Summary
stating that to survive a motion to dismiss a plaintiff must "plead facts that touch on the period and object of the conspiracy and some actions taken in furtherance of the conspiracy"
Summary of this case from Conklin v. Warrington TownshipOpinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 01-2449
September 12, 2003
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Juan Garcia has filed a five count amended complaint against four unidentified Philadelphia police officers, Yvonne Jones, a minor, and the minor's parents, Jamelia Jones and her unidentified father. The claims arises out of the arrest of plaintiff on May 19, 1999. On that date Philadelphia police picked up Yvonne Jones, who was then thirteen years old, for truancy. She told the officers that she was not in school because she had been sexually molested by a Hispanic male. Later that day the unidentified police officers stopped plaintiff while he was driving. Yvonne Jones identified plaintiff as the man who had sexually molested her. Plaintiff was arrested for the kidnap and rape of Yvonne Jones. He was transported to the sex crimes unit where he spent twelve hours in jail during which time Yvonne Jones recanted her story and told police that she had fabricated the entire story to avoid getting in trouble for skipping school. Plaintiff was subsequently cleared of all charges.
The first count in plaintiff's amended complaint alleges that the defendant police officers violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by denying plaintiff his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Count Two of the amended complaint claims that the defendant police officers and Yvonne Jones conspired to violate plaintiff's constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985(3). The remaining counts contain state claims of false arrest and false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent supervision. Defendants Jamelia Jones and John Doe, Yvonne Jones' unidentified father, are defendants with respect to the state claims only. I do not reach the merits of the state claims in this decision.
Plaintiff attempted in good faith to determine the current residence of Yvonne and Jamelia Jones, the minor and her mother. When that address could not be found I allowed plaintiff to serve Yvonne and Jamelia Jones by posting the amended complaint at their last known address. Service was made on February 14, 2002.
Plaintiff has not been able to serve the minor's father because both his identity and whereabouts are unknown to plaintiff. Plaintiff also is unable to identify the four police officers who executed the arrest but asserts that he is currently working with the City to obtain that information.
Yvonne and Jamelia Jones have not appeared, plead or otherwise defended this action. Plaintiff has moved for the entry of default judgment against Yvonne and Jamelia Jones, however, default judgment may not be entered against Yvonne because she is a minor.
I attempted to secure counsel to represent Yvonne and Jamelia Jones. Although counsel was willing to represent them pro bono I could not locate Yvonne and Jamelia Jones. Thereafter, I asked counsel to act as a friend of the court in this action.
I requested that the amicus attorney brief two issues for me: (1) whether plaintiff had identified and served the "John Doe" defendants named in the complaint and (2) whether Count II of plaintiff s amended complaint alleging conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1985 should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. I have before me an amicus brief regarding the effect of plaintiff s inability to identify and serve the defendant police officers and the validity of plaintiff s conspiracy claim. These issues relate to whether Counts I and n of the complaint should be dismissed. I also have before me plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to the dismissal of Counts I and II.
Plaintiff had not identified or served the "John Doe" defendants. Amicus took the initiative to brief me on how the fact that plaintiff has not identified or served the "John Doe" defendants affects the claims pending against them.
DISCUSSION
I. Count I will be dismissed for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m)
Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states:
If service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within 120 days after the filing of the complaint, the court, upon motion or on its own initiative after notice to the plaintiff, shall dismiss the action without prejudice as to that defendant or direct that service be effected within a specified time; provided that if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court shall extend the time for service for an appropriate period. . . .
Plaintiff filed his complaint on May 16, 2001. It has now been more than two years since the complaint was filed. Plaintiff defends the delay in service by informing the court that a subpoena was issued to the City of Philadelphia to produce on May 30, 2003 documents identifying the defendant police officers. Allegedly due to some misunderstanding the City has not yet provided plaintiff with the officers' names.
In this Circuit a two-step analysis is applied when a plaintiff's compliance with Rule 4(m) is challenged. First, I must consider whether the plaintiff has shown good cause for the delay. McCurdv v. Am. Bd. of Plastic Surgery. 157 F.3d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 1998). If the plaintiff has shown good cause, I must extend the service deadline. Id. If the plaintiff has not shown good cause for the delay it is left me in my discretion to decide whether to extend the service deadline. Id
Plaintiff has not shown good cause for failing to make service within the time provided in Rule 4(m). The primary focus of good cause analysis is the reasons with which the plaintiff attempts to justify his delay.MCI Telecoms. Corp. v. Teleconcepts, 71 F.3d 1086, 1097 (3d Cir. 1995). Plaintiff has not provided any justification for his delay until May of this year. Because plaintiff has offered no reasons for failing to attempt to identify or serve the four defendant police officers for more than two years after he filed his complaint I will dismiss all claims against the defendant police officers.
II. Count II will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss all or part of an action for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) does not address the merits of a case but rather tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Conley v. Gibson. 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
When considering Rule 12(b)(6), I must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations of fact, and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, in plaintiff's complaint and must determine whether "under any reasonable reading of the pleadings, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). "The complaint will be deemed to have alleged sufficient facts if it adequately put the defendant on notice of the essential elements of the plaintiff's cause of action." Id.
