Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BC266081, Elizabeth A. Grimes, Judge.
Robert Mann and Donald Cook for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Rockard J. Delgadillo, City Attorney and Janet G. Bogigian, Assistant City Attorney for Defendants and Respondents.
TURNER, P. J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, Kelvin Thomas Gant, appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of defendants, City of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles Police Department (the department), on a class action complaint alleging title 42 United States Code section 1983 Fourteenth Amendment due process violations under Monell v. New York Department of Social Services (1978) 436 U.S. 658, 690. Plaintiff was mistakenly held on an arrest warrant issued for Kevin Thomas Gant (“Mr. Gant”). Plaintiff is Mr. Gant’s twin brother. Plaintiff was initially arrested for his own domestic violence conduct with his estranged spouse. After he was arrested, police officers discovered the outstanding warrant for Mr. Gant. Although by January 9, 2001 the Los Angeles County District Attorney and the Los Angeles City Attorney declined to file burglary and domestic violence charges, plaintiff was held on Mr. Gant’s arrest warrant until January 12, 2001.
In a prior appeal, we determined that the trial court properly summarily adjudicated the following claims raised by plaintiff: false arrest; false imprisonment; Civil Code section 52.1 civil rights violation; wrongful arrest; and declaratory and injunctive relief. (Gant v. City of Los Angeles, et al. (Oct. 5, 2005, B173284) [nonpub.opn.].) However, we reversed that portion of the judgment determining that defendants were entitled to summarily adjudicate the Monell claim. (Gant v. City of Los Angeles, supra, at p. 2.) On remand, the trial court granted the defendants’ subsequent summary judgment motion and ruled, “Plaintiff has not demonstrated there is any material disputed fact to be tried as to whether or not the [defendants have] a policy, custom or practice of inaction that amounts to a knowing failure to protect constitutional rights.” The sole question before us is whether there is a triable issue as to plaintiff’s Monell claim. We affirm the judgment.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Our Original Opinion
In our initial opinion, we held that triable issues of material fact remained as to whether plaintiff was entitled to relief under his due process claim that defendants have a policy, practice, or custom of knowingly failing to take action in the case of mistaken arrests of persons pursuant to warrants. (Gant v. City of Los Angeles, supra, at pp. 2, 27-32.) We held: “There are two sets of federal civil rights claims. The first involves the legality of his arrest. For the reasons previously discussed, no due process violation premised on the initial arrest occurred. The second potential violation involves an alleged policy, custom, or practice on the part of the city knowingly to allow the circumstances which led to the plaintiff’s incarceration until January 12, 2001. As to the policy, custom, or practice issue, we believe there is a triable issue for the reasons we now elucidate. [¶] Plaintiff argues that the failure to investigate whether he was the person actually on the warrant for Mr. Gant by readily available means for six days deprived him of rights protected under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Title 42 United States Code section 1983 provides that ‘every person,’ who under color of law, causes the deprivation of ‘any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,’ is liable for damages or subject to injunctive orders. A municipality may be liable under title 42 United States Code section 1983 for a policy of inaction if it amounts to a knowing failure to protect constitutional rights. (City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris (1989) 489 U.S. 378, 388; Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, supra, 436 U.S. at p. 690.) Under Monell, municipal liability may be established in one of three ways. First, a municipality may be liable when one of its employees commits a constitutional deprivation pursuant to a formal governmental policy or pursuant to a practice which is ‘standard operating procedure.’ (Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist. (1989) 491 U.S. 701, 737; City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik (1988) 485 U.S. 112, 127.) Second, municipal liability may be established by showing an official with ‘final policy-making authority’ expressly authorized an unconstitutional policy or gave an unconstitutional order. (Pembaur v. Cincinnati (1986) 475 U.S. 469, 480; Monell v. New York Dept. of Social Services, supra, 436 U.S. at p. 694.) Third, municipal liability may be established by proof that the official with final policy-making authority had a policy of inaction and such inaction amounted to a failure to protect constitutional rights. (City of Canton v. Harris, supra, 489 U.S. at pp. 388-389.) A ‘policy’ occurs within the meaning of Monell when an official responsible for establishing final policy makes a deliberate choice to follow a course of action from among various alternatives. This case involves the third aspect of potential Monell liability. [¶] As to this third aspect of Monell liability, the United States Supreme Court, in a failure to properly train case, explained how a municipality’s inaction can result in liability for deliberate inaction: ‘Only where a municipality’s failure to train its employees in a relevant respect evidences a “deliberate indifference” to the rights of its inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly thought of as a city “policy or custom” that is actionable under § 1983. As Justice BRENNAN’s opinion in Pembaur v. Cinnicinnati, [supra], 475 U.S. [at pp. 483-484] (plurality) put it: “[M]unicipal liability under § 1983 attaches where-and only where-a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives” by city policymakers. See also Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, [1985] 471 U.S., at 823 . . ., (opinion of REHNQUIST, J.). Only where a failure to train reflects a ‘deliberate’ or ‘conscious’ choice by a municipality-a ‘policy’ as defined by our prior cases-can a city be liable for such a failure under § 1983.’ (City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, supra, 489 U.S. 389; Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence (3rd Cir. 2005) 396 F.3d 314, 324.) The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has set forth the test for municipal responsibility for failing to take action to correct a known violation of a constitutional right: ‘In order to impose liability based on a policy of deliberate inaction, the “plaintiff must establish: (1) that he possessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy ‘amounts to deliberate indifference’ to the plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) that the policy [was] the “moving force behind the constitutional violation.”’ Oviatt [v. Pearce 9th Cir. 1979] 954 F.2d 1470,] 1474 (quoting City of Canton, [Ohio,] 489 U.S. at 389-391.’ (Berry v. Baca (9th Cir. 2004) 379 F.3d 764, 767.) In order to be actionable, the challenged policy must amount to more than mere negligence. (Daniels v. Williams (1986) 474 U.S. 327, 333-336; Berry v. Baca, supra, 379 F.3d at p. 764.) [¶] At issue is whether plaintiff’s six-day incarceration on a facially valid warrant of Mr. Gant can give rise to a constitutional claim. (Baker v. McCollan [(1979)] 443 U.S. [137] at pp. 144-146; Brass v. County of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 2003) 328 F.3d 1192, 1200; Oviatt v. Pearce, supra, 954 F.2d at p. 1474.) As previously noted, the fact that a person is mistakenly incarcerated does not necessarily mean that he or she has been deprived of a constitutional right. (Hill v. California [(1971)] 401 U.S. [797,] 804; Baker v. McCollan, supra, 443 U.S. at p. 142.) The Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested. (Baker v. McCollan, supra, 443 U.S. at p. 145; Johnson v. Crooks (8th Cir. 2003) 326 F.3d 995, 999.) Plaintiff contends that his detention after a lapse of time in the face of repeated claims of innocence deprived him of his constitutional liberty interest in violation of the due process clause. (Baker v. McCollan, supra, 443 U.S. at p. 143; Fairley v. Luman [(9th Cir. 2002)] 281 F.3d [913,] 917-918; Oviatt v. Pearce, supra, 954 F.2d at p. 1474.) Such a claim is premised on the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process right to be released within a reasonable time after the reason for the detention has ended. (Baker v. McCollan, supra, 443 U.S. at pp. 144-146; Brass v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 328 F.3d at p. 1200; Oviatt v. Pearce, supra, 954 F.2d at p. 1474.) . . . [¶] . . . [¶] In this case, the policy, custom, or practice issue was resolved at the summary judgment stage. A summary judgment motion must be directed to the issues framed by the pleadings. (Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. [(1994)] 7 Cal.4th [1238,] 1252; Goerhring v. Chapman University [(2004)] 121 Cal.App.4th [353,] 364.) As the moving party, the city had an initial burden of producing [evidence] to make a prima facie showing there was no merit to plaintiff’s Monell policy, custom, or practice claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. [(2001)] 25 Cal.4th [826,] 850-851; Kids’ Universe v. In2Labs [(2002)] 95 Cal.App.4th [870,] 878.) [¶] In this case, the city failed to carry its initial summary judgment burden on the Monell policy, practices, and custom issue. The ever so brief seven page separate statement of undisputed facts makes no reference to evidence pertinent to the Monell policy, practices, and custom issue alleged in the complaint. The factual matters which serve as the basis of a summary judgment motion must be cited to in the separate statement of undisputed facts. (Thrifty Oil Co. