Opinion
Civ. No. 97-1281 (DRD).
August 26, 1999.
Jeffrey E. Fogel, Esq., Nutley, New Jersey, Attorney for Plaintiff.
Arlindo B. Araujo, Esq., Pope, Grossman, Bergrin, Verdesco Bross, P.A., Newark, New Jersey, Attorneys for Defendants.
OPINION
In this civil rights action defendant Gary Larson moves for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 or, in the alternative, to admit the guilty plea of plaintiff Melanio O. Galvan into evidence at the time of trial. For the following reasons, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This is an action alleging the violation of Plaintiff's civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On March 20, 1995 Galvan went to the Eyes First store in Woodbridge Township, New Jersey to inquire about problems he was having with a pair of glasses that he had recently purchased there. (Galvan Dep., 95:7 — 97:24.) According to Galvan he had been told that he could come to the store any time after 6:00 p.m. and that he didn't need an appointment with the doctor because he was not coming for an examination. (Id., 95:13-24.) He arrived at approximately 7:00 p.m. (Id. 96:5-10; 115:8-10.) During Galvan's discussion with store personnel he became upset and refused to leave the store without his glasses. (Id., 123:22 — 125:11.) Store personnel called the Woodbridge Police because Galvan refused to leave. (Id., 125:17-20.) Officer Larson was one of the officers who responded to the call for assistance, which was referred to by the police dispatcher as a "disturbance" and a "customer problem." (Berry Dep., 8:11-24.)
Officer Norman Berry was the first Woodbridge officer on the scene. (Id., 10:3-15.) When Officer Berry went into the Eye Store he spoke to a female employee behind the counter and was told that Galvan was demanding to see the doctor, who was not in the store at the time. (Id., 11:11 — 12:2.) The employee told Officer Berry that Galvan did not have an appointment with the doctor scheduled for that day and that he was told that he could not see the doctor. (Id.) The employee also told Officer Berry that Galvan was upsetting the other customers and that she was afraid of him. (Id., 11:11-12.) Officer Berry asked Galvan what was wrong, and Galvan answered that his glasses weren't right and he wanted to see the doctor. (Id., 13:19 — 14:3.) Officer Berry then asked Galvan to step outside so that he could get his side of the story and assist him, but Galvan would not listen to him. (Id., 14:4 — 15:8.) Galvan finally went outside after three requests because Officer Berry ordered him to in a strong tone of voice. (Id., 15:9 — 16:7.)
When Officer Berry and Galvan went outside, first Sergeant Monteiro and then Officer Larson arrived on the scene as back up. (Id., 16:8 — 17:19.) The events that transpired next are disputed. In his deposition Officer Berry testified that Galvan refused to give his name or produce any identification. (Id., 18:22 — 19:6; 22:12 — 23:12.) According to Officer Berry Galvan tried to push his way between him and Officer Larson to get back into the store. (Id., 19:7-15.) Galvan, on the other hand, testified that when Officer Larson asked for his identification he pulled out his wallet and Officer Larson grabbed it. (Galvan Dep., 77:13 — 78:15.) He also stated that he wrote down the plate numbers of the patrol cars when the officers refused to give him their names or badge numbers. (Id., 85:8-12.) According to Galvan he later saw Officer Larson sorting through the cards in his wallet. (Id., 158:6 — 159:16.) Galvan also testified that he did not attempt to go back into the store. (Galvan Dep., 76:21 — 77:3; 130:1-10.)
According to Officer Larson, Galvan threatened to sue the officers or to file Internal Affairs complaints. (Larson Dep., 30:21; 72:8 — 73:1.) Galvan was handcuffed and arrested by Officer Larson in front of Sergeant Monteiro. (Id., 19:7-25.) Officer Larson charged Galvan with violating N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1 for obstructing him by "trying to enter a business after he was removed by police for disorderly conduct. The suspect also refused to produce I.D. for an official investigation report. The suspect tryed [sic] to intimidate officers by writing down their names and making threats." (Warrant Complaint, Pl. Ex. A.) Galvan complained about the tightness of the handcuffs and, according to Officer Larson, they were checked by Officer Berry who found them to be within normal limits. (Berry Dep., 19:25 — 20:15; 34:4-7.) According to Galvan, however, when he complained about the handcuffs Officer Larson twisted them and made then even tighter. (Galvan Dep., 25:18-24; 28:7-14.) Galvan also testified in his deposition that after he was handcuffed he was pushed towards the patrol car, violently pushed against the trunk of the car and then placed into the vehicle. (Id., 21:20 — 22:1.) According to Galvan he incurred a scar on his left wrist as a result of his arrest and handcuffing. (Id., 17:14-19.)
Galvan was transported to police headquarters by Officer Larson and was detained there. According to Galvan, Officer Larson asked for his identification information upon their arrival and Galvan provided him with all of the information he requested, although Officer Larson made no effort to verify any of the information Galvan gave him. (Larson Dep., 42:14 — 45:16; 54:4-7; Arrest Report, Pl. Ex. B.) Municipal Court Judge John Jorgenson was contacted, and he set bail at $750.00 with no 10% option. (Def. Ex. D., 1:1-25.) Larson believes that he told Judge Jorgenson that "Galvan had no proper I.D." (Answer to Interrogatories, Pl. Ex. C.) The summons complaint prepared by Officer Larson was voided and warrant no. W 1995-000-799-1225 was issued since Galvan could not meet the bail set on the summons complaint. (Def. Ex. D, 1:1-25.) Judge Jorgenson's decision to void the summons and issue a warrant was based on Galvan's lack of proper identification. (Id.)
