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In Garcia v Delgado Travel Agency, 4 A.D.3d 204, 771 N.Y.S.2d 646), the Court held that ["[t]he fact that it was raining and water was being tracked in does not constitute notice of a dangerous situation warranting more than laying floor mats.
Summary of this case from Olshow v. RCP Assoc., a New York Ltd. P'ShipOpinion
2884.
Decided February 19, 2004.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Edward Lehner, J.), entered December 17, 2002, which granted defendants' motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Nicholas I. Timko, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Harold Y. MacCartney, Jr., for Defendant-Respondent.
Before: Nardelli, J.P., Saxe, Lerner, Marlow, JJ.
Viewing this matter in a light most favorable to plaintiff, there is no evidence that defendants either created the wet condition in the lobby or had notice of a hazard that could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care ( Kovelsky v. City Univ. of N.Y., 221 A.D.2d 234). The fact that it was raining and water was being tracked in does not constitute notice of a dangerous situation ( Joseph v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 277 A.D.2d 96) warranting more than laying floor mats ( see Keum Choi v. Olympia York Water St. Co., 278 A.D.2d 106). Indeed, defendants were under no obligation to cover the entire floor with mats and to continuously mop up all tracked-in water ( Kovelsky v. City Univ. of N.Y., supra). There was neither active notice, in the form of complaints received, nor constructive notice of a hazard sufficiently visible as to permit discovery and remedy by defendants ( Yearwood v. Cushman Wakefield, 294 A.D.2d 568). In the absence of proof as to how long a condition existed, no inference can be drawn that defendants had constructive notice of a dangerously wet floor ( Wallace v. Doral Tuscany Hotel, 302 A.D.2d 255).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.