Gandara v. Wilson

10 Citing cases

  1. Griego v. Grieco

    90 N.M. 174 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977)   Cited 16 times

    The doctors were qualified to testify whether Grieco followed the standard of care and skill required of physicians in examining, diagnosing and treating a patient suffering from "blunt trauma" to the abdomen to determine whether an intra-abdominal injury was present. See Goffe v. Pharmaseal Laboratories, Inc., No. 2480 (Ct.App.), decided December 7, 1976 (Sutin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. granted January 7, 1977; Gandara v. Wilson, 85 N.M. 161, 509 P.2d 1356 (Ct.App. 1973). Grieco suggests consideration of Murphy v. Dyer, 409 F.2d 747 (10th Cir. 1969).

  2. Goffe v. Pharmaseal Laboratories, Inc.

    90 N.M. 764 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976)   Cited 10 times
    Mentioning cross-claim against doctor and hospital

    Furthermore, the medical expert or experts must be qualified to express an opinion concerning the recognized standard of medical practice in the community and an opinion that the defendant departed from that standard or neglected to do something required by the standards. Gandara v. Wilson, 85 N.M. 161, 509 P.2d 1356 (Ct.App. 1973). At the outset of our discussion, it is well to remind ourselves that a medical malpractice suit is a negligence action.

  3. Morrison v. MacNamara

    407 A.2d 555 (D.C. 1979)   Cited 141 times
    Adopting national standard of care for medical professionals and hospitals

    Despite these criticisms, the locality rule is still followed in several jurisdictions. See, e. g., Levett v. Etkind, 158 Conn. 567, 573, 265 A.2d 70 (1969); Gandora v. Wilson, 85 N.M. 161, 163, 509 P.2d 1356, 1358 (1973). The majority of jurisdictions, however, have abandoned the locality rule.

  4. Ardoin v. Hartford Acc. Indem. Co.

    360 So. 2d 1331 (La. 1978)   Cited 217 times
    In Ardoin the court addressed the retroactivity of Act 807 of 1975 which further defined the standard of care owed by physicians under C.C. art. 2315.

    Moreover, only a distinct minority of states still adhere to the strict locality rule. Dunham v. Elder, 18 Md. App. 360, 306 A.2d 568 (1973); Gandara v. Wilson, 85 N.M. 161, 509 P.2d 1356 (1973); Levett v. Etkund [Etkind], 158 Conn. 567, 265 A.2d 70 (1969); Lockart v. Maclean, 77 Nev. 210, 361 P.2d 670 (1961). A plurality of states now apply the "similar locality" rule, see, e. g., Mecham v. McLeay, 193 Neb. 457, 227 N.W.2d 829 (1975); Karrigan v. Nazareth Convent Academy, Inc., 212 Kan. 44, 510 P.2d 190 (1973); Runyon v. Reid, 510 P.2d 943 (Okla.

  5. Pharmaseal Laboratories, Inc. v. Goffe

    90 N.M. 753 (N.M. 1977)   Cited 141 times
    Holding that summary judgment as to a doctor's negligence was improper in the presence of both expert and lay testimony sufficient to raise genuine issues of fact regarding the alleged negligence

    The adoption of this rule by the New Mexico Supreme Court indicated a change in the law. We hereby modify Cervantes v. Forbis, supra, and Gandara v. Wilson, 85 N.M. 161, 509 P.2d 1356 (Ct.App. 1973) and other cases insofar as they purport to mandate a "strict-locality" rule and we declare that the first paragraph of N.M.U.J.I.Civ. 8.1 is the correct statement of New Mexico law. Evidence of the standard of knowledge, skill and care owed by a physician to his patient can be provided by expert testimony of the knowledge, skill and care ordinarily used by reasonably well-qualified doctors of the same field of medicine practicing under similar circumstances, and this includes testimony from doctors from the same or other localities. Los Alamos Medical Center v. Coe, 58 N.M. 686, 275 P.2d 175 (1954).

