Summary
Finding that plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss even though he failed to describe the frequency or the severity of the alleged harassing conduct
Summary of this case from Agostini v. Friendship Village of South HillsOpinion
Civil Action No. 04-01869.
July 20, 2004
MEMORANDUM
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Reginald Gallman asserts that defendant Bethanna Agency d/b/a/ Bethanna Home violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. The first count of the complaint claims that defendant discriminated against plaintiff on account of his religion and that he was subjected to sexually harassing conduct. The second count alleges that defendant retaliated against plaintiff for having reported the allegedly discriminatory and harassing conduct to a supervisor. In Count III of the complaint, plaintiff further contends that defendant violated provisions of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. § 951, et seq. (PHRA). Now before me is defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims for sexual harassment under Title VII and for punitive damages under the PHRA. I will deny the motion as to plaintiff's claims for sexual harassment and will grant it as to plaintiff's claims for punitive damages under the PHRA.
The Court of Appeals has recognized: "The proper analysis under Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act is identical, as Pennsylvania courts have construed the protections of the two acts interchangeably." Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 426 n. 3. (3d Cir. 2001).
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, a Jewish man, was employed by defendant from September 9, 2002 to November 17, 2002. He alleges that, during the course of his employment, Samuel Dominguez, a Residential Manager for defendant, repeatedly harassed him because of his religion, advising him he was doomed to Hell if he did not believe in Jesus, accusing him of practicing witchcraft and even contacting him at home to chide him for not being a Christian.
Plaintiff further alleges that he was subjected to sexual harassment during the course of his employment. He asserts that he was repeatedly sexually propositioned by representatives of defendant and that, on at least one occasion, an unnamed supervising clinician at defendant's facility flashed her breasts at him.
Plaintiff asserts that on November 7, 2002, he asked Rodriguez to stop making disparaging comments about his religious beliefs. He alleges that on November 9, 2002, he was suspended without pay "for allegedly allowing several residents to smoke on the premises as well as alleging [sic] that Plaintiff took several of the residents home to have sexual relations with his wife." (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 23). On November 14, 2002, before plaintiff could meet with representatives of defendant to discuss Dominguez's allegedly disparaging treatment, plaintiff was summarily discharged for allegedly not having enough educational credits to continue as an employee at the residential facility. On November 19, 2002, plaintiff filed a complaint with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (PHRC) alleging he was both sexually harassed and harassed because of his religion while employed by defendant.
III. STANDARD FOR RULE 12(b)(6)
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss examines the sufficiency of the complaint. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957). In determining the sufficiency of the complaint I must accept all of the plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom. Graves v. Lowery, 117 F.3d 723, 726 (3d Cir. 1997).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the Rules require is "a short and plain statement of the claim" that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.Id., quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47. I should not inquire as to whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but only whether he is entitled to offer evidence to support his claims.See Oatway v. Am. Int'l Group, Inc., 325 F.3d 184, 187 (3d Cir. 2003). "Thus, [I will] not grant a motion to dismiss 'unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Graves, 117 F.3d at 726, quoting, Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46.
IV. DISCUSSION A. Claim for Sexual Harassment/Hostile Work Environment under Title VII
Accepting all plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom, I find he has pled sufficient facts to withstand a motion to dismiss his claim of sexual harassment under Title VII. Under Title VII and the PHRA it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.Weston v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 425 (3d Cir. 2001), citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). A plaintiff must establish five elements to assert a successful hostile work environment claim against his or her employer: (1) the employee suffered intentional discrimination because of his or her sex; (2) the discrimination was pervasive and regular; (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff; (4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same sex in that position; and (5) respondeat superior liability existed. Knabe v. Boury Corp., 114 F.3d 407, 410 (3d Cir. 1997).
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), the Supreme Court first recognized claims for hostile work environment sexual harassment under this provision of Title VII. However, the Court emphasized that "not all workplace conduct that may be described as 'harassment' affects a 'term, condition, or privilege' of employment within the meaning of Title VII."Id. at 67. Rather, "[f]or sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Id. (internal quote omitted). In determining whether a work environment is objectively hostile, courts are required to examine "all the circumstances," including "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)'s lenient notice pleading requirement, a plaintiff must simply plead sufficient facts to "give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). Plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to give defendant fair notice of the grounds for his claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment. Where plaintiff has alleged defendant's representatives subjected him to repeated sexual advances and other allegedly hostile conduct, it does not appear "clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the [plaintiff's] allegations."Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514, citing Hishon v. King Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). Although plaintiff does not describe the frequency or severity of the alleged harassing conduct, his allegations are nevertheless sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. "Complaints 'need not plead law or match facts to every element of a legal theory'" Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 429 (3d Cir. 2001), quoting Krieger v. Fadely, 211 F.3d 134, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (further citations omitted). Plaintiff should be entitled to offer evidence to support his claim that he was subjected to hostile work environment sexual harassment in violation of Title VII. I will deny defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims for sexual harassment.
B. Claim for Punitive Damages under the PHRA
Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that punitive damages are not available under the PHRA, Hoy v. Angelone, 720 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 1998), I will grant defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim for punitive damages.