Opinion
C. A. 3:21-1359-JMC-SVH
04-06-2022
Jerome Garcia, Plaintiff, v. A.K. Enzor and Willie McCauley, Jr., State Troopers, Defendants.
ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Shiva V. Hodges United States Magistrate Judge
Jerome Garcia (“Plaintiff”) alleges his rights were violated as a result of a traffic stop, arrest, and vehicle search that occurred on Interstate-26 in Calhoun County, South Carolina, on July 10, 2019. The state troopers involved in the stop argue: (1) that Plaintiff's claims are barred because he was convicted on the relevant charges and served the associated sentence; and (2) if not barred, Plaintiff's claims should be otherwise dismissed.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, against A.K. Enzor (“Enzor”) and Willie McCauley, Jr. (“McCauley”) (collectively “Defendants”), both in their individual capacities. [ECF No. 8-1 ¶ 32]. Plaintiff seeks monetary relief. [See ECF No. 8 at 5].
This matter comes before the court on Defendants' motion for summary judgment. [ECF No. 57]. Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Plaintiff of the dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to Defendants' motion. [ECF No. 58]. Plaintiff filed a response to Defendants' motion on March 3, 2022, while incarcerated, and a supplemental response on March 22, 2022, after his release. [ECF Nos. 66, 68]. Also pending before the court is Plaintiff's motion to stay. [ECF No. 60].
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(f) (D.S.C.), this matter has been referred to the undersigned for all pretrial proceedings. For the following reasons, the undersigned denies Plaintiff's motion to stay and recommends the district judge grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On July 10, 2019, Plaintiff was traveling on Interstate-26 to Charleston, South Carolina, with his employer, Jessica Gunter (“Gunter”). [ECF No. 8-1 ¶ 2]. Plaintiff states his vehicle did not have a license plate, and law enforcement pulled him over. Id. ¶ 4.
Enzor approached the vehicle because of the lack of license plate, and the parties agree that Plaintiff refused to provide any information as to his identity or concerning the vehicle, with Plaintiff asserting his Fifth Amendment rights and telling Enzor that he could talk to Plaintiff's attorney. [ECF Nos. 8-1 ¶¶ 5-6, ECF No. 57-2 ¶ 3, ECF No. 57-2 ¶ 10 (dash cam video)]. The parties additionally agree that Enzor then requested back up, and McCauley, a sergeant with the South Carolina Highway Patrol, as well as deputies from Calhoun County Sheriff's Office (“CCSO”), thereafter arrived. [ECF Nos. 8-1 ¶¶ 7-8, ECF No. 57-2 ¶ 4, ECF No. 57-3 ¶¶ 1-2].
Plaintiff also has submitted electronic evidence in the form of video from Gunter's cell phone, although, during the time she was recording, she was physically removed from the interactions between Plaintiff and Defendants and did not record any of the relevant audio. [See ECF No. 9].
Plaintiff states he was placed under arrest “without any articulated facts of any crime,” although he was informed as to a “civil infraction.” [ECF Nos. 8-1¶ 9; see also ECF No. 57-2 ¶ 10 (dash cam video with Enzor informing Plaintiff that he was pulled over for not having a license plate and because Enzor believed the vehicle was not registered)]. Enzor arrested Plaintiff, read him his Miranda rights, and placed him in the patrol vehicle; Enzor attests that because the vehicle contained no license plate and there was no proof of insurance, the vehicle was towed and impounded. [ECF No. 57-2 ¶¶ 4-5, ECF No. 57-3 ¶ 3, see also ECF No. 57-2 ¶ 10].
Both parties agree that prior to the vehicle being towed, Plaintiff's vehicle was searched, although Defendants deny that anything was removed from it, as alleged by Plaintiff, including any “court paperwork of my federal lawsuits.” [ECF Nos. 8-1 ¶¶ 10-12, ECF No. 57-2 ¶ 9, ECF No. 57-3 ¶ 3, see also ECF No. 57-2 ¶ 10]. Enzor attests that while he was conducting an inventory search of the vehicle, based on a picture identification found in the glove box, he was able to determine Plaintiff's identify and learned that Plaintiff was driving with a suspended license for failure to pay a traffic ticket and that the vehicle was registered to Isabel Maria Ramos, 16924 Millstone Drive, La Puente, California 29053. [ECF No. 57-2 ¶ 6].
