( Supra, p. 745.) In referring to county water districts (as well as municipal utility districts) the court in Galt County Water Dist. v. Evans, 10 Cal.App.2d 116 [ 51 P.2d 202], referred to them as "public corporations inferior in power and scope to a municipal corporation" (p. 119); and over a water district — its organization and change of boundaries — the Legislature has plenary control. ( Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. v. All Parties, 6 Cal.2d 197 [ 57 P.2d 506].)
The identity of a special district is not merged in that of another political entity simply because its boundaries are the same as that of the other political entity. ( Los Angeles City SchoolDistrict v. Longden, 148 Cal. 380, 381-382, 385 [ 83 P. 246]; In re Wetmore, 99 Cal. 146, 151 [33 P. 769]; Hancock v. Board of Education, 140 Cal. 554 [ 74 P. 44]; Galt County WaterDistrict v. Evans, 10 Cal.App.2d 116 [ 51 P.2d 202].) (9) The Local Hospital District Law is not invalid because it authorizes a difference in rates to be charged nonresidents.
On proceedings in mandate to compel the performance by the secretary of his official duty in the premises, the court held that the Galt County Water District "still retained power to incur a bonded indebtedness". ( Galt County Water Dist. v. Evans, 10 Cal.App.2d 116 [ 51 P.2d 202].) We do not accept appellants' view that the case of Capuchino Land Co. v. Board of Trustees, 34 Cal.App. 239 [ 167 P. 178], presents facts so "almost identical with those of the present case" as to carry conviction as against the above-quoted provision of section 6a, as construed by the court in the Galt Water District case, supra.
In the absence of constitutional restrictions, the Legislature has plenary power over the organization, boundaries, powers and liabilities of a special district. ( In re Madera Irr. Dist., 92 Cal. 296 [28 P. 272, 675, 27 Am.St.Rep. 106, 14 L.R.A. 755]; Petition of East Fruitvale Sanitary Dist., 158 Cal. 453, 457 [ 111 P. 368]; Galt County Water Dist. v. Evans, 10 Cal.App.2d 116, 118 [ 51 P.2d 202].) Where vested rights are not impaired, the Legislature may enlarge, restrict, modify or abrogate the powers granted to such districts.
To the same effect is La Mesa Homes Co. v. La Mesa etc. Irrigation District, 173 Cal. 121 [ 159 P. 593], involving an irrigation district. (See also Stuckenbruck v. Board of Supervisors, 193 Cal. 506 [ 225 P. 857]; Galt County Water Dist. v. Evans, 10 Cal.App.2d 116 [ 51 P.2d 202]; Dickson v. City of Carlsbad, 119 Cal.App.2d 809 [ 260 P.2d 226]; Oakdale Irr. Dist. v. County of Calaveras, 133 Cal.App.2d 127 [ 283 P.2d 732].) [4] It would therefore clearly appear that when a general law of the state, adopted by the state Legislature, provides for a scheme of public improvement, the scope of which intrudes upon or transcends the boundary of one or several municipalities, together with unincorporated territory, such contemplated improvement ceases to be a municipal affair and comes within the proper domain and regulation of the general laws of the state.
( La Mesa Homes Co. v. La Mesa etc. Irr. Dist., 173 Cal. 121, 125 [ 159 P. 593]; see also Pixley v. Saunders, 168 Cal. 152 [ 141 P. 815].) In Galt County Water Dist. v. Evans, 10 Cal.App.2d 116 [ 51 P.2d 202], it was held that the annexation by the Sacramento Municipal Utility District of the Galt County Water District did not preclude the latter district from the exercise of the power to incur a bonded indebtedness granted by the County Water District Act. The Legislature has expressly provided in section 34075 of the Water Code that lands within a water district may be included within an irrigation district; and section 34077 of the same code provides that such inclusion shall not release the included land from any of the burdens, obligations or liability of the water district; and that such lands shall in all respects continue to be a part of the water district.
It seems very evident from the language of the court that a contrary result would have attained if the California statutes, like those of Colorado here in examination, unequivocally had conferred authority upon the sanitation district to operate within another municipality. That this deduction is warranted appears from the opinion in the later California case of Galt County Water District v. Evans, 10 Cal. App. 2d 116, 51 P.2d 202, wherein, because the legislature of that state subsequently so had provided expressly, the court held that even after its annexation to the Sacramento Municipal Utility District, the involved water district still might exercise the power to incur bonded indebtedness. Concerning the controlling force of legislative expression, and its effect on the Fruitvale case, supra, the court said: "We may fairly assume that the legislature, having in mind a situation similar to that discussed in In Re Sanitary Board of East Fruitvale Sanitary District, supra, deliberately proposed to correct the condition there pointed out and enacted the amendment referred to and has accordingly exercised its power and expressed its legislative intent."
In Morrison v. Smith Bros., Inc., 211 Cal. 36 [ 293 P. 53], it was said that a county water district was a public corporation that may be called a quasi-municipal corporation. In Galt County Water Dist. v. Evans, 10 Cal.App. (2d) 116 [ 51 P.2d 202], county water districts were defined as "public corporations inferior in power and scope to a municipal corporation". In SacramentoM.U. Dist. v. All Parties, etc., 6 Cal. (2d) 197 [ 57 P.2d 506], the Supreme Court said: