F. INSUFFICIENCY OF DAMAGES AWARD FOR FUTURE PAIN AND SUFFERING A jury's determination with respect to awards for past and future pain and suffering will not be set aside unless the award deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation (see CPLR 5501[c]; Harvey v Mazal Am. Partners, 79 NY2d 218, 225 [1992]; Garcia v CPS 1 Realty, L.P., 164 AD3d 656, 659 [2d Dept 2018]; Quijano v American Tr. Ins. Co., 155 AD3d 981, 983 [2d Dept 2017]; Harrision v New York City Tr. Auth., 113 AD3d 472, 476 [1st Dept 2014]). "The 'reasonableness' of compensation must be measured against relevant precedent of comparable cases" (Kayes v Liberati, 104 AD3d 739, 741 [2d Dept 2013]; see Urbina v 26 Ct. St. Assoc., LLC, 46 AD3d 268, 275 [1st Dept 2007]; Reed v City of New York, 304 AD2d 1, 7 [1st Dept 2003]; Halsey v New York City Tr. Auth., 114 AD3d 726, 727 [2d Dept 2014]).
"A jury's determination with respect to awards for past and future pain and suffering will not be set aside unless the award deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation" (Garcia v CPS 1 Realty, LP, 164 A.D.3d 656, 658; see CPLR 5501[c]; see Petit v Archer, 218 A.D.3d 695, 696). "The 'reasonableness' of compensation must be measured against relevant precedent of comparable cases" (Kayes v Liberati, 104 A.D.3d 739, 741; see Petit v Archer, 218 A.D.3d at 696).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in admitting the piece of metal into evidence (seeMazella v. Beals, 27 N.Y.3d at 709, 37 N.Y.S.3d 46, 57 N.E.3d 1083 ; see alsoMane v. Brusco, 280 A.D.2d 436, 437, 721 N.Y.S.2d 620 ). "The amount of damages to be awarded to a plaintiff for personal injuries is a question for the jury, and its determination will not be disturbed unless the award deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation" ( Graves v. New York City Tr. Auth., 81 A.D.3d 589, 916 N.Y.S.2d 793 ; see CPLR 5501[c] ; Garcia v. CPS 1 Realty, LP, 164 A.D.3d 656, 658, 83 N.Y.S.3d 129 ). " ‘The reasonableness of compensation must be measured against [the] relevant precedent of comparable cases’ " ( Garcia v. CPS 1 Realty, LP, 164 A.D.3d at 658, 83 N.Y.S.3d 129, quoting Kayes v. Liberati, 104 A.D.3d 739, 741, 960 N.Y.S.2d 499 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).
Generally, "[t]he amount of damages to be awarded for personal injuries is primarily a question for the jury, and the jury's determination is entitled to great deference" (Coker v Bakkal Foods, Inc., 52 AD3d 765, 766 [2d Dept 2008]). Thus, a jury's determination with respect to awards for past and future pain and suffering will not be set aside unless the awards deviate materially from what would be reasonable compensation (see CPLR 5501[c]; Harvey v Mazal Am. Partners, 79 NY2d 218, 225 [1992]; Garcia v CPS 1 Realty, L.P., 164 AD3d 656, 659 [2d Dept 2018]; Quijano v American Tr. Ins. Co., 155 AD3d 981, 983 [2d Dept 2017]; Harrision v New York City Tr. Auth., 113 AD3d 472, 476 [1st Dept 2014]). "The 'reasonableness' of compensation must be measured against relevant precedent of comparable cases" (Kayes v Liberati, 104 AD3d 739, 741 [2d Dept 2013]; see Urbina v 26 Ct. St. Assoc., LLC, 46 AD3d 268, 275 [1st Dept 2007]; Reed v City of New York, 304 AD2d 1, 7 [1st Dept 2003]; Halsey v New York City Tr. Auth., 114 AD3d 726, 727 [2d Dept 2014]).
Defendants contend that the plaintiff's case most resembles Garcia v CPR 1 Realty, L.P. (164 AD3d 656 [2d Dept 2018]), where the plaintiff, who was 46 years old, suffered an inguinal hernia that required surgery as well as herniated discs with radiculopathy. The lumbar fusion surgery apparently caused the plaintiff in that case to be incontinent.
The Court may set aside a jury verdict on the issue of damages when it deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation (see Bock v City of Mount Vernon, 123 A.D.3d 644, 646 [2d Dept 2014]). In determining whether the compensation is reasonable, the Court is not bound, but merely guided by relevant precedent in similar actions (see Garcia v CPS I Realty, LP, 164 A.D.3d 656, 658 [2d Dept 2018]). Here, plaintiff testified that the Accident has caused devastating effects on every aspect of his life, from work to personal activities.
"A jury's determination with respect to awards for past and future pain and suffering will not be set aside unless the award deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation" (Garcia v CPS 1 Realty, LP, 164 A.D.3d 656, 658; see CPLR 5501[c]; Petit v Archer, 218 A.D.3d 695). "The 'reasonableness' of compensation must be measured against relevant precedent of comparable cases" (Kayes v Liberati, 104 A.D.3d 739, 741; see Petit v Archer, 218 A.D.3d 695).
"A jury's determination with respect to awards for past and future pain and suffering will not be set aside unless the award deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation" (Garcia v CPS 1 Realty, LP, 164 A.D.3d 656, 658, citing CPLR 5501[c]; see Petit v Archer, 218 A.D.3d 695, 696). "The 'reasonableness' of compensation must be measured against relevant precedent of comparable cases" (Kayes v Liberati, 104 A.D.3d 739, 741; see Petit v Archer, 218 A.D.3d at 696).
"A jury's determination with respect to awards for past and future pain and suffering will not be set aside unless the award deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation" (Garcia v CPS 1 Realty, LP, 164 A.D.3d 656, 658, citing CPLR 5501[c]). "The 'reasonableness' of compensation must be measured against relevant precedent of comparable cases" (Kayes v Liberati, 104 A.D.3d 739, 741).
Among other evidence, the defendants presented expert witness testimony demonstrating that, by October 2011, the plaintiff had fully recovered from the claimed injury to his finger, and that the plaintiff's continuing complaints of finger, back, neck, and shoulder pain were related to his fall in November 2011 and not the April 12, 2011 construction accident. Thus, the jury's verdict was not contrary to the weight of the evidence (seeLolik v. Big V. Supermarkets, 86 N.Y.2d at 746, 631 N.Y.S.2d 122, 655 N.E.2d 163 ; Grivas v. MTA Bus Co., 205 A.D.3d at 777, 165 N.Y.S.3d 894 ; Young Mee Oh v. Koon, 140 A.D.3d at 862, 35 N.Y.S.3d 116 ; see alsoGarcia v. CPS 1 Realty, LP, 164 A.D.3d 656, 658, 83 N.Y.S.3d 129 ). BARROS, J.P., MILLER, DOWLING and WARHIT, JJ., concur.