Although I must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff, I need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences. See Conley. 355 U.S. at 45-46. Claims should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Id.
Count II of plaintiff's amended complaint alleges that the minor defendant, Yvonne Jones, and four unidentified police officer defendants entered into a conspiracy to falsely arrest plaintiff Juan Garcia and thereby deprive him of civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Plaintiff fails to state a claim under either statute.
A. Plaintiff's amended complaint fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C § 1983
To establish a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) he has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States; and (2) that the defendant deprived him of that right acting under color of law. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930 (1982), citing Adickes v. S. H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendants caused him to be arrested without probable cause and that he was falsely arrested and imprisoned. Although plaintiff failed to identify any particular constitutional right breached by defendants, his allegations sufficiently establish a claim for deprivation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment right to freedom from unreasonable search and seizure. See Berg v. County of Allegheny. 219 F.3d 261, 268 (3d. Cir. 2000). Plaintiff's allegation that defendants caused him to be arrested without probable cause satisfies the first requirement to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff, however, fails to plead sufficiently the second requirement necessary to prevail under a § 1983 claim. To meet this requirement, plaintiff must plead facts supporting the allegation that Yvonne Jones deprived him of his constitutional right and that she did so "under color of law." Lugar. 457 U.S. at 928.
The Supreme Court has applied three different tests to determine whether a private citizen is acting under color of state law for the purpose of Section 1983. A party is acting under color of state law if it "exercises powers that are traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state," Blum v. Yaretskv. 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05 (1982); or if the party engages in a symbiotic, interdependent relationship with the state,Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961); or if the party acted in concert or conspired with the state to deprive plaintiff of his rights, Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, (1970).
Plaintiff claims that Yvonne Jones was acting under color of law because she acted in concert or conspired with the defendant police officers to deprive him of his rights. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) plaintiff's claim of conspiracy must be plead with particularity. Bieros v. Nicola. 860 F. Supp. 223, 225 (E.D. Pa. 1994). This is true even though civil rights claims are not themselves subject to a heightened pleading standard. Id.
A Section 1983 conspiracy requires an agreement or "meeting of the minds" among defendants to deprive plaintiff of his rights. Adickes. 398 U.S. at 158. Plaintiff must plead facts that touch on the period and object of the conspiracy and some actions taken in furtherance of the conspiracy. Loftus v. SEPTA. 843 F. Supp. 981, 986-87 (E.D. Pa. 1994). "[M]ere incantation of the words 'conspiracy' or 'acted in concert' does not talismanically satisfy the [Rule 8(a)(2)'s] requirements." Id. at 987.
Plaintiff fails to fulfill the pleading requirement for conspiracy because the amended complaint does not allege any specific facts that would support the existence of a conspiracy. Plaintiff's amended complaint makes the bare allegation that Yvonne Jones "entered into a conspiracy to harm the plaintiff . . . and deny the plaintiff his constitutional rights and privileges under the Constitution. . . ." Compl. ¶ 32. It further alleges the defendant officers "failed to exercise independent judgment" and instead "accepted Yvonne Jones' uncorroborated story and arrested the plaintiff." Compl. ¶ 18, 27. The amended complaint says nothing about when, why or how Yvonne Jones and the police officers reached an agreement to violate plaintiff's rights. For the foregoing reasons, I will dismiss plaintiff's claim against Yvonne Jones under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
B. Plaintiff's amended complaint fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
Count II of plaintiff s amended complaint alleges that the conspiracy he claims existed between defendants Yvonne Jones and the police officers violated 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Section 1985 forbids "the conspiracy between two or more persons in any State or Territory, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
The elements of a cause of action under Section 1985(3) are: (1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. United Bhd. of Carpenters Joiners of Am., Local 610 v. Scott. 463 U.S. 825, 828-829 (1983). More specifically, the second element requires a showing of "some racial or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action." Id. at 828, quoting Griffin. 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971). To sustain a federal conspiracy claim under Section 1985(3), plaintiff's must allege that the purported conspirators were motivated by a racial or class-based animus. Defeo v. Sill. 810 F. Supp. 648, 658 (E.D.Pa. 1993).
Plaintiff's amended complaint does not allege that Yvonne Jones or the defendant police officers conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights because he was a member of a particular race or class. Because plaintiff's complaint lacks the crucial element required for claims under this statute — an allegation of a racial or class-based animus behind defendants' actions I will also dismiss the 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) claim against Yvonne Jones.
III. The remaining counts will be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
Plaintiff invoked federal question jurisdiction in his complaint. After today's Order the only remaining claims are based on state law. I will decline to exercise jurisdiction over those claims.
ORDER
AND NOW, this day of September, 2003, after consideration of the amicus brief regarding dismissal of Counts I and II, plaintiff's brief in response thereto and for the reasons set forth in the accompanying memorandum:
(1) Counts I and n of plaintiff's amended complaint are DISMISSED as to the defendant police officers for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m);
(2) Count II of plaintiff's amended complaint is DISMISSED as to defendant Yvonne Jones for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; and
(3) Counts III, IV and V of plaintiff s amended complaint are DISMISSED without prejudice.