot be given literal effect." 172 S.W.3d at 616 (Hecht, J., concurring). In this case, the trial court properly gave the general grant literal effect. The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
The appellants also assert that a general description or "cover-all" clause is only intended to convey small strips of land. In Greer, Justice Hecht noted that a similar argument made in that case, i.e., "that general grants can never include more than small strips of adjacent specifically described property," was "squarely rejected" in Whatley and Sun Oil Co. and was "at least inconsistent" with three other decisions. 172 S.W.3d at 615 (Hecht, J., concurring).