Opinion
No. CV09 5025895S
May 29, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE (#103)
FACTS
On January 8, 2009, the plaintiff, Yolanda Garces, commenced this action by service of process on the defendant, RK Spero Company, LLC. This action arises out of several alleged incidents that occurred at the plaintiff's former place of employment, a McDonald's restaurant located at 308 Ferry Street in New Haven, which is owned by the defendant. In an eight-count complaint, the plaintiff alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, wrongful discharge, breach of implied covenant of good faith, unjust enrichment, sexual harassment, religious discrimination and invasion of privacy.
The facts, as alleged in the complaint, are as follows. The plaintiff was offered a job by one of the defendant's agents and commenced employment by verbal agreement in February 2006. In accordance with that verbal agreement, the defendant agreed to schedule the plaintiff to work specific weekly hours that would not interfere with her regular religious obligations. Although the plaintiff is not fluent in English, during the time of her employment with the defendant, she was an exemplary employee and was awarded two certificates for meritorious work.
In November 2006, however, a coworker alerted the plaintiff to the fact that the store manager, Erica Rodriguez, was not paying her for all of the hours that she had worked. In addition, during that month, the defendant hired a store supervisor, John Porter, who, along Rodriguez, spoke "badly" about the plaintiff to other employees, mocked her because she lacked fluency in English and denied her use of the bathroom on several occasions.
One day, during December 2006, the plaintiff asked Rodriguez for the key to the bathroom and Rodriguez advised her to ask Porter, who refused upon request. Rodriguez became aware that Porter denied the key to the plaintiff and told her that she should beg Porter for the key. At that time, the plaintiff explained to Rodriguez that she had her menstrual cycle and needed to use the bathroom. Upon learning this information, Rodriguez and Porter mocked the plaintiff and refused to grant her access to the bathroom. As a result, blood leaked through the plaintiff's clothing and she had to wash her uniform and dry it with the hand-dryer in the bathroom before she could return to work.
Shortly after this incident, the plaintiff noticed changes to her work schedule and discussed them with several of her superiors, including Rodriguez and Porter. At that time, she did not receive any explanation. Specifically, Porter refused to discuss the change in hours with the plaintiff. The following Sunday, the plaintiff noticed that her name was no longer on the schedule. Upon further inquiry, Rodriguez informed the plaintiff that her religious obligations were in conflict with the defendant's needs. Additionally, at that time, another manager informed the plaintiff that Rodriguez had destroyed some of her personal property, which she had left at work.
In January 2007, the plaintiff returned to the McDonald's restaurant on Ferry Street, with a friend who was fluent in both English and Spanish, to ask her superiors why she was not getting shifts on the schedule. At that time, Porter refused to meet with the plaintiff and her friend, but Rodriguez told them that the plaintiff was terminated because of her religion. As a result of this conduct, the plaintiff suffered various damages including lost wages, humiliation, embarrassment, mental anguish and emotional distress.
On March 6, 2009, the defendant filed a motion to strike counts one, two, four, six and eight of the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that they all "fail to state a cause of action under Connecticut law." At that time, the defendant also filed its memorandum of law in support of motion to strike. On April 3, 2009, the plaintiff filed an objection to motion to strike and a memorandum of law in support of objection to motion to strike, in which she argues that all of the controverted counts are legally sufficient for various reasons. The matter was heard at short calendar on April 6, 2009.
During oral argument at short calendar on April 6, 2009, the defendant's counsel withdrew its motion to strike count four.
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading . . . and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Batte-Holmgren v. Commissioner of Public Health, 281 Conn. 277, 914 A.2d 996 (2007). "It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310, 318, 907 A.2d 1188 (2006). The court must "construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sullivan v. Lake Compounce Theme Park, Inc., 277 Conn. 113, 117, 889 A.2d 810 (2006). "If any facts provable under the express and implied allegations in the plaintiff's complaint support a cause of action . . . the complaint is not vulnerable to a motion to strike." Bouchard v. People's Bank, 219 Conn. 465, 471, 594 A.2d 1 (1991). Nevertheless, "[a] motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, supra, 262 Conn. 498.
