"In Puerto Rico, the one year statutory limitation for tort action governs § 1983 claims." Garcia-Rodriquez v. Laboy, 598 F. Supp. 2d 186, 193 (D.P.R. 2008) (citing Article 1868(2) of the Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5298(2); Altair Corp. v. Pesquera de Busquets, 769 F.2d 30, 31 (1st Cir. 1985)). Tolling provisions are also governed by the law of Puerto Rico.

Further,"[i]n order for a previously filed judicial action to toll the statute of limitations as to a later filed complaint, the second complaint must assert a cause of action identical to the one in the first." García Rodríguez v. Laboy, 598 F. Supp. 2d 186, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107371 (D.P.R. 2008). Once the complaint is filed, the limitations period is tolled until the judicial proceedings have definitively concluded (in Spanish, "final y firme").

While the limitations period is borrowed from local law, the accrual date of a Section 1983 claim is a question governed by federal law. Calero–Colon v. Betancourt–Lebron, 68 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1995); see also Garcia Rodriguez v. Laboy, 598 F.Supp.2d 186, 193 (D.P.R.2008) (citing Carreras–Rosa v. Alves–Cruz, 127 F.3d 172, 174 (1st Cir.1997)). The general rule is the limitations period of a Section 1983 claim begins to run when the plaintiff knows, or has reason to know, of the injury which is the basis for his claim and the person who caused it.

Colon Prieto v. Geigel, 115 D.P.R. 232, 234, 15 P.R. Offic. Trans. 313 (1984). Rodriguez v. Laboy, 598 F.Supp.2d 186 (D.P.R.2008)(explaining that the “awareness as to the injury and the person that caused it” regarding the accrual of the statute of limitations does not require Plaintiff to know the exact name or circumstances of the tortfeasor).

Courts in this district have dismissed time-barred claims on their own motion “where the Court estimates that the plaintiff may not prevail, even by amending the complaint.” See Feliciano v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 688 F.Supp.2d 41, 44 n. 3 (D.P.R.2009) (citing Garcia Rodriguez v. Laboy, 598 F.Supp.2d 186, 196 (D.P.R.2008)). As framed in the motion to dismiss, the statute of limitations argument is not cabined to factual allegations pertaining to Roman, Santiago, or Perez, but rather addresses the time-barred nature of plaintiffs' complaint as a whole.

Although the motion to dismiss raising the statute of limitations defense was filed only on behalf of Roman, Santiago, and Perez, the Court finds that prescription applies to plaintiffs' federal claims against all defendants. Courts in this district have dismissed time-barred claims on their own motion "where the Court estimates that the plaintiff may not prevail, even by amending the complaint." See Feliciano v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 688 F.Supp.2d 41, 44 n. 3 (D.P.R. 2009) (citing Garcia Rodriguez v. Laboy, 598 F.Supp.2d 186, 196 (D.P.R. 2008)). As framed in the motion to dismiss, the statute of limitations argument is not cabined to factual allegations pertaining to Roman, Santiago, or Perez, but rather addresses the time-barred nature of plaintiffs' complaint as a whole.

P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 5303. Because the statute of limitations begins to run regardless of whether plaintiff knows the real name of the tortfeasor or not, "plaintiffs are forced to file complaints without having complete information about the tortfeasors and must do so using fictitious names like John Doe."Garcia Rodriguez v. Laboy, 598 F.Supp.2d 186, 194 (D.P.R. 2008). In addition, "[u]nder article 1874 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, the interruption of prescription against one defendant also tolls the statute against any other defendants who are solidarily liable."