According to Officer Larson the common practice in Woodbridge and other municipalities is for a judge to set bail on persons without proper identification with instructions to the shift supervisor to release the subject on his own recognizance if someone brings in proper identification within a reasonable time.
Galvan was taken to the Middlesex County Adult Correctional Center in North Brunswick where he was held until the following afternoon when bail was posted. (Galvan Dep., 37:5-10; 38:21-24.) When Galvan appeared before Woodbridge Township Municipal Court Judge Spencer Robbins on August 3, 1995 he pleaded guilty to Woodbridge's loitering ordinance. (Transcript of Plea, Def. Ex. F.) Judge Robbins asked Galvan if he was pleading guilty because "apparently, you were at a place in Woodbridge and apparently hanging out at the place." (Id.) When Galvan responded affirmatively, Judge Robbins accepted that as an acknowledgment of a plea and fined Galvan $200 in addition to $30 in court costs. (Id.)
Galvan filed his initial Complaint against Woodbridge Township and Officer Larson on March 20, 1997, exactly two years after his arrest. His Second Amended Complaint alleges that Officer Larson violated his civil rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments due to unlawful arrest, excessive use of force and unlawful detention. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Galvan's claims against Woodbridge Township were dismissed by stipulation on May 20, 1999.
Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party establishes that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that [it] is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party must show that if the evidentiary material of record were reduced to admissible evidence in court, it would be insufficient to permit the non-moving party to carry its burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
Once the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56, "its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts in question." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986), rev'g, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983). The opposing party must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial and may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings. Sound Ship Bldg. Corp. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 533 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 860 (1976).
At the summary judgment stage the court's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but rather to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties, however, will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment. Id. at 247-248.
ANALYSIS
I. Summary Judgment
Officer Larson argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because Galvan's allegations against him "are not at all supported by the facts of this matter." (Def. Br., p. 6.) He asserts that Galvan was justly arrested for his behavior at the Eyes First store; that he and the other officers "followed reasonable police procedures at all times"; that the decision to detain Galvan was made "exclusively and independently" by Judge Jorgenson because Galvan had refused to produce any personal identification at the time of his arrest; and that excessive force was not used and Galvan was not cuffed too tightly by Officer Larson. (Id., pp. 6-7.) Officer Larson contends that the scar on his Galvan's wrist was actually an old scar from a bullet wound sustained in the Philippines, and that Galvan had received a settlement for alleged police brutality by New York City police for using handcuffs that were too tight on the same wrist. Galvan correctly responds that there are material issues of fact with regard to each of his claims and that summary judgment is precluded. The record is replete with factual issues, and summary judgment is inappropriate.
Material facts are in dispute regarding Galvan's claim for unlawful arrest. According to the warrant complaint, Officer Larsen arrested Galvan for obstructing the administration of law by "trying to enter a business after he was removed by police for disorderly conduct." (Pl. Ex. A.). However, Galvan denies trying to reenter the store after he was told to exit. In addition, Officer Larson indicated in the warrant complaint that Galvan refused to produce identification, while Galvan testified in his deposition that he pulled out his wallet to provide the identification and Officer Larson grabbed it from him. These direct conflicts can not be resolved on a motion for summary judgment.
Material facts are also in dispute regarding Galvan's excessive force claim. Galvan's claim of excessive force is predicated on the assertion that he was pushed to the patrol car and then violently pushed against the trunk of the car, that his handcuffs were too tight, and that when he complained they were tightened even further. Officer Larson disputes Galvan's account, asserting that there was no excessive force used and that Officer Berry checked the handcuffs and decided they were not too tight. As a result of these directly conflicting versions of the facts, summary judgment may not be granted.
Summary judgment on Galvan's wrongful detention claim is also precluded because material issues of fact exist. R. 3:4-1(b) provides that a defendant charged with a disorderly persons offense must be released on a summons by the police unless the officer determines that one of the exceptions set forth, such as the inability to satisfactorily identify the arrested person, is present and a warrant is necessary. See R. 3:4-1(b)(1)(e). Officer Larson maintains that the reason Galvan was not released on a summons was because he failed to provide proper identification. However, Galvan testified at his deposition that he attempted to show Officer Larson his identification but he grabbed his wallet. In addition, Galvan appears to have provided Officer Larsen with all of the identifying information required, as it appears on the arrest report prepared on March 20, 1995, the date of his arrest. (Pl. Ex. B.) Further, Officer Larson's contention that he is not responsible for Galvan's overnight detention because Judge Jorgenson signed the warrant is unavailing; the judge signed the warrant because Officer Larson had informed him that Galvan had not provided satisfactory identification. Therefore, summary judgment is inappropriate.
II. Admission of Municipal Court Plea
Officer Larson also moves to admit Galvan's plea of guilt to the public loitering charge into evidence at the time of trial. As set forth on the record at oral argument on August 23, 1999, this portion of the motion will be granted to the extent that the transcript of proceedings before Judge Robbins at the time that Galvan entered his plea, rather than the plea itself, will be admitted at trial.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part. An appropriate order follows.
O R D E R
This matter having been opened to the Court by the attorneys for defendant Gary Larson on a motion for summary judgment and to admit Plaintiff Melanio O. Galvan's guilty plea into evidence at the time of trial, and notice having been given to all parties, in consideration of the papers submitted, for good cause shown, and for the reasons set forth in the Court's opinion of even date,
IT IS, on this day of August 1999, ORDERED as follows:
1. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
2. Defendant's motion to admit Plaintiff's guilty plea into evidence is GRANTED to the extent that the transcript of proceedings before Judge Robbins at the time that Galvan entered his plea, rather than the plea itself, will be admitted at trial.