Plaintiff was charged with driving under suspension, first offense; operation or permitting operation of vehicle which is not registered and licensed; and uninsured motor vehicle, first offense, ticket numbers 20192410977926, 20192410977927, and 20192410977928. [ECF No. 8-1 at 56 (tickets), ECF No. 57-2 ¶ 7, ECF No. 57-2 at 5-7 (tickets)].
Plaintiff filed his complaint on May 6, 2021, and an amended complaint on June 4, 2021. [ECF Nos. 1, 8]. The trial concerning Plaintiff's charges was held on November 2, 2021, before Calhoun County Magistrate Jeffrey P. Bloom. [ECF No. 57-2 ¶ 11]. Plaintiff did not appear, and he was found guilty in a jury trial held in his absence. [ECF No. 57-2 ¶ 11, ECF No. 57-2 at 11 (verdict form)].
Plaintiff argues he was not properly notified about his jury trial and that documents he should have received regarding his trial were delivered to the wrong address. [ECF No. 68 at 4, ECF No. 66 at 3, ECF No. 66-1]. The undersigned notes the documents Plaintiff referenced are currently part of the record before the court except for the incident report and Plaintiff's driving record. [See ECF No. 66-1].
Magistrate Bloom issued a bench warrant on November 2, 2021. [ECF No. 57-2 at 13]. Defendants filed their instant motion for summary judgment on January 24, 2022, apparently prior to Plaintiff's arrest on the bench warrant. [See ECF No. 57-1 at 3]. At some point, Plaintiff was incarcerated, and the parties agree he was sentenced to 90 days. [ECF No. 65 at 2]. Plaintiff appears to have been released from custody prior to March 22, 2022. [ECF No. 66 at 1].
The undersigned notes Plaintiff filed numerous complaints asserting violations of his rights similar to those asserted here against various state agencies, judges, and individuals. See, e.g., Garcia v. Childs, C. A. No. 3:21-4066-MGL-PJG (filed Dec. 17, 2021); Garcia v. South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles, C. A. No. 3:21-2780-JMC-SVH (filed August 27, 2021); Garcia v. Bloom, C. A. No. 5:21-4035-JMC-SVH (filed Dec. 14, 2021); Garcia v. Strom, C. A. No. 3:21-1715-JMC-SVH (filed June 9, 2021); Garcia v. Shwedo, C. A. No. 3:21-1318-JMC-SVH (filed May 4, 2021); Garcia v. McBride, C. A. No. 3:20-695-JMC-SVH (filed February 11, 2020); and Garcia v. Dwyer, C. A. No. 3:20-694-JMC-SVH (filed February 11, 2020).
II. Discussion
A. Standard on Summary Judgment
The court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is appropriate; if the movant carries its burden, then the burden shifts to the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). If a movant asserts that a fact cannot be disputed, it must support that assertion either by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials;” or “showing . . . that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248. Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts that set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Analysis
1. Plaintiff's Arrest
Plaintiff's claims for damages for alleged false arrest and imprisonment are barred by the United States Supreme Court's holding in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the Court stated the following:
We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.Id. at 486-87.
In addressing a claim for damages, “the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Judgment in Plaintiff's favor on his false arrest and imprisonment claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his subsequent conviction. Because Plaintiff fails to demonstrate he has successfully challenged his convictions, Heck bars his claims.
In Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007), the Supreme Court clarified that Heck does not apply in the pre-conviction setting. Id. at 393. The Wallace Court stated a stay of the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is appropriate in such instances:
If a plaintiff files a false-arrest claim before he has been convicted (or files any other claim related to rulings that will likely be made in a pending or anticipated criminal trial), it is within the power of the district court, and in accord with common practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended .... If the plaintiff is ultimately convicted, and if the stayed civil suit would impugn that conviction, Heck will require dismissal; otherwise, the civil action will proceed, absent some other bar to suit.Id. at 393-94.
