Opinion
No. C 04-1666 WHA (PR).
May 13, 2004
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff, an inmate at the Santa Clara County Jail, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint. He also requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.Id. at 1915A(b)(1), (2).
B. Legal Claims
1. Defendant De Jesus
De Jesus was plaintiff's probation officer. He contends that she committed perjury in court in his probation revocation proceeding. He also asserts that she unfairly filed charges indicating that he had violated probation conditions.
The Ninth Circuit has held that probation officers possess an absolute judicial immunity from damage suits under § 1983 for official functions bearing a close association to the judicial process, which is clearly the case with De Jesus' actions here.Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d 155, 156-58 (9th Cir. 1985) (immunity for preparing reports for use by state courts). However, the circuit has held that when the relevant court of last resort has undercut the theory or reasoning underlying circuit precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable, district courts (and three-judge panels of the court of appeals) should consider themselves bound by the intervening higher authority and reject the prior opinion of the circuit as having been effectively overruled. Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003).
The United States Supreme Court has taken a "functional approach" to the question of whether absolute immunity applies in a given situation, meaning that it looks to "the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it." Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993) (quotingForrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229, (1988)). Thus, state actors are granted absolute immunity from damages liability in suits under § 1983 only for actions taken while performing a duty functionally comparable to one for which officials were immune at common law. Miller, 335 F.3d at 897. This appears to undercut the "close relation to the judicial process" rationale inDemoran. However, under the common law, judges, prosecutors, trial witnesses, and jurors were absolutely immune for such critical functions. Id. at 896. Given that De Jesus' actions alleged here were those of a witness and a prosecutor, it is clear that she is absolutely immune, whether under Demoran or that rationale in Buckley.
2. Defendant Teves
Teves is alleged to have been De Jesus' supervisor. When plaintiff complained to her about De Jesus and asked to be assigned to another probation officer, Teves told him "it could get worse." These allegations are not sufficient to state a claim for violation of a constitutional right, and Teves' liability seems to be predicated on respondeat superior liability, i.e., plaintiff is seeking to hold Teves liable because she was De Jesus' supervisor. Under no circumstances is there respondeat superior liability under section 1983. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).
3. Judge Poches
Plaintiff alleges that in response to plaintiff's letter to him telling him of De Jesus' perjury, Judge Poches stripped him of his pro per status, denied him his right to represent himself, forced him to accept a public defender, and referred him to "mental health." These are clearly actions taken in a judicial capacity, for which Judge Poches is absolutely immune. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967) (applying judicial immunity to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
4. Injunctive relief
Immunity does not bar claims for injunctive relief in § 1983 actions. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984) (judicial immunity). However, "in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff does not base his claims on violation of a declaratory decree, or allege that declaratory relief was not available, so to the extent he requests injunctive relief, he has failed to state a claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED. The clerk shall close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.