Opinion
June 18, 1990
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Gurahian, J.).
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, that branch of the defendant's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as it is asserted by the plaintiff Henry Gallo is granted, and that branch of the complaint is dismissed.
The record contains no evidence of any affirmative misconduct or misrepresentation on the part of the defendant which can be said to have induced the reasonable reliance of the plaintiff Henry Gallo in failing to timely commence this action (see, Matter of Pherbo Realty Corp. v. Board of Assessors, 104 A.D.2d 1037; Elmer v. Village of Honeoye Falls, 100 A.D.2d 734). Contrary to this plaintiff's contention, the ambiguous language contained in the letters confirming the numerous adjournments of the oral examinations to be held pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-h, all of which adjournments were requested by him, cannot be said to constitute the type of written stipulation upon which the First Department relied in Robinson v. City of New York ( 24 A.D.2d 260) in applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel to preclude the defendant city from asserting the Statute of Limitations as a defense. As this court has previously held, estoppel should not lightly be invoked against the State or a subdivision thereof, and will only be so invoked when justified by the facts or when necessary to prevent manifest injustice (Eden v. Board of Trustees, 49 A.D.2d 277, 283-284). Thompson, J.P., Brown, Eiber and Miller, JJ., concur.