  6. Poulin v. Zartman

    542 P.2d 251 (Alaska 1975)   Cited 73 times
    Holding that father of infant blinded after oxygen treatment failed to make out a prima facie informed consent claim because he failed to show that he would have declined the procedure if he had known of alternative treatment

    06 (1973 1973 Supp.); Prosser, Torts § 32, 161 (4th ed. 1971); Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 953 (1968 1973 Supp.); Note, An Evaluation of Changes in Medical Standard of Care, 23 Vand.L.Rev. 729 (1970); Waltz, The Rise and Gradual Fall of the Locality Rule in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 18 DePaul L.Rev. 408 (1969); Perdue, The Law of Texas Medical Malpractice: Standard of Care, 11 Houston L.Rev. 22 (1973); Kroll, The Etiology, Pulse and Prognosis of Medical Malpractice, 8 Suffolk L.Rev. 598 (1974); King Coe, The Wisdom of the Strict Locality Rule, 3 Baltimore L. Rev. 221 (1974).Gandara v. Wilson, 85 N.M. 161, 509 P.2d 1356 (1973). Basically the states have taken one of three positions on this issue.

  7. Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp

    276 Md. 187 (Md. 1975)   Cited 85 times
    In Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hospital Ass'n., 276 Md. 187, 349 A.2d 245 (1975), the Court of Appeals of Maryland traced the origins of the strict locality rule, noting the grounds on which it has been attacked.

    A distinct minority of states, however, cling to the strict locality rule. Horton v. Vickers, 142 Conn. 105, 111 A.2d 675, 679 (1955) ("in the same general neighborhood"), accord,Levett v. Etkind, 158 Conn. 567, 265 A.2d 70, 41 A.L.R.3d 1343 (1969); Lockart v. Maclean, 77 Nev. 210, 361 P.2d 670 (1961); Gandara v. Wilson, 85 N.M. 161, 509 P.2d 1356, 1358 (1973) ("recognized standards of medical practice in the community"); see Bertrand v. Aetna Casualty Surety Company, 306 So.2d 343, 347 (La. App. 1975) ("in the same community or locality"). Nevertheless, recognizing the significant developments which have occurred in the training and practice of medicine, and the population shifts which have marked the increased urbanization of our society, a majority of American courts have now abandoned the strict locality rule as being too narrow.

  8. Sewell v. Wilson

    97 N.M. 523 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982)   Cited 29 times
    Upholding the plaintiff's appeal against dismissal when it demonstrated "continual activity in pursuit of [its] claim and sufficient excuse for failure to attempt to conclude it with any greater dispatch"

    Nevertheless, to give scientific or specialized opinion testimony, an expert witness must be qualified to do so by knowledge, skill, training or education. N.M.R.Evid. 702, N.M.S.A. 1978; see, Gandara v. Wilson, 85 N.M. 161, 509 P.2d 1356 (Ct.App. 1973); Dahl v. Turner, 80 N.M. 564, 458 P.2d 816, 39 A.L.R.3d 207 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 80 N.M. 608, 458 P.2d 860 (1969). A medical expert must also be able to testify as to how and why he arrives at an opinion that a defendant physician's conduct has been substandard.

  9. Hines v. St. Joseph's Hospital

    86 N.M. 763 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974)   Cited 44 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Rejecting strict liability for blood

    "[O]ne person's preference does not establish a standard of care." Hutchins v. Blood Services of Montana, 506 P.2d 449 (Mont. 1973); Gandara v. Wilson, 85 N.M. 161, 509 P.2d 1356 (Ct.App. 1973). "* * * However, in order to prove a case of actionable negligence, plaintiff must do more than have an expert witness testify that he would like to have the test used.

  10. State v. Sedillo

    86 N.M. 382 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974)   Cited 12 times

    Its orders are final. See, Alexander v. Delgado, 84 N.M. 717, 507 P.2d 778 (1973); Gandara v. Wilson, 85 N.M. 161, 509 P.2d 1356 (Ct.App. 1973); Salazar v. State, 82 N.M. 630, 485 P.2d 741 (Ct.App. 1971). (2) Entrapment was not an issue.