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1075; Lewis v. County of Sacramento (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 107, 116.) No evidence on the Monell policy, practices, and custom issue is adverted to in the city’s separate statement. The separate statement does state without citation to any evidence, ‘Plaintiff cannot prove his “arrest” on the warrant for his brother was done pursuant to any custom, policy, or practice of the City of Los Angeles.’ In this regard, the city has the burden of demonstrating not merely that plaintiff has no evidence to support his Monell policy, practices, and custom allegation, but that he cannot reasonably be expected to obtain any. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854; Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.) The city has not sustained its burden in this respect. Moreover, the city presented no evidence as to it policies, if any, as to mistaken identity arrests. Simply stated, the burden of proof never shifted to plaintiff on the Monell policy, practices, and custom cause of action. Upon issuance of the remittitur, the trial court is to grant summary adjudication as to all of plaintiff's causes of action except his Monell policy, practices, and custom claims.” (Gant v. City of Los Angeles, supra, pp. 27-32.)
B. The Complaint
The complaint contained the following allegations. Plaintiff is a representative of a class of persons who are arrested, detained, and incarcerated by the Los Angeles Police Department on the warrants of others. Defendants continued to detain and incarcerate plaintiff after it was or should have been determined he was not the person wanted in the warrant. Plaintiff was injured as a result of the city’s failure to utilize readily available and accepted means of determining whether an arrestee held on a warrant is the person for whom the warrant was issued. Defendants further were alleged to have knowingly, with gross negligence or deliberate indifference, maintained or permitted, unconstitutional official policies, customs, or practices within the meaning of Monell v. New York Dept. of Social Services, supra, 436 U.S. at page 690 and City of Canton v. Harris, supra, 489 U.S. at page 388. Plaintiff alleged he was entitled to damages under title 42 United States Code section 1983 for violations of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.
C. The Current Summary Judgment
On April 10, 2006, defendants filed a summary judgment motion on the ground plaintiff could not prove there was an unconstitutional policy, practice, or custom of inaction which led to a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiff was arrested on January 5, 2001, after the department officers arrived at the home of Elane Sharell Porchia. Ms. Porchia was separated from plaintiff. Plaintiff came to Ms. Porchia’s home at around 12:30 a.m. in a drunken state, knocked on the door, and demanded entrance. Plaintiff was subsequently arrested after: forcing his way into the home by pushing a door into Ms. Porchia’s head and foot; threatening Ms. Porchia; and swearing at police officers who responded to a 911 telephone call.
Officer Shane David Bua declared that he had been employed by the Los Angeles Police Department since February 2000. Officer Bua and his partners placed plaintiff under arrest for burglary. (Pen. Code § 459.) In the arrest report, Officer Bua also recommended that plaintiff be charged with spousal battery. (Pen. Code § 243, subd. (e)(1).) Officer Bua ran a “want and warrant check” utilizing the Countywide Warrant System. The computerized system revealed a no bail felony warrant for Mr. Gant. Officer Bua declared: “8. I also ran a computerized criminal history (also known as a ‘rap sheet’) on Kelvin Thomas Gant and found that the name Kevin Thomas Gant was listed as an alias used by Kelvin Gant. [¶] 9. I also ran a computerized criminal history on Kevin Thomas Gant and found that he used Kelvin Thomas Gant’s name as an alias. Therefore, it happened that the two brothers had used each other’s names interchangeably . . . . [¶] 11. In addition to using his brother’s name as an alias, Kelvin Thomas Gant’s rap sheet shows that on May 15, 1999, he was arrested on three outstanding warrants, one of which was the same warrant that came up on the wants and warrant check on January 5, 2001. The specific warrant number was listed as count number three (LAA#96508401). Based on my experience and training, I know that Los Angeles County warrant numbers are the same as the corresponding Los Angeles County Superior Court Criminal case numbers. [¶] [12.] In this case, the warrant number on the warrant information sheet was XCNA9608401 and the warrant number on the rap sheet was LAA96508401. Because the warrant number appeared on Kelvin Thomas Gant’s own rap sheep, this provided an additional basis to believe that the warrant number was for the person we had in custody on January 5, 2001.” (Emphasis omitted.)