Here, however, Plaintiff has already been convicted and served his sentence. Therefore,Wallace is inapplicable, and Heck requires dismissal.
As discussed below, Plaintiff's pending motion to stay does not concern a stay of this case pending resolution of any of his criminal proceedings, including a direct appeal, potential post-conviction relief, or any federal habeas corpus proceedings. Because Plaintiff has not moved for a stay pending resolution of any further criminal proceedings, the undersigned declines to address Defendants' related arguments. [See ECF No. 65 at 2-3 (citing Workman v. Richardson, C. A. No. 6:17-01208-RBH, 2018 WL 6829014, at *2 (D.S.C. Dec. 27, 2018), aff'd sub nom. Workman v. Metro PCS Mobile Phone Co., 767 Fed.Appx. 580 (4th Cir. 2019))].
2. Search of Plaintiff's Vehicle
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. It is well-settled that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject to only a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff's vehicle, in particular his glove box, was searched without his consent and without a warrant. Instead, Defendants argue that the search was reasonable pursuant to the second Gant holding and as an inventory search.
Defendants additionally argue that Plaintiff's claims concerning the search of his vehicle are barred by Heck. Most circuit courts of appeal have held that “[b]ecause an illegal search or arrest may be followed by a valid conviction, a successful § 1983 action for Fourth Amendment search and seizure violations does not necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction. As a result, Heck does not generally bar such claims.” Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases). “The Heck analysis requires a close factual examination of the underlying conviction,” as Heck bars § 1983 claims only “if it is clear from the record” that a successful claim would necessarily imply that the plaintiff's earlier conviction was invalid. Riddick v. Lott, 202 Fed.Appx. 615, 616 (4th Cir. 2006). Here, it is not clear from the record that Plaintiff's claims regarding the search of his vehicle would necessarily imply that his convictions were invalid; accordingly, the undersigned address Plaintiff's claims on the merits.
In Gant v. Arizona, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), the United States Supreme Court held that “[p]olice may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.” Id. at 351. The Fourth Circuit has referred to these as the “first Gant holding” and the “second Gant holding.” See United States v. Davis, 997 F.3d 191, 196-197 (4th Cir. 2021).
The first Gant holding has no applicability in the present instance, but the search at issue was constitutionally permissible based on the second Gant holding. It was reasonable for Defendants to believe that the glove box contained evidence of the offense of arrest in that it is common for motorists to keep such things as identification, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance within the vehicle glove box. See United States v. Mahler, C. A. No. 1:13-00123-EJL, 2014 WL 495631, at *4 (D. Idaho Feb. 6, 2014) (“it is reasonable to believe that an adult . . . would have some form of identification or some item that would reveal his identity located either on his person or within the vehicle in which he was traveling and had been using for a week”).
Additionally, as to the search of the rest of Plaintiff's vehicle, the Supreme Court has held a properly conducted inventory search was not unreasonable and, therefore, not violative of the Fourth Amendment. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). “The policies supporting the warrant requirement including the concept of probable cause are not implicated in an inventory search.” United States v. Frasher, 632 F.3d 450, 454 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987)).
Here, Enzor attested that because the vehicle contained no license plate and there was no proof of insurance, the vehicle was towed and impounded, and prior to towing, an inventory search was conducted. Plaintiff has submitted no argument or evidence that the inventory search was not properly conducted, except for arguing some of his possessions were taken, including “court paperwork of my federal lawsuits.”
As stated above, both Enzor and McCauley testified that they did not remove any paperwork from Plaintiff's vehicle, and Enzor attested more specifically as follows:
At no time did I remove from the vehicle any paperwork from Mr. Garcia's federal lawsuits as he has alleged. A true and accurate copy of the Towed Vehicle Report is attached to this affidavit as Exhibit B. I believe that I did have a copy of a mechanic's invoice that contained the VIN which was used to verify the vehicle owner and to prepare paperwork for the traffic stop and arrest. That paper would have been placed with Mr. Garcia's property upon booking at the detention center.[ECF No. 57-2 ¶ 9 (citing ECF No. 57-9); see also ECF No. 57-2 ¶ 10].
