The order of the Supreme Court, commencing liquidation proceedings of the National Surety Company was entered on or about June 1, 1934, pursuant to the Insurance Law (Cons. Laws, ch. 28; § 404, subd. 1). By virtue of this order the Superintendent as liquidator was vested with all causes of action theretofore vested in the company, including any causes of action against former directors. (Insurance Law, § 404, subd. 2; Isaac v. Marcus, 258 N.Y. 257, 268; Gallin v. Burdick, 265 N.Y. 492. ) Petitioner, however, urges that here the action is not brought by the Superintendent as rehabilitator liquidator, but by bondholders, other creditors, and stockholders, and that, therefore, petitioner has an absolute right to intervene. It is a complete answer to this contention that a court of equity, by virtue of its supervision over all phases of the liquidation of a financial corporation, possesses full discretion to permit or deny an application for intervention. The conduct of the liquidation is subject in all its phases to the supervision and control of the court, except in so far as the Legislature may have vested discretionary power in the Superintendent.

Thus, the Court of Appeals found there that the statutory scheme of New York's insurance laws confers upon "the Supreme Court, with the agency of the Superintendent * * * exclusive jurisdiction of claims both for and against an insurance company" (supra, at 250). Other cases have held that the right of the Superintendent of Insurance to bring an action is paramount and exclusive (see, Gallin v. Burdick, 152 Misc. 468, affd 241 App. Div. 888, affd 265 N.Y. 492; Matter of Allcity Ins. Co. [Kondak], 66 A.D.2d 531, 534-535, appeal dismissed in part, denied in part 48 N.Y.2d 629). In Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. (supra), which is relied upon by the defendants and discussed above, the Supreme Court determined that the trustee in reorganization did not have standing for reasons which are not present in this action.