Because of the similarity of names of Kelvin and Kevin, Officer Bua believed they were the same person. Plaintiff had a minute order in his possession. The minute order was from the case of People v. Kevin Thomas Gant, Los Angeles Superior Court, case No. A953793, and stated that the individual had been erroneously booked an unspecified warrant in that case. The minute order stated, “The person in custody states his name his ‘Kelvin Gant’ and that ‘Kevin’ Gant is his twin brother.”
On January 8, 2001, the Los Angeles Police Department issued plaintiff a certificate of release after the Los Angeles County District Attorney decided not to file criminal charges as a result of the burglary and domestic violence arrest. On January 9, 2001, the Los Angeles City Attorney decided not to file criminal charges on the domestic violence arrest. Rather, Deputy City Attorney Michelle D. Lim, reviewed the police report and concluded that the case should be set for a City Attorney Hearing in lieu of filing criminal charges.
The trial court scheduled a bench warrant hearing for January 10, 2001. Plaintiff was not present at the scheduled January 10, 2001 hearing and is listed as “miss-out” in the minute order. Dennis Elmore of the Custody Support Services Unit of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department declared that he is a duly authorized custodian of the Custody Division Manual. His primary duty is to ensure that the custody facilities within the department are in compliance with department and division policy as well as with state and federal mandates. The sheriff’s department is responsible for movement of prisoners to and from court and custody facilities via its Transportation Bureau. A miss-out occurs when a prisoner does not make it to a scheduled court hearing. A miss-out can occur for a number of reasons such as illness, hospitalization, oversleeping, or when an inmate simply refuses to attend court.
Because plaintiff was a miss-out, the January 10, 2001 bench warrant hearing was continued to January 11, 2001. On January 11, 2001, the trial court ruled that plaintiff was not the same person named in the bench warrant case. Plaintiff was released on the warrant case. This was the same case for which plaintiff had the May 21, 1999 minute order. Also on January 11, 2001, the trial court issued a judicial clearance ordering plaintiff’s release forthwith.
Los Angeles Police Officer Guillermo Campos declared that he is a police officer and an inactive member of the State Bar of California. Officer Campos is assigned as a legal instructor to the Legal Training Unit which is part of the department’s Training Division. He has been assigned to that position since May 2002 and a police officer since September 1996. Officer Campos is familiar with the training given prior to January 5, 2001 to police officers regarding individuals sought pursuant to a warrant. Officer Campos teaches all of the Peace Officer Standards and Training required academy training regarding criminal law and criminal procedure to recruits. He also teaches required training regarding the laws of arrest and laws of search and seizure. Officer Campos declared: “2. . . . This training comprises approximately 25 hours of the recruit officers’ training and includes instruction on consensual encounters, detentions, arrests, and search warrants. Los Angeles Police Department recruits receive a total [of] 100 hours in criminal law and procedure. [¶] 3. During the instruction regarding arrests of individuals and warrants, matching suspects/arrestees to warrants is often discussed. However, the procedures for matching suspects to warrants [are] not the subject of the [Peace Officer Standards and Training] mandated lesson plan. [¶] 4. Recruits also receive approximately 100 hours of Academy training in the area of report writing, crime investigation, and arrest procedures. As part of this training, Peace Officer Responsibilities during a custodial arrest situation is discussed. Recruits are taught before the arrested person can be committed for custody, the validity of the warrant must be confirmed. In other words, recruits are taught methods to match the suspect/arrestee to the warrant such as Los Angeles Police Department records, criminal history records including rap sheets, criminal history indexes, Department of Motor Vehicles records, and the arrestee’s fingerprint records. [¶] 5. When the issue of a suspect’s/arrestee’s identity is an issue, it is a policy, practice, and procedure for field training officers to explain to probationers the methods to follow to confirm an arrestee’s