Count One: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
In count one of her complaint, the plaintiff alleges the aforementioned facts and additionally alleges that "Erica Rodriguez and . . . John Porter knew or should have known that their interactions with the plaintiff were likely to result in the plaintiff . . . suffering from emotional distress," that their conduct was extreme and outrageous and that, as a result, she suffered "humiliation, embarrassment, [m]ental anguish and severe emotional distress." The defendant contends in its motion to strike, however, that count one fails to state a cause of action under Connecticut law. Specifically, the defendant argues that these "factual allegations show that [the plaintiff] cannot establish the requisite `extreme and outrageous conduct' on [the] Defendant's part." Responding to the defendant's motion, the plaintiff claims that precedent establishes that these alleged facts can constitute "extreme and outrageous conduct."
"In order for the plaintiff to prevail in a case for liability under . . . [intentional infliction of emotional distress], four elements must be established. It must be shown: (1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the defendant's conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's distress; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe . . . Whether a defendant's conduct is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that it be extreme and outrageous is initially a question for the court to determine, . . . Only where reasonable minds disagree does it become an issue for the jury . . .
"Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires conduct that exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by decent society . . . Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arose his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim `Outrageous!' . . . Conduct on the part of the defendant that is merely insulting or displays bad manners or results in hurt feelings is insufficient to form the basis for an action based upon intentional infliction of emotional distress." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Appleton v. Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205, 210-11, 757 A.2d 1059 (2000). "[I]n assessing a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court performs a gatekeeping function. In this capacity, the role of the court is to determine whether the allegations of a complaint . . . set forth behaviors that a reasonable fact finder could find to be extreme or outrageous. In exercising this responsibility, the court is not fact finding, but rather is making an assessment whether, as a matter of law, the alleged behavior fits the criteria required to establish a claim premised on intentional infliction of emotional distress." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tracy v. New Milford Public Schools, 101 Conn.App. 560, 569, 922 A.2d 280, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 910, 931 A.2d 935 (2007).
When making its determination, however, a court remains aware that, "individuals in the workplace reasonably should expect to experience some level of emotional distress, even significant emotional distress, as a result of conduct in the workplace. There are few things more central to a person's life than a job, and the mere fact of being demoted or denied advancement may be extremely distressing. That is simply an unavoidable part of being employed." Perodeau v. Hartford, 259 Conn. 729, 757, 792 A.2d 752 (2002).
Both parties cite cases in support of their opposing views, yet none of these cases are directly on point with the unique facts of this case. In its memorandum of law in support of motion to strike, the defendant summarizes several fact patterns which were held not legally sufficient and then claims that all of these cases involve "[c]onduct far worse than anything alleged here." Although the court does not agree with the defendant's broad generalization, its argument does illustrate the factual nature of these decisions. No case is exactly like another. This reality has led the court, Quinn, J., to provide that, "[t]here is no bright line rule to determine what constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct . . . The court looks to the specific facts and circumstances of each case in making its decision . . . However, [a] line can be drawn between the slight hurts which are the price of a complex society and the severe mental disturbances inflicted by intentional acts wholly lacking in social utility . . . [T]hose cases in the employment context that have granted motions to strike because the allegations do not sufficiently describe extreme and outrageous behavior are more often those that allege little more than that the plaintiff was terminated without just cause." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Leone v. New England Communications, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 01 0509752 (April 10, 2002, Quinn, J.) (32 Conn. L. Rptr. 72).
In this case, some of the facts alleged by the plaintiff in her complaint are indeed heinous and are seemingly more analogous to a form of cruel torture than an act that contributes to the social utility of a complex society. Undoubtably, requiring the plaintiff to beg for a bathroom key to the point where she bleeds through her clothing could lead an average member of the community to exclaim, "Outrageous!" Furthermore, the court notes that, "[i]n finding [a defendant's] conduct to be extreme and outrageous, [other courts have] emphasized the supervisory positions of the tormentors and their knowledge of the plaintiff's sensitivities to such conduct as aggravating factors." Lamothe v. Russell, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 07 4022729S (March 25, 2009, Bellis, J.). Thus, both Rodriguez and Porter's positions of power over the plaintiff can properly he viewed as aggravating factors in this case.
As stated above, the court merely acts as a gatekeeper to determine whether reasonable minds could disagree. Because the court finds that a reasonable mind could determine that these acts satisfy the "Outrageous!" test, the allegations of count one are legally sufficient. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to strike count one of the plaintiff's complaint is denied.
