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Gamble v. Town of Hempstead

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Mar 5, 2001
281 A.D.2d 391 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)

Opinion

Submitted February 7, 2001.

March 5, 2001.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Alpert, J.), dated June 14, 2000, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Joseph J. Ra, Town Attorney, Hempstead, N.Y. (Mary Elizabeth Mahon of counsel), for appellant.

Kaye Lenchner, Mineola, N.Y. (Mitchell J. Lenchner of counsel), for respondents.

Before: LAWRENCE J. BRACKEN, ACTING P.J., SONDRA MILLER, LEO F. McGINITY, ROBERT W. SCHMIDT, JJ.


DECISION ORDER

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the defendant's motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

The infant plaintiff was injured when she tripped and fell on a crack in the surface of a basketball court while playing basketball. By engaging in a sport or recreational activity, a participant consents to those commonly-appreciated risks which are inherent in and arise out of the nature of the sport generally and which flow from such participation (see, Morgan v. State of New York, 90 N.Y.2d 471, 484-486). Application of the doctrine of assumption of the risk requires not only knowledge of the injury-causing defect, but also, appreciation of the resultant risk. Awareness of risk, however, is not to be determined in a vacuum (see, Maddox v. City of New York, 66 N.Y.2d 270, 278). Rather, it is to be assessed against the background of the skill and experience of the particular plaintiff (see, Maddox v. City of New York, supra, at 278; Turcotte v. Fell, 68 N.Y.2d 432, 439; Morgan v. State of New York, supra, at 486; Pascucci v. Town of Oyster Bay, 186 A.D.2d 725). Furthermore, the doctrine encompasses risks associated with the construction of the playing field, and any open and obvious conditions thereon (see, Maddox v. City of New York, supra; Paone v. County of Suffolk, 251 A.D.2d 563).

Here, the crack in the surface of the basketball court was open, obvious, clearly visible, and known to the infant plaintiff. In addition, contrary to the Supreme Court's conclusion, the infant plaintiff had the necessary skill and experience to appreciate the risk presented by the crack. Accordingly, summary judgment should have been granted in favor of the defendant dismissing the complaint.


Summaries of

Gamble v. Town of Hempstead

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Mar 5, 2001
281 A.D.2d 391 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)
Case details for

Gamble v. Town of Hempstead

Case Details

Full title:KEISHONNA GAMBLE, ETC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS, v. TOWN OF HEMPSTEAD…

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department

Date published: Mar 5, 2001

Citations

281 A.D.2d 391 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)
721 N.Y.S.2d 385

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