identity with a warrant’s descriptors. This will include checking databases as Los Angeles Police Department records, criminal history records including rap sheets, criminal history indexes, Department of Motor Vehicles records, and the arrestee’s fingerprint records. [¶] 6. If the identity of the arrestee remains in doubt, Field Training Officers teach probationers to seek a fingerprint comparison. [¶] 7. In addition, the 2001 Los Angeles Police Department Manual section 611.15 requires certain steps be taken when an arrestee claimed not [to] be the person named in the warrant. Prior to booking, the officer was required to access: Los Angeles Police Department records; a personal history index; Department of Motor Vehicles records; and the arrestee’s fingerprint records. The policy also stated: ‘If during the records search the suspect is positively identified as the subject of the warrant, the record search may be terminated. When a record search does not eliminate the suspect and the concerned department employee believes the suspect is the person on the warrant, the suspect may be booked.’”
Defendants also presented deposition testimony from Lieutenant Michelle Marie Veenstra. Lieutenant Veenstra was the watch commander at the time of plaintiff’s arrest. She did not specifically recall his arrest. However, she had reviewed the arrest report and concluded it complied with department policy. The arrest report contains information about a felony arrest. A copy of the warrant is included in the booking recommendation. She would expect to be included in a booking approval form and identification, a California identification card, a driver’s license, or the rap sheet if they do not have a California identification card. She would also expect a field identification card to be included in the booking approval form. The field identification card contains a name, address, vehicle information, and location of arrest. When a person is arrested on a warrant, a thorough investigation is made. The arrest report states that plaintiff was arrested on an open burglary and domestic violence charge and also hold pursuant to the warrant.
Defendants argued that the undisputed evidence warranted summary judgment of the Monell claim. Defendants asserted: at least four days, from Friday January 5, 2001 until January 9, 2001, must be attributed to plaintiff’s burglary and domestic violence arrest and time it took for the two local prosecuting agencies to decide whether to file criminal charges against plaintiff; plaintiff was a “miss-out” on January 10, 2001, at a bench warrant hearing such that his time in custody should not be attributed to any policy, practice, or custom of the Los Angeles Police Department; and plaintiff was cleared by the trial court on January 11, 2001, when he was released on the warrant and issued a certificate of clearance.
Defendants argued that plaintiff had no evidence his rights were violated pursuant to custom, policy, or practice of inaction on the part of the Los Angeles Police Department. Defendants cited Los Angeles Police Department Manual section 611.15 which directs its officers to follow certain procedures prior to booking including accessing: Los Angeles Police Department records; a personal history index; Department of Motor Vehicle records; and fingerprint records. Probationers are taught to confirm a warrant suspect’s identification by accessing the aforementioned records. Officers are required to document the methods utilized in order for a supervisor to approve the arrest and booking. According to defendants, the policy did not cause any constitutional violation in this case because: Officer Bua ran a computerized criminal history of plaintiff and Mr. Gant; the rap sheets of plaintiff and Mr. Gant contained each other’s names as aliases; the warrant number appeared on plaintiff’s rap sheet; and due to similarity of the names, Kelvin and Kevin, Officer Bua believed plaintiff was Mr. Gant. As a result, defendants argued that there was no evidence the department had a policy of inaction which caused a six-day detention or more generally with respect to so-called wrong warrant arrests.
Additionally, citing Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, supra, 471 U.S. at page 823, defendants contended a failure to train claim could not be the based on a single incident. Plaintiff had no evidence to prove there was a usual and recurring problem of incarcerating the wrong persons on a warrant. In anticipation of plaintiff’s opposition, the city argued that there was no Fourteenth Amendment right to have a fingerprint comparison.