Count Two: Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
In count two of her complaint, the plaintiff alleges a cause of action sounding in negligent infliction of emotional distress. In its memorandum of law in support of motion to strike, the defendant contends that this count must be stricken "[b]ecause the plaintiff has not, and cannot allege that [the defendant] `engaged in unreasonable conduct in the termination process.'" The plaintiff responds that she "was not informed of her termination for more than several days after discovering she was not on the schedule," and thus, the alleged facts describing the process of her termination are legally sufficient to support this cause of action.
"[A] pivotal difference between claims for emotional distress based on intentional conduct and those based on negligent conduct is that an essential component of an intentional infliction claim is that the defendant's alleged behavior must be extreme and outrageous. A claim based on the negligent infliction of distress requires only that the actor's conduct be unreasonable and create an unreasonable risk of foreseeable emotional harm. Thus, to survive a motion to strike, a complaint alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress need not include allegations of extreme and outrageous behavior." Olson v. Bristol-Burlington Health District, 87 Conn.App. 1, 7, 863 A.2d 748, cert. granted, 273 Conn. 914, 870 A.2d 1083 (2005).
However, "[a]n employee at will . . . has no contract, may be terminated at will and, therefore, operates under the assumption that he or she may be terminated at any time without cause." Murphy v. Lord Thompson Manor, Inc., 105 Conn.App. 546, 554, 938 A.2d 1269, cert. denied, 286 Conn. 914, 945 A.2d 976 (2008). Therefore, "negligent infliction of emotional distress in the employment context arises only where it is based upon unreasonable conduct of the defendant in the termination process . . . The mere termination of employment, even where it is wrongful, is therefore not, by itself, enough to sustain a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The mere act of firing an employee, even if wrongfully motivated, does not transgress the bounds of socially tolerable behavior." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Parsons v. United Technologies Corp., 243 Conn. 66, 88-89, 700 A.2d 655 (1997).
Thus, to plead a legally sufficient cause of action, the alleged facts must establish that, "the manner of the plaintiff's termination from employment was different . . . from the usual termination of employment or that it was done in any way that could cause anything more than the normal upset that would result from any termination of employment." Chieffalo v. Norden Systems, Inc., 49 Conn.App. 474, 481, 714 A.2d 1261 (1998). "The dispositive issue in each case [is] whether the defendant's conduct during the termination process was sufficiently wrongful that the defendant should have realized that its conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress and that [that] distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Perodeau v. Hartford, supra, 259 Conn. 751.
Based on this precedent, the defendant argues that, "for Plaintiff's claim to survive, she must plead that [the defendant] engaged in conduct during the termination process that was so unreasonable that [it] `should have known that its conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress, and that that distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm,'" but has failed to do so and therefore, this count must be stricken. In response, the plaintiff cites a Superior Court case, Guccione v. Paley, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 05 4002943S (June 14, 2006, Trombley, J.), for the proposition "that making the plaintiff wait over forty-eight hours before telling her that she was fired" was sufficiently wrongful and therefore, satisfied the pleading requirements for negligent infliction of emotional distress for the purposes of a motion to strike.
In Paley, the plaintiff was a full-time house-cleaner who worked exclusively for the defendant. One day, following several other incidents, an agent of the defendant instructed her not to come to work and informed her that she would be contacted the next day. Two days later, the plaintiff eventually spoke to another one of the defendant's agents and was informed that her employment had been terminated. Holding that these allegations were legally sufficient to withstand a motion to strike, the court reasoned "that [the defendant's] conduct of placing and leaving [the plaintiff] in a situation in which she did not know for several days whether she was employed by [the defendant], which was her sole source of income for herself and her children, constitutes unreasonable treatment of the employee during a period of time in which her termination of employment is pending." Guccione v. Paley, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 05 4002943S.
In the complaint, the plaintiff alleges facts that, when construed in her favor, suggest an even greater lapse in time between her constructive termination and notice of her official termination. Specifically, in count one, which is incorporated by reference by count two, the plaintiff alleges that when she "went to work to get her schedule her name was not on the schedule." At that time, the plaintiff questioned Rodriguez about this change and was told "that the plaintiff's schedule couldn't stay the same because of her church schedule and that her religious obligations interfered with when the plaintiff was needed to work." At some later date, in January 2007, the plaintiff and a friend returned to the plaintiff's place of employment to again question her supervisors about her lack of hours on the schedule. It was only at this time that Rodriguez officially informed the plaintiff that she had been terminated.
