{14} "Stacking refers to an insured's attempted recovery of damages by aggregating the coverage under more than one policy or under one policy covering more than one automobile." Gamboa v. Allstate Ins. Co., 104 N.M. 756, 757, 726 P.2d 1386, 1387 (1986). It follows that "the `stacking' issue arises only when it is determined that the person seeking to cumulate benefits on two or more uninsured motorist coverages is an insured under those policies."

The language the parties employed in their agreement "must be given its natural and ordinary meaning." Gamboa v. Allstate Ins. Co., 104 N.M. 756, 758, 726 P.2d 1386, 1388 (1986) (quoting Sears v. Wilson, 10 Kan. App. 2d 494, 704 P.2d 389, 390 (1985)). Although ambiguities in a policy must be liberally construed in favor of the insured, Thompson v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 90 N.M. 620, 621, 567 P.2d 62, 63 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 4, 569 P.2d 414 (1977), a clause is ambiguous only if it is "reasonably and fairly susceptible of different constructions."

The term "stacking" refers to an insured's attempt to recover damages in aggregate under more than one policy or one policy covering more than one vehicle until all damages either are satisfied or the total policy limits are exhausted. Gamboa v. Allstate Ins. Co., 104 N.M. 756, 757, 726 P.2d 1386, 1387 (1986); Lopez v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., Inc., 98 N.M. 166, 168, 646 P.2d 1230, 1232 (1982). In addition, the term "class one insured" generally encompasses those persons who are named insureds under a policy, i.e., the owner, the spouse, and any relatives living in the household; and the term "class two insured" pertains to any person occupying the insured motor vehicle at the time of the accident.

Class 1 insureds are recognized as having UM coverage no matter what their location at the time of an accident; in other words, without regard to whether they are occupying a covered vehicle. Rehders, 135 P.3d at 245-46; Gamboa v. Allstate Ins. Co., 726 P.2d 1386, 1388 (N.M. 1986) ("First class insureds are covered by policies no matter where they are or in what circumstances they may be; coverage is not limited to a particular vehicle."). As in Rehders, Class 1-type status is available under the Nationwide UM endorsement only if the "Named Insured" is an individual.

Delancey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 918 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1990); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wainscott, 439 F.Supp. 840 (D.Alaska 1977); Bartning v. State Farm Fire Cas., 164 Ariz. 370, 793 P.2d 127 (Ct.App. 1990); Smith v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 186 Cal.App.3d 239, 230 Cal.Rptr. 495 (1986); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Chacon, 939 P.2d 517 (Colo.Ct.App. 1997); Valiant Ins. Co. v. Webster, 567 So.2d 408 (Fla. 1990); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. George, 326 Ill.App.3d 1065, 261 Ill.Dec. 236, 762 N.E.2d 1163 (2002); Ivey v. Mass. Bay Ins. Co., 569 N.E.2d 692 (Ind.Ct.App. 1991); Lafleur v. Fid. Cas. Ins. Co. of New York, 385 So.2d 1241 (La.Ct.App. 1980); Gillespie v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 343 So.2d 467 (Miss. 1977); Livingston v. Omaha Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 927 S.W.2d 444 (Mo.Ct.App. 1996); Gamboa v. Allstate Ins. Co., 104 N.M. 756, 726 P.2d 1386 (1986); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hammonds, 72 Wash.App. 664, 865 P.2d 560 (1994). [¶ 8] Uninsured motorist coverage is a relatively recent development.

{10} Stacking refers to "an insured's attempt to recover damages in aggregate under more than one policy or one policy covering more than one vehicle until all damages either are satisfied or the total policy limits are exhausted." Morro v. Farmers Ins. Co., 106 N.M. 669, 670, 748 P.2d 512, 513 (1988) (citing Gamboa v. Allstate Ins. Co., 104 N.M. 756, 757, 726 P.2d 1386, 1387 (1986), and Lopez v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., 98 N.M. 166, 168, 646 P.2d 1230, 1232 (1982)). {11} We resolve questions regarding insurance policies by interpreting their terms and provisions in accordance with the "same principles which govern the interpretation of all contracts."

Knowles v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 113 N.M. 703, 832 P.2d 394, 396 (1992). The court can construe an insurance policy only where the language of the policy is equivocal, indefinite, or ambiguous. Gamboa v. Allstate Ins. Co., 104 N.M. 756, 726 P.2d 1386, 1389 (1986). Whether an insurance policy is ambiguous is a question of law to be determined by the court.

If an insurance contract is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for a court to construe its terms. Gamboa v. Allstate Ins. Co., 104 N.M. 756, 726 P.2d 1386, 1389 (1986). Whether an insurance contract is ambiguous is a question of law to be determined by the court, Richardson v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 112 N.M. 73, 811 P.2d 571, 572 (1991), and, as with all legal questions, we conduct a de novo review of the district court's conclusions.

When facts are undisputed, and the sole issue is the application of an insurance policy, the matter is a question of law for the court. See Benns v. Continental Cas., Co., 982 F.2d 461, 462 (10th Cir. 1993); Gamboa v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1986-NMSC-078, ¶ 9, 104 N.M. 756, 758; Richardson v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 1991-NMSC-052, ¶ 7, 112 N.M. 73, 74, 811 P.2d 571, 572 (“Absent ambiguity, provisions of contract need only be applied, rather than construed or interpreted.”). So, the Court need only apply the provisions of the policy contract to determine whether Travelers must defend and indemnify HGS in the underlying lawsuits.

When facts are undisputed, and the only issue is the application of an insurance policy, all that remains is a question of law for the court. See Benns v. Continental Cas., Co, 982 F.2d 461, 462 (10th Cir. 1993); Gamboa v. Allstate Ins. Co, 1986-NMSC-078, ¶ 9, 104 N.M. 756. There appears to be no dispute that New Mexico law governs the policy.