D. Plaintiff’s Opposition
In his opposition to the summary judgment, plaintiff did not dispute a number of defendant’s undisputed facts related to his arrest. However, plaintiff objected to the facts on the ground the events surrounding his arrest were irrelevant to his Monell claim which was the sole remaining issue. According to plaintiff, he was arrested on January 5 and not released until January 12, 2001. Plaintiff argued his due process rights were violated because defendants did not do anything after his arrest to verify he was not the individual named in the arrest warrant. Plaintiff further argued that defendants had only produced evidence of a policy for arrest and booking a person but had not produced any proof of its policy after a suspect is booked. Rather, plaintiff argued defendants did nothing except take him to court and allowed the judge to order a fingerprint comparison. Plaintiff contended that defendants’ “inaction” policy after a mistaken arrest establishes a policy of indifference to his constitutional rights as stated by the Ninth Circuit in Fairley v. Luman, supra, 281 F.3d at page 916.
As part of his opposition, plaintiff produced excerpts from Lieutenant Veenstra’s deposition. Lieutenant Veenstra testified that when a person claims not to be the person in the warrant, there are no requirements to secure a computerized criminal record, to check Department of Motor Vehicle records, or to compare fingerprints. She did not know if the department had access to state fingerprints. Sergeant Richard Baeza signed the arrest report as the approving supervisor. Sergeant Baeza had never heard of Live-Scan. Sergeant Baeza did not know what the policy was on the number of identifiers between the warrant and the arrestee before an arrest could be made. Sergeant Baeza did not know if there was a written policy to determine whether an arrestee was the person actually named in the warrant. Finally, defendants argue plaintiff has included deposition testimony in his appellant’s appendix that was not included as evidence in his opposition to the summary judgment motion. We have referred solely to the evidence that was produced in support of and in opposition to the summary judgment motion.
E. The Reply to the Opposition
In reply, defendants argued that the Fourteenth Amendment did not require post-booking fingerprint comparisons be performed to guarantee positive identification of detainees claiming to be the wrong person on a warrant when pre-booking steps are taken to verify the arrestee’s identity. Defendants further argued: even if plaintiff was detained until January 12, 2001, it was only three days after the time for which his detention on the burglary charges ended; due process does not require a police department to conduct post-booking verification of detainee identities when pre-booking steps are taken; and pre-booking steps were taken to verify plaintiff’s identity in this case. Defendants also contend: Fairley v. Luman, supra, 281 F.3d at pages 916-917, a case involving an appeal from a judgment in the arrestee’s favor, is distinguishable on its facts from this case; in Fairley there was evidence that fingerprints of the two brothers were available for easy comparison; there is no evidence the department had a problem with arresting the wrong individual such that a policy is required to deal with mistaken arrests; defendants’ policies do not shock the conscience; assuming plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated, he failed to meet his burden of proving the absence of post-booking procedures was either deliberately indifferent to his civil rights or the moving force behind his violation; and plaintiff presented no evidence that he made repeated protests of innocence.
F. The Summary Judgment
The trial court granted the summary judgment motion. In ruling on the motion, the trial court ruled, “Plaintiff has not demonstrated there is any material disputed fact to be tried as to whether or not defendant had a policy, custom or practice of inaction that amounts to a knowing failure to protect constitutional rights.” Judgment was entered on August 3, 2006. Plaintiff filed a timely appeal from the judgment.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
In Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at pages 850-851, our Supreme Court described a party’s burdens on summary judgment or adjudication motions as follows: “[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. That is because of the general principle that a party who seeks a court’s action in his favor bears the burden of persuasion thereon. [Citation.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof. . . . [¶] [T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact. . . . A prima facie showing is one that is sufficient to support the position of the party in question. [Citation.]” (Fns. omitted, see Kids’ Universe v. In2Labs, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at pp. 871, 878.) We review the trial court's decision to grant the summary judgment motion de novo. (Johnson v. City of Loma Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4th 61, 65, 67-68; Sharon P. v. Arman, Ltd. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1181, 1188, disapproved on another point in Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 853, fn. 19.) The trial court’s stated reasons for granting summary judgment are not binding on us because we review its ruling not its rationale. (Continental Ins. Co. v. Columbus Line, Inc. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1196; Dictor v. David & Simon, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 238, 245.) In addition, a summary judgment motion is directed to the issues framed by the pleadings. (Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1252; Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 673.) Those are the only issues a motion for summary judgment must address. (Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1252; Goehring v. Chapman University, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 364.)