Upon examining the Paley decision, the court finds its reasoning to be logical and therefore, adopts its rule. In addition, the court notes the striking similarity between the alleged process of termination in that case and the case at hand. Thus, the allegations contained in the plaintiff's complaint are legally sufficient to bring fourth a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to strike count two is denied.
Count Six: Sexual Harassment
In count eight of her complaint, the plaintiff alleges sexual harassment. Although, pursuant to the laws of Connecticut, there is no common-law cause of action called "sexual harassment," in her memorandum of law in support of objection to motion to strike, the plaintiff primarily cites federal case law pertinent to a hostile or abusive work environment claim under Title VII. In addition, this inartfully pleaded count could also be reasonably interpreted as claiming a violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act and both parties seem to acknowledge as much in their memorandums. Regardless of whether count six alleges a violation of Title VII or the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, the defendant contends, in its memorandum of law in support of its motion to strike, that the count is legally insufficient. Specifically, it claims that the "Plaintiff's allegations, even if taken as true, fall far short of the type of `extremely serious' acts of harassment that the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, Title VII, and any other anti-discrimination statutes were intended to proscribe and redress, and do not rise to the level of sexual harassment as a matter of law." In support of this proposition, the defendant summarizes various federal cases to illustrate the type of fact patterns that have been held to be legally sufficient to maintain a Title VII hostile work environment cause of action. Alternatively, in her memorandum of law in support of objection to motion to strike, the plaintiff counters that, "this conduct if proven at trial can be seen as `severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment — an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive.'"
The court will first address a claim of sexual harassment pursuant to the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act and commences its analysis by examining the language of General Statutes § 64a-60. That section provides in relevant part: "(a) It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (8) For an employer, by the employer or the employer's agent, . . . to harass an employee . . . on the basis of sex. `Sexual harassment! shall, for the purposes of this section, be defined as any unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual favors or any conduct of a sexual nature when (A) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, (B) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (C) such conduct has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment." General Statutes § 64a-60(a).
Therefore, contrary to the plaintiff's claim, for the purposes of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, it is irrelevant whether a jury believes the alleged actions are severe and pervasive enough to find a hostile work environment. Rather, as the plain language of General Statutes § 64a-60(a)(8) makes clear, without allegations of "any unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual favors or any conduct of a sexual nature," the defendants cannot have committed sexual harassment, as a matter of law. The court notes that the plaintiff's complaint is vacant of any such allegations. Thus, count six of the plaintiff's complaint is legally insufficient to bring forth a cause of action for sexual harassment pursuant to this statute.
Next, the court will examine the legal requirements for a sex discrimination claim under Title VII. "For sexual harassment to state a claim under Title VII, it must be sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment. Whether sexual harassment at the workplace is sufficiently severe and persistent to affect seriously the psychological well being of employees is a question to be determined with regard to the totality of the circumstances." Hensen v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982). Case law establishes, however, that the lack of access to a bathroom may be used as a basis for the finding of a hostile work environment for the purposes of a sex discrimination or retaliation claim only when it is accompanied by additional allegations of sexually discriminatory acts, such as sexual advances, name calling based on gender or unwanted touching. Baker v. John Morrell Co., 382 F.3d 816, 828-29 (8th Cir. 2004); Dauer v. Verizon Communications, Inc., Docket No. 03 Civ. 05047 (PGG) (S.D.N.Y. January 26, 2009); Stapp v. Overnight Transportation Co., 995 F.Supp 1207, 1213-14 (Kan. 1998); Munday v. Waste Management of North America, Inc., 858 F.Supp. 1364, 1373 (Md. 1994).
The complaint contains several allegations that may be interpreted as discriminatory, however, lack of access to the bathroom is the only one that is seemingly based on the plaintiff's gender. The court finds, after considering the precedent, that as a matter of law, the plaintiff cannot establish a hostile work environment for the purposes of a sex discrimination claim brought pursuant to Title VII without alleging additional sexually discriminatory acts. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to strike count six of the plaintiff complaint is granted.
