Opinion
193 Index No. 155262/21 Case No. 2022–02357
05-04-2023
Guzel GANIEVA, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Leon BLACK, Defendant–Appellant.
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, New York (Michael B. Carlinsky of counsel), for appellant. Wigdor LLP, New York (Jeanne M. Christensen of counsel), for respondent.
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, New York (Michael B. Carlinsky of counsel), for appellant.
Wigdor LLP, New York (Jeanne M. Christensen of counsel), for respondent.
Manzanet–Daniels, J.P., Singh, Moulton, Rodriguez, Pitt–Burke, JJ.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (David B. Cohen, J.), entered on or about May 6, 2022, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3024(b) to strike certain factual allegations from the first amended complaint and granted plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to amend that pleading, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, defendant's motion granted, and plaintiff's motion denied.
Prior to the commencement of this action, the parties’ years-long relationship ended, and plaintiff publicly accused defendant of sexual harassment and abuse. Defendant responded by publicly stating that the parties had a consensual relationship, and that plaintiff had extorted him for years. Plaintiff commenced this action against defendant asserting causes of action for defamation, defamation per se, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and gender-motivated violence under the Victims of Gender–Motivated Violence Protection Law (Administrative Code of NYC § 10–111 et seq. ).
The court should have granted defendant's motion to strike certain inflammatory factual allegations from the first amended complaint. The allegations at issue, which employed rhetoric or detailed defendant's misconduct toward other women and his relationships with notorious third parties, were scandalous and prejudicial, and not necessary to establish any element of plaintiff's causes of action (see CPLR 3024[b] ; Breest v. Haggis, 180 A.D.3d 83, 95, 115 N.Y.S.3d 322 [1st Dept. 2019] ; see also Pisula v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y., 201 A.D.3d 88, 96–97, 159 N.Y.S.3d 458 [2d Dept. 2021] ). CPLR 3024(b) motions do not judge whether matters will be discoverable or admissible at trial (see Breest, 180 A.D.3d at 95 n. 13, 115 N.Y.S.3d 322 ; Pisula, 201 A.D.3d at 97, 159 N.Y.S.3d 458 ).
The court also should have denied plaintiff's motion for leave to amend to add similar factual allegations relating to defendant's misconduct toward another woman and his relationship with one of the notorious third parties. Those allegations were "palpably insufficient" because, like the allegations that should have been stricken, they do not establish any element of plaintiff's causes of action ( Favourite Ltd. v. Cico, 208 A.D.3d 99, 108, 171 N.Y.S.3d 67 [1st Dept. 2022] ; see also CPLR 3025[b] ).