B. There Are No Triable Issues of Material Fact
The issue here is whether defendants were deliberately indifferent to persons mistakenly arrested on warrants for other persons. In the present case, there is evidence plaintiff was mistakenly arrested and incarcerated on an arrest warrant naming Mr. Gant from January 5 until 12, 2001. The evidence shows plaintiff was arrested on January 5, 2001 in part because of Mr. Gant’s facially valid warrant. But the undisputed evidence also established that plaintiff was arrested on January 5, 2001 based on his own conduct related to a domestic violence and burglary incident with his estranged spouse. It was not until January 9, 2001 that both the district attorney and the city attorney declined to pursue criminal charges against plaintiff. Thus, it was not until January 9, 2001, that plaintiff was being held solely on the warrant seeking Mr. Gant’s arrest. We assume for purposes of discussion that plaintiff was not released from custody until January 12, 2001.
As we explained in our original opinion, in order to establish liability under Monell, plaintiff was required to prove that defendants had an official policy of inaction constituting a “deliberate” choice such that it amounted to a failure to protect constitutional rights. (City of Canton v. Harris, supra, 489 U.S. at pp. 388-389; Oviatt v. Pearce, supra, 954 F.2d at p. 1474.) Plaintiff could satisfy the policy standard by producing evidence defendants made a deliberate choice to follow a course of action from among various alternatives such that it amounted to deliberate indifference. (Pembaur v. Cinnicinnati, supra, 475 U.S. at pp. 483-484; City of Canton v. Harris, supra, 489 U.S. 389; Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, supra, 396 F.3d at pp. 324-325.) To impose liability for failing to take action to correct a known violation of constitutional rights, a Ninth Circuit panel has held: “[A] section 1983 plaintiff must establish (1) that he possessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy ‘amounts to deliberate indifference’ to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) that the policy [was] the ‘moving force behind the constitutional violation.’” (Oviatt v. Pearce, supra, 954 F.2d at p. 1474; accord Berry v. Baca, supra, 379 F.3d at p. 767.) Moreover, the title 42 United States Code section 1983 claim is not actionable if the challenged policy does not amount to anything more than mere negligence. (Daniels v. Williams, supra, 474 U.S. at pp. 333-336; Berry v. Baca, supra, 379 F.3d at p. 767.)
To begin with, defendants met their initial burden of producing evidence they have no practice, policy, or custom which led to defendant’s incarceration. Defendants established that the Los Angeles Police Department Policy Manual section 611.15 sets forth the policy for determining whether an arrestee is an individual named in an arrest warrant. Further, defendants produced evidence that the decision to hold plaintiff on the facially valid arrest warrant complied with the procedural safeguards set forth in the policy manual. Moreover, Officer Bua diligently conducted several computer searches in an effort to verify that defendant was the subject of the arrest warrant for Mr. Gant. Thus, the burden of production shifted to plaintiff to present evidence of a practice, policy, or custom. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 490; Wiz Technology, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1, 11.) Plaintiff presented no evidence to support his allegation that defendants knew, or should have known, that the procedures utilized were likely to result in a violation of his constitutional rights. Nor was evidence produced of any constitutionally significant number of persons who are deprived of their liberty under circumstances similar to those in plaintiff’s situation. At best, all plaintiff demonstrated is that a negligent act occurred, which is not actionable pursuant to title 42 United States Code section 1983. Summary judgment was correctly entered.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants, the City of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles Police Department, are to recover their costs on appeal from plaintiff, Kelvin Thomas Gant.
We concur: MOSK, J., KRIEGLER, J.