Count Eight: Invasion of Privacy
In count eight of her complaint, the plaintiff alleges that when the defendant's agent forced her to reveal to them the "reason why plaintiff needed to use the bathroom so bad," they invaded her privacy. The defendant contends, in its motion to strike, that these allegations fail to state a legally sufficient cause of action. Specifically, the defendant proposes that "no one even requested, comment[ed] on, or demanded the information regarding Plaintiff's menstrual cycle." In the alternative, the defendant also argues that "this single statement does not rise to the level of invasion of privacy as required under the law." In response to the defendant's motion, the plaintiff claims that her "supervisors made her beg for use of the bathroom and reveal [a] personal and private reason as to why she needed to use the bathroom." Furthermore, she contends that "[w]hether particular conduct would be highly offensive to a reasonable person is a question of fact" and thus, her allegations are legally sufficient.
"[T]he law of privacy has not developed as a single tort, but as a complex of four distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in common except that each represents an interference with the right of the plaintiff to be let alone . . . The four categories of invasion of privacy are set forth . . . as follows: (a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another; (b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness; (c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life; or (d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public. Indeed, these four categories have been adopted by a number of courts that have recognized the privacy right of action." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Foncello v. Amorossi, 284 Conn. 225, 234, 931 A.2d 924 (2007). The court recognizes, however, that "[t]he Connecticut Appellate Courts have yet to interpret what constitutes an invasion of privacy under the first category: an unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Birge v. Medical Electronic Distributors, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 07 6000054S (December 1, 2008, Abrams, J.). Nevertheless, when defining the contours of the law of privacy in Connecticut, the Supreme Court has repeatedly looked to the Restatement. See Foncello v. Amorossi, supra, 284 Conn. 234; Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., 188 Conn. 107, 127, CT Page 9000 448 A.2d 1317 (1982). Likewise, the Superior Court has consistently followed this practice. See Dirge v. Medical Electronic Distributors, Inc., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 07 6000054S; Bonanno v. Dan Perkins Chevrolet, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, Docket No. CV 99 066602 (February 4, 2000, Nadeau, J.) [26 Conn. L. Rptr. 368]; Hellanbrand v. National Waste Associates, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 07 5010727 (January 31, 2008, Hale, J.T.R.) (44 Conn. L. Rptr. 849).
The Restatement provides: "One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person." 3 Restatement (Second), Torts § 652B, p. 378 (1977). "This is said to consist of intentional interference with another's interest in solitude or seclusion, either as to his person or to his private affairs or concerns." W. Prosser W. Keeton, Torts (5th Ed. 1984) § 117, p. 854. A legally sufficient cause of action, therefore, must allege an offensive intentional intrusion and a privacy interest.
Acknowledging this standard, the defendant recites the facts of previous cases, none of which consider the specific type of act alleged by the plaintiff and then concludes that "while not directly on point, what the holdings in these cases make clear is that Plaintiff's allegations fall far short of what is required to plead the tort of invasion of privacy by an unreasonable intrusion upon her seclusion."
After reviewing the precedent, the court agrees with the defendant that "there appear to be very few cases directly on point." The court notes, however, that there are several cases that discuss an individual's expectation of privacy during menstruation as pertaining to an unconstitutional search. In these cases, courts have not had "much difficulty in concluding that society considers reasonable [a woman's] expectation that she would be permitted to attend in private to the very personal hygienic needs arising out of her menstruation. One strains to conjure up an activity more private than the changing of a sanitary napkin." Wilkes v. Clayton, 696 F.Sup. 144, 147 (N.J. 1988). Although these courts were not considering a person's expectation of privacy for the purposes of an unreasonable intrusion tort claim, their reasoning still provides guidance pertaining to our societal understanding of what is highly offensive and what is private. Thus, as a matter of law, a reasonable person could conclude that the alleged behavior of the defendant's agents in this case was highly offensive and intrusive on the plaintiff's privacy because other courts have found similar acts to violate a constitutional expectation of privacy.
The defendant additionally claims that there is no alleged intrusion in this case because its agents did not directly solicit this specific information from the plaintiff. Based on the alleged acts, however, a reasonable person could find that the defendant's agents constructively demanded this information by not permitting the plaintiff to use the bathroom upon her request. Thus, the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts that establish the required elements of an invasion of privacy tort. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to strike count eight is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, the defendant's motion to strike counts one, two and eight is denied because each states a claim upon which relief can be granted. Count six, however, does not state a legally sufficient cause of action and, therefore, the defendant's motion to strike that count is granted.