Opinion
2:22-cv-01051-KJM-CKD
11-22-2022
MICHAEL LUCIEN GARCIA, Plaintiff, v. KATHLEEN ALLISON, et al., Defendants.
ORDER
CAROLYN K. DELANEY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Plaintiff requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis. As plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), his request will be granted. Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff's trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding month's income credited to plaintiff's prison trust account. These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff's account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
I. Screening Standard
The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).
A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.
In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).
II. Allegations in the Complaint
At all times relevant to the allegations in the complaint, plaintiff was an inmate at California State Prison-Sacramento (“CSP-Sac”). Named as defendants in this action are Kathleen Allison, the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation; Jeff Lynch, the Warden of CSP-Sac; and four correctional officers employed at CSP-Sac.
In his first claim for relief, plaintiff alleges that on or around July 2021, defendant Kurgan threatened his safety by not making sure that wet floor signs were displayed after the porters mopped the floor. As a result, plaintiff slipped on the floor and broke his right ankle.
Plaintiff describes how, two weeks later, defendants Kurgan and Olmos dragged him across the dayroom floor and pushed him off of a small flight of stairs resulting in injury, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. In a separate cause of action for excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, plaintiff alleges that defendant Kurgan punched him on the right side of the head during this same altercation on August 6, 2021.
Plaintiff further alleges that defendant Kurgan made a false report against him in retaliation for the filing of a staff complaint of excessive force against him.
By way of relief, plaintiff seeks monetary compensation for his pain and suffering, a declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief against defendants.
III. Legal Standards
The following legal standards are being provided to plaintiff based on his pro se status as well as the nature of the allegations in his complaint.
A. Linkage
The civil rights statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects' another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiffs federal rights.
B. Supervisory Liability
Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009) (“In a § 1983 suit ... the term “supervisory liability” is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”). When the named defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between the defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged; that is, a plaintiff must allege some facts indicating that the defendant either personally participated in or directed the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978).
C. False Rules Violation Report (“RVR”)
A prisoner has no constitutionally-guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly accused of conduct that may lead to disciplinary sanctions. See Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989). As long as a prisoner is afforded procedural due process in the disciplinary hearing, allegations of a fabricated charge generally fail to state a claim under section 1983. See Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 1140- 41 (7th Cir. 1984). An exception exists when the fabrication of charges infringed on the inmate's substantive constitutional rights, such as when false charges are made in retaliation for an inmate's exercise of a constitutionally protected right. See Sprouse, 870 F.2d at 452 (holding that filing of a false disciplinary charge in retaliation for a grievance filed by an inmate is actionable under section 1983).
D. Retaliation
“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). Filing an inmate grievance is a protected action under the First Amendment. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003). A prison transfer may also constitute an adverse action. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 568 (9th Cir. 2005) (recognizing an arbitrary confiscation and destruction of property, initiation of a prison transfer, and assault as retaliation for filing inmate grievances); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that a retaliatory prison transfer and double-cell status can constitute a cause of action for retaliation under the First Amendment).
E. Deliberate Indifference to Safety
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment imposes on prison officials, among other things, a duty to “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates .” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1991) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). An inmate's Eighth Amendment rights are violated by a prison official if that official exposes an inmate to a “substantial risk of serious harm,” while displaying “deliberate indifference” to that risk. Id. at 834. In the context of failure to protect an inmate from a known threat to safety, deliberate indifference does not require an express intent to punish. Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir.1986). Further, the standard does not require that the official believe “to a moral certainty” physical harm will result. Id. But, there must be more than “mere suspicion” of harm. Id.
IV. Analysis
After conducting the required screening, the court finds that plaintiff sufficiently alleges an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against defendants Kurgan and Olmos. Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief against defendants Allison, Lynch, Abarca, or Caruso because he does not link them to any of the alleged constitutional violations. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). To the extent that plaintiff alleges a retaliation claim against defendant Kurgan for filing a false charge against him, plaintiff does not contend that this resulted in a chilling of his First Amendment rights. Absent such an allegation, plaintiff has not adequately alleged a First Amendment retaliation claim against defendant Kurgan. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff's allegations concerning his slip and fall do not amount to deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff does not allege that any named defendant had reason to believe that the dayroom floor posed a substantial risk of serious harm, especially since plaintiff fell “while trying to climb the lower stair case,” and did not slip on the floor itself. See ECF No. 1 at 9. Based on these deficiencies with the remaining claims, plaintiff may choose to proceed on the Eighth Amendment excessive force claims found cognizable against defendants Kurgan and Olmos, or he may attempt to cure these defects by filing a first amended complaint.
Plaintiff may elect to amend his complaint to attempt to cure the deficiencies identified in this screening order. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (district courts must afford pro se litigants an opportunity to amend to correct any deficiency in their complaints). If plaintiff chooses to proceed on the Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against defendants Kurgan and Olmos found cognizable in this screening order, the court will construe this as a request to voluntarily dismiss the additional claims and defendants pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, in his amended complaint, plaintiff must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). Furthermore, vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
Finally, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.
V. Plain Language Summary for Pro Se Party
The following information is meant to explain this order in plain English and is not intended as legal advice.
Some of the allegations in the complaint state claims for relief against the defendants, and some do not. You must decide if you want to (1) proceed immediately on the Eighth Amendment claims against defendants Kurgan and Olmos; or, 2) amend the complaint to fix the problems identified in this order with respect to the remaining claims and defendants. Once you decide, you must complete the attached Notice of Election form by checking only one box and returning it to the court.
Once the court receives the Notice of Election, it will issue an order telling you what you need to do next. If you do not return this Notice, the court will order service of the complaint only on the claims found cognizable in this screening order and will recommend dismissing the remaining claims and defendants.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted.
2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court's order to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith.
3. Plaintiff has the option to proceed immediately on the Eighth Amendment claims against defendants Colvin, Brooks, and Stewart. In the alternative, plaintiff may choose to amend the complaint to fix the deficiencies identified in this order with respect to the remaining claims and defendants.
4. Within 21 days from the date of this order, plaintiff shall complete and return the attached Notice of Election form notifying the court whether he wants to proceed on the screened complaint or whether he wants time to file a first amended complaint.
5. If plaintiff fails to return the attached Notice of Election within the time provided, the court will construe this failure as consent to dismiss the deficient claims and proceed only on the cognizable claims identified above.
NOTICE OF ELECTION
Check only one option:
___ Plaintiff wants to proceed immediately on the Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against defendants Kurgan and Olmos. Plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the remaining claims and defendants; or
__ Plaintiff wants time to file a first amended complaint.