Plaintiff has offered no argument or evidence in opposition to Defendants' evidence presented above, nor identified what was taken, beyond lawsuit paperwork, or who allegedly took his property. [See, e.g. ECF Nos. 66, 68]. As the Fourth Circuit has held, liability under § 1983 is “personal, based upon each defendant's own constitutional violations.” Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff additionally appears to argue that he was incorrectly identified by law enforcement as a “sovereign citizen.” [See, e.g., ECF No. 68 at 3, see also ECF No. 57-2 ¶ 10]. However, a Fourth Amendment inquiry focuses on the objective, not subjective, motivations of law enforcement. See, e.g., Cybernet, LLC v. David, 954 F.3d 162, 173 (4th Cir. 2020) (“Cybernet's various allegations of malice do not, as it suggests, render any damage that occurred here unconstitutional .... As the Supreme Court has put it, ‘[t]he Fourth Amendment inquiry is one of ‘objective reasonableness' under the circumstances, and subjective concepts like ‘malice' and ‘sadism' have no proper place in that inquiry.'” (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 398 (1989)).
McCauley attested that he had no role in any search of Plaintiff's vehicle [ECF No. 57-3 ¶ 3], and Defendants argue the “search was conducted of the vehicle primarily by the Calhoun County Sheriff's Deputies who arrived to provide assistance,” who “have not been sued.” [ECF No. 57-1 at 2, see also ECF No. 57-2 ¶ 10].
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claims related to the search of his vehicle.
Given the recommendation above, it is unnecessary for the undersigned to address Defendants' arguments on qualified immunity.
3. Plaintiff's Motion to Stay
The undersigned denies as moot Plaintiff's motion to stay, where he requested the court to stay his case pending his release from custody, and where he has been released and filed additional documentation in opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment thereafter [ECF No. 68
(indicating Plaintiff's “objection to summary judgment” was sent from his home address)] and further indicated his intent to withdraw his motion to stay [ECF No. 66 at 1].
Throughout this case, Plaintiff has additionally challenged the actions of Magistrate Bloom, including alleged violations of his rights to a speedy trial, as well as his conditions of confinement while incarcerated. These claims are not properly before the court, and the undersigned declines to address them. See, e.g., Garcia v. Rickenbaker, C. A. No. 3:21-01359-JMC, 2021 WL 5200204, at *2 (D.S.C. Nov. 9, 2021) (“Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Rickenbaker relate to his judicial actions, and he is entitled to absolute immunity. Accordingly, this court finds Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Rickenbaker should be summarily dismissed.”); Sturkey v. Wilson, C. A. No. 7:18-1558-RMG-MGB, 2018 WL 3687983, at *1 (D.S.C. July 18, 2018) (“Plaintiff presents a litany of complaints about the state court and several prosecutors, including procedural matters (i.e. hearing dates, discovery, and speedy trial matters) that are not properly cognizable in this § 1983 action.”), report and recommendation adopted, C. A. No. 7:18-1558-RMG, 2018 WL 3660125 (D.S.C. Aug. 2, 2018); Hamilton v. Ninth Jud. Cir. Ct. of Charleston Cty., C. A. No. 2:17-921-MBS-MGB, 2017 WL 2373217, at *3 (D.S.C. May 3, 2017) (“If he believes the state court has not properly decided his speedy trial motion, he may pursue an appeal or other remedies in state court.”), report and recommendation adopted, C. A. No. 2:17-0921-MBS, 2017 WL 2362387 (D.S.C. May 31, 2017).
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned denies Plaintiff's motion to stay [ECF No. 60] and recommends the district judge grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing Plaintiff's claims without prejudice. [ECF No. 57].
IT IS